Artículos

 

Typology of irrigation institutions and water governance through horizontal agreements

 

Tipología de instituciones de riego y gobernabilidad del agua mediante acuerdos horizontales

 

Jacinta Palerm-Viqueira

 

Colegio de Postgraduados. Km 35.6 Carretera México-Texcoco. Montecillo. Texcoco. Estado de Mexico, México. (jpalerm@colpos.mx)

 

Recibido: agosto, 2014.
Aprobado: abril, 2015.

 

Abstract

An argument is made for a typology of the diversity of self-governance. On the one hand, decentralized or centralized governance, and bureaucratic or non-bureaucratic water management. On the other hand the existence of networks of horizontal agreements with no overarching institutions.

Key words: self-governance, irrigation systems, bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic management, networks.

 

Resumen

Se presenta un argumento a favor de una tipología de la diversidad del autogobierno. Por un lado, el gobierno descentralizado o centralizado, y la gestión burocrática o no burocrática del agua. Por otra parte, la existencia de redes de acuerdos horizontales sin instituciones de alcance global.

Palabras clave: autogobierno, sistemas de irrigación, gestión burocrática y no burocrática, redes.

 

Introduction

Research on the existence and capacities of self-governance organizations for the management of irrigation systems has seen important advances in recent years. There are a growing number of case studies, greater systematization of case study analyses and, as a result, a greater capacity to perform comparative analyses and to establish typologies. However, concepts such as self-governance and bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic management are still vague, as well as their implications. Also, research attention has centered on irrigation system institutions, with little attention to interactions between institutions, or to other water users' institutions.

In this paper, on the one hand, concepts such as self-governance and bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic water management will be reviewed, as well as the concept of centralized/ decentralized self-governance, which is, in fact, another name for organizational levels. The nexus between organizational type and land tenure size as well as irrigation system size will also be reviewed briefly; and, finally, some implications of different organizational types (decentralized self-governance and non-bureaucratic management/ centralized self-governance and bureaucratic management) will be established, illustrated with data from an in-depth case study that raise doubts about the benefits of bureaucratic management and centralized self-governance.

It is proposed that land tenure and irrigation system size are relevant in choosing the most sustainable organizational design, and that fringe benefits such as "empowerment" through development of local capabilities are important for small landholders.

On the other hand, cases in which irrigation institutions establish horizontal agreements between themselves, without creating a new institution or organizational tier, will be reviewed. In all the cases under consideration either the irrigation system tract is not well-defined or the irrigation systems overlap; the irrigation system and the irrigation institution are not isomorphic; or they involve river management, falling outside the sphere of a discrete, well-defined "irrigation system" with its authority structure (Hunt, 1988)¹. Besides developing the concept of horizontal agreements, the way in which negotiation and horizontal agreements take place in these non-discrete, not well-defined irrigation systems, is described.

These cases are theoretically interesting, as the horizontal agreements lack a governance body, except for the agreement itself, and lack a specific management body. These cases show that a lack of institutions does not necessarily mean a lack of governance. Horizontal agreements distance themselves from the technocratic or bureaucratic model for water management (Guillet, 2006). And, thus, also with some of the conclusions of the so-called hydraulic hypothesis (Wittfogel, 1957).

 

Typology of irrigation institutions: self-governance and bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic management

Evidence from case studies allows us to propose that institutions for the administration of irrigation systems can be typified: (a) by governance type; that is, governance by the irrigators themselves ("self-governance") or by the State; or (b) by management type, non-bureaucratic or bureaucratic; that is, when irrigators themselves carry out fundamental tasks on the basis of a body of accumulated local knowledge, filling all of the necessary positions from among their ranks, the management type is non-bureaucratic –and might be properly called "self-management"; and, when fundamental tasks are done by hired specialized or professional staff, the management type is bureaucratic (Palerm-Viqueira, 2006, 2002).

It is likely that the capacity for non-bureaucratic management may be limited by the size of the system; but there are non-bureaucratic organizations that operate systems that are as large as 10 000 hectares, that is, medium-sized systems. The irrigation system size is measured as irrigated surface: small, a few hundred hectares to 2000-3000 hectares; medium, 3000 to 15 000 hectares; and large, 20 000-50 000, to 100 000 hectares and more (Palerm-Viqueira, 2006, 2002).

The typical organizational design of non-bureaucratic management is in organizational levels or tiers, and these are related to the operational levels of the irrigation system. This organizational design has been described and analyzed in explicit terms by Pradhan (1989), Yoder (Yoder, 1994a, 1994b) and Ostrom (1990), and is also one of Ostrom's organizational principles for sustainable institutions.

Although this organizational design is also found in bureaucratic management of irrigation systems, it is probably mandatory for the non-bureaucratic management of the larger irrigation systems where land tenure is characterized by small-scale farms, due to the number of people involved. The predominance of small-scale farmers in an irrigation system means there is a multitude of irrigators even in small systems, and more so in medium-sized irrigation systems; a system with an irrigated surface of 10 000 hectares can have some 4000 irrigators.

Organizational tiers of bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic management, as well as different governance-type tiers, can also be found. For the management of storage reservoirs and for river administration, and for large irrigation systems, the organization of the lower operational levels, such as the field irrigation ditches or the irrigation system itself, can be non-bureaucratic; however, the higher one moves in the operational levels, the use of technical staff becomes the norm, thus, there is bureaucratic management. Governance of the larger infrastructure, such as storage reservoirs, is usually reserved to government (State) institutions with few cases of co-governance or participation of irrigators' organizations (Freeman and Lowdermilk, 1985; Maass and Anderson, 1978; Palerm-Viqueira et al., 2000; Pimentel-Equihua and Palerm-Viqueira, 2009; Price, 1994; Salcedo, 2006, 2005).

The evidence also indicates that the cases of non-bureaucratic management are apparently associated with a pattern of land tenure of peasant smallholders or small-scale farmers (Palerm-Viqueira, 2006, 2002). For example, in México, the few large-scale farmers in irrigation systems with prevailing peasant land tenure and non-bureaucratic management opt for hiring a local person to fulfill their obligations in operational tasks, instead of investing their own labor².

Haciendas or very large farms also follow a different pattern. In México, haciendas either had control of the whole irrigation system or had to deal with few other hacienda owners and with powerless peasant communities. Each hacienda sent its own employees to guard over the water and do maintenance work, and social arrangements between users of the same irrigation systems seem to have been largely informal (Castañeda, 2004; Lipsett-Rivera, 1999; Sánchez Rodríguez, 2001; see also Hunt, 1988).

The evidence for the United States, where medium and large farms are typical, is that although governance is in the hands of the irrigators, management is usually bureaucratic, except where the pattern of land tenure is characterized by small-scale farms and the irrigation systems are small, such as the acequias of New Mexico (Rivera, 1998) or in Utah, where although the formal management is bureaucratic, in fact the "hired staff" are the irrigators themselves (Maass and Anderson, 1978, pp: 332–359). Case studies of management types for irrigation systems, with prevailing land tenure of medium or large farms, would be interesting. For example, in the Lemoore Canal case, the elected president of the "committee" is also Chief Engineer; that is, it is seemingly a case of non-bureaucratic management, but the available information on land tenure is insufficient to establish the farm size, although it does not seem to be characterized by small-scale farms (Maass and Anderson, 1978, p. 196; Palerm-Viqueira, 2006).

Non-bureaucratic management seems to be an interesting option for small and medium sized irrigation systems, as it is linked with other characteristics. The evidence from case studies of non-bureaucratic management characterized by peasant land tenure shows that these peasant institutions for water management can have a centuries old sustainability, for example the Spanish comunidades de regantes (Glick, 1970; Maass and Anderson, 1978; Ostrom, 1990), or the New Mexico acequias (Rivera, 1998). Institutional sustainability is also linked to the social capacity towards sustainability of the irrigation works; Rivera (pers. comm.) argues that small-scale irrigation systems with simple technology allow irrigators to maintain and repair the irrigation system with their own pool of local knowledge and capacities and, therefore, make the irrigation systems more sustainable. Also due consideration should be given to Worster's proposal that technocratic management and sophisticated and expensive technology favor large farms (Worster, 1985, pp: 202–203, 215, 248–249).

Another interesting factor linked to non-bureaucratic management is that local organizational capacities in irrigation management and governance allow the use of these capacities in developing new enterprises. This has been established in Indian experiences developing community-based water resources (Agarwal et al., 2001, pp: xxvii, 4142, 191, 297)³ or, for New Mexico, in the link between the acequia tradition of non-bureaucratic management and self-governance and the evolution of sociedades mutualistas (Rivera, pers. comm.). The social impact of developing local capacities, which can be called "empowerment", is best seen where there is an almost total absence of local organization such as in the black rural communities of South Africa, totally dependent on State provision of domestic water (N. Jha, pers. comm.).

However, policies for IMT (Irrigation Management Transfer) seem to favor bureaucratic management and attention is centered in changing the governance of the irrigation systems and not the management type. For example, the World Bank turnover model case is bureaucratic; that is, although governance is in the hands of the irrigators, operation is in the hands of hired technical staff. This organizational model is a Mexican contribution and has been also used in Turkey (Groenfeldt, 1997; Groenfeldt and Sun, 1996; Palerm-Viqueira, 2006, 2002; Svendsen and Nott, 1999; The World Bank Participation Sourcebook, 1996).

In fact, technical staff is thought as necessary by some IMT experts, even for small and medium sized irrigation systems; in the case of medium-sized irrigation systems because they cannot operate without technical staff, and in the case of small irrigation systems because otherwise they are "stuck in a low-level technology trap". IMT experts propose associating various small irrigation systems so they can afford an adequate technical staff (Johnson III, 2002)⁴.

The assumption is that the technocrats will work for the good of the irrigation system and the irrigators, but, as with State institutions staffed with technocrats and charged with irrigation management, this assumption may be wishful thinking. Bureaucratic management has its own set of problems, even with self-governance.

For example, the Cuautla River Water Association had a formal organizational design based on the Mexican model: self-governance and bureaucratic management, and it followed the IMT experts' recommendation: the association of small irrigation systems; however, water distribution was not to the satisfaction of the irrigators.

The following description is based on an in-depth case study of the Cuautla River Water Association, financed by the Mexican National Water Agency (Comisión Nacional del Agua), with the commitment of making a working draft of bylaws for the Cuautla River Water Association, and that the working draft should be based on a participatory methodology (Palerm-Viqueira et al., 2001).

The Cuautla River Water Association, México, is an irrigation module (módulo de riego), belonging to the Morelos Irrigation District, turned over in the 1990s. The Cuautla River Water Association is comprised by 29 irrigation systems, sharing the same river but not the same infrastructure. Although the irrigated surface totals some 10 to 13 thousand hectares, only four of the irrigation systems have more than a thousand hectares and of these only one has two thousand hectares. The formal organizational design for governance is an assembly of representatives; each community has one representative even if they belong to more than one irrigation system. The assembly elects a committee (president, secretary and treasurer), and the committee is in charge of hiring the Chief Engineer (gerente técnico), ditch riders and office staff. Governance and management are centralized –and not decentralized in each irrigation system.

The 2001-2002 organizational diagnostic that preceded the bylaws working draft established that, dating from pre- turnover days, each community (ejido) had self-governance institutions and a non-bureaucratic management for the community operational level of the irrigation systems, and that the communities sharing the same main canal of an irrigation system had a non-bureaucratic system in place for maintenance. The Water Association was formally in charge of water distribution in each irrigation system through a ditch rider, but the 2001-2002 organizational diagnostic established that not every irrigation system had a ditch rider, and that even with a ditch rider water distribution was problematic. It was also established that there was a grassroots movement for a multi-community organizational tier in each irrigation system, which entails decentralized self-governance for each irrigation system and involvement of local users in management tasks, particularly vigilance of correct water distribution.

The tail end irrigation system on the river, the one with more water shortages (Mirador), had already established written bylaws for self-governance and non-bureaucratic management before the 2001-2002 organizational diagnostic; in other irrigation systems community authorities informed the Chief Engineer about negotiated inter-community water distribution agreements, or the Chief Engineer met with community authorities to see if they could arrive at inter-community water distribution agreements. Other smaller irrigation systems with no water shortages and which had no Water Association ditch riders, had reached a satisfactory solution for all the irrigators, such as hiring the same person to irrigate their fields, since this person functioned as a de facto ditch rider deciding on water distribution between his clients.

The grassroots movement for a multi-community organizational tier in each irrigation system, also pushed by the Chief Engineer's de facto negotiations with the authorities of the communities in a given irrigation system, was reinforced by our own organizational proposal (bylaws working draft) to the Cuautla River Water Association and in fact was backed both by the technical staff and by the elected committee, as it was felt by all that consensus and vigilance by same irrigation system users was necessary to establish an equitable and predictable water supply for all. The desired change was from a centralized self-governance and bureaucratic management towards a decentralized self-governance and non-bureaucratic management.

Other more or less serious problems for the Cuautla River Water Association were lack of control by the irrigators over the monies paid by them to the Water Association as water service, and lack of authority to negotiate with other water users; for example, regarding the use of the river to dump municipal and industrial residual waters and the new groundwater users, which were on the one hand having an impact on water quality and on the other depleting spring sources for the Cuautla river flow. Professional staff such as engineers and accountants was of no help towards controlling monies or evaluating and negotiating water quality and medium-range water availability for the Cuautla River Water Association.

Another assumption made by IMT experts is that modernization is "good" and that technical staff will modernize; but even if we accept that modernization is "good", technical staff may have no interest in modernization; that is, the Cuautla River Chief Engineer was making no effort towards modernization. On the other hand, technical expertise can be hired on a temporary basis by non-bureaucratic irrigation organizations, such as in the Nexapa case, where they hired a construction company that did most of its work for the Mexico City subway system, to fix a tunnel that is an integral part of the irrigation system (Rodríguez Meza, 1998; Rodríguez Meza and Palerm-Viqueira, 2003).

 

Water governance through horizontal agreements

The above topics need more analysis, however in this paper we also want to call attention to another organizational design, perhaps less widespread; it can be briefly described as horizontal agreements between institutions that do not lead to the creation of a new institution or organizational tier to deal with water distribution, maintenance and monitoring. By absence of a new organizational tier or new institution, we mean that there is no specific governance body made up by the parts that arrived at the agreement⁵.

We review a series of cases of horizontal agreements, in some cases creating networks of horizontal agreements between water user associations, peasant communities and irrigators. Most of the cases reviewed are based on the in-depth case study of the Cuautla River Water Association in the state of Morelos, as well as case studies of other irrigation systems in Morelos. The predominance of cases from the state of Morelos has to do with the high density of irrigation systems in the state, as well as the high density of case studies done in the state by the same research group. Horizontal agreements were also reported in Valle de Tehuacán, in the state of Puebla, also with a high density of case studies.

In all of these cases horizontal agreements fall outside the sphere of a discrete, well-defined "irrigation system" (Hunt, 1988). That is, the cases refer to situations where the irrigation system tract is not well-defined, the irrigation systems overlap, and the irrigation system and the irrigation institution are not isomorphic or refer to river management⁶. Thus, horizontal agreements create a network of water governance, with no overarching institutions. Horizontal agreements, seen from the point of view of irrigation forcing into existence management structures (Wittfogel, 1957), seem to be in a special theoretical case.

In the cases we review, horizontal agreements are formal or explicit. However, horizontal agreements (i.e., absence of an institution or organizational tier), are not always as clear cut, as it is not always obvious if there is an institution, because many non-bureaucratic and self-governance organizations have non-official or non-State recognized institutions, thus making the institution itself "invisible". Also, when water is abundant it appears as if there is an absence of organization, since governance, management and irrigation officials and staff change in the course of a year, from one year to another, and between user groups that belong to the same irrigation system (Palerm-Viqueira, 2001; Palerm Viquiera, 2003). On the other hand, informal horizontal agreements can fall into the category of local culture customary rights, such as in New Mexico with water sharing between acequias of the available river water; this local culture customary right is in contradiction with the "first in time, first in right" that is being pushed by water legislators in New Mexico. In fact, the acequia mayordomos would have to get together to implement the local customary right in water scarcity situations, thus implementing horizontal agreements based on customary rights and precedents of when to declare water scarcity, how much water should be shared, and who should irrigate first (Crawford, 1988).

Notwithstanding the above, the concept of horizontal agreements helps observe and analyze networks of horizontal agreements between water users' associations, peasant communities and irrigators that span over medium and large irrigation tracts without creating institutions, without a schema of organizational levels and, of course, with a complete absence of bureaucracy (Guillet, 2006). Non-bureaucratic management, as well as horizontal agreements, breaks with the technocratic model for water management.

 

Horizontal agreements between institutions – case review

Case 1. Tehuacán Valley (based on Campos et al., 2000)

In the Tehuacán Valley there are some 10 000 or more hectares (24 710 acres) of irrigated land. The sources of irrigation water include numerous springs, qanats, deep wells and some river water. No single source has a defined command area. An active water market and a complex network of canals makes it possible to carry irrigation waters to a variety of places, so it is impossible to tell exactly where the water will go. To further complicate matters, ownership of water rights, canals and land is in different hands, including private individuals, ejidos and indigenous communities; and there are three means of access to them: private ownership, sharecropping arrangements (mediería) and rental (including payment for the use of canals). Governance institutions for qanats and canal tracts are sociedades de aguas (water societies) composed of the individuals that have water rights, governance institutions for springs, deep wells and river water and canal tracts are juntas de aguas or unidades de riego that are community or ejido based, and some communities or ejidos have canal tracts but no community-based water rights.

The Tehuacán Valley case can be analyzed, from a point of view of looking purely at infrastructure, as comprising one system or a multitude of interlocking systems; but from a governance point of view they are clearly distinct with horizontal social arrangements making possible the water flow from a water source to a given plot through canals.

Case 2. Achololes and achololeras in the irrigation systems of the Cuautla River (based on Pimentel-Equihua and Palerm Viquiera, 2001; Palerm-Viqueira et al., 2001; Rodríguez Haros et al., 2004). See Figure 1 and Figure 2.

The water users' association of the Cuautla River comprises 29 systems, irrigating some 10 000 hectares and, from the viewpoint of the offtakes, each canal is a discrete irrigation system; however, from the point of view of the acholol water, it is one system, as acholol water flows from one canal-system to another.

Local water users define achololes as "water that comes from other field plots or other community fields". Acholol water is the excess water that drains from a field after irrigation, is captured by drainage canals called achololeras and used to irrigate lower-lying fields. Local water users use the term "encadenamiento del agua" (water chaining) when the acholol water from an irrigated plot is re-used by guiding the acholol to another plot to augment the irrigation water right or as sole water source. When the acholol water flows beyond the possibility of being used in a field, the water users of the field call this acholol water "aguas muertas" or "achololes muertos" (dead water). However the acholol water continues its downhill course and flows directly into other canals of the irrigation systems of the Cuautla River Water Association or flows into the Cuautla River where it is lifted by downstream irrigation systems, also of the Cuautla River Water Association. During the dry season (March-May) the use of achololes for irrigated agriculture is critical.

The term acholol and the use of this water, in the form of "encadenamiento del agua", are present in other regions in Mexico; what is outstanding in the Cuautla case is the extent of the acholol water. The area covered is some 10 000 hectares.

The importance and extent of achololes comes most forcibly to attention during the dry season. Flow in the Cuautla River begins with two large springs; several irrigation systems use this water and excess water flows into the Cuautla River. Downstream, a small dam lifts all the water in the river, at the next dam water is again present and, again, it is all lifted, leaving the river bed dry; this continues downstream. This puzzle has to do with small springs on the river bed and with acholol water. It is also possible that the springs on the river bed are related to subsurface drainage of irrigation water.

Quantifying acholol water is technically complex, but observation was made of achololeras draining acholol water into the Cuautla river, and it was possible to make a chart of acholol flow because irrigators from a given irrigation system knew what irrigation system they "gave" achololes to, and they knew from what irrigation system they "received" achololes.

Also, due to a conflict over acholol water rights, it was found that acholol waters follow not only man-made achololeras (drainage canals) but also follow social arrangements. In the case in point, the written agreements date from the 1950's and were made between the communities that "gave" achololes and the communities that were asking for permission to use the achololes and build an achololera (drainage canal). An attempt was made, also in the 1950's, to register the water use as a water right with the National Water Agency (Secretaría de Recursos Hidráulicos), but the Agency's answer was that due to the occasional and therefore non-measurable characteristic of the water, it was not possible to establish a water right, although due permission was given for the drainage canal construction.

Acholol water users have their own institution for achololera maintenance and acholol water distribution; the institution for the irrigation system that "gives" the achololes does not participate in the institution of acholol water users, and these do not participate in maintenance and other tasks of the irrigation system that generates the achololes. It is a horizontal agreement.

Although the acholol water flow through achololeras may be seen as a prolongation of an irrigation system, from the viewpoint of the local water culture influenced by the national legal interpretation in the 1950's, and from the viewpoint of governance, they are different systems.

Guillet (2006) describes something very similar for the Orbigo Valley irrigated by the Duero River, in Spain. Small irrigation systems generate return waters, locally called agua perdida (lost water) and there are horizontal agreements between irrigation systems, dating from the 15^th, 16^th and 18^th centuries, so return water goes directly from one system to the other instead of returning the water to the river.

Something similar is also seen in the French East Pyrenees, close to the city of Perpignan, where in a strange twist, there was a long-standing conflict between two irrigation systems, where the one upstream refused to pass the return water to the lower-lying irrigation system and, on purpose, directed the return water flow to the river; however, other irrigation systems in the region had long standing amicable horizontal agreements for the use of return flows (Pimentel-Equihua and Palerm Viquiera, 2001).

Case 3. River management. The Cuautla River Water Association and the Watercress Producers Association (based on Ávalos and Palerm-Viqueira, 2003; Palerm-Viqueira et al., 2001)

The Cuautla River bed, close to the springs, is used for watercress production. Watercress is a semiaquatic crop and requires damming and spreading the river flow. Although the river bed is federal property, watercress producers have a special permit to use the river bed.

The Cuautla River Water Association, composed by 29 small irrigation systems, and the Watercress Producers Association signed an agreement in 1990 whereby watercress production must cease at the beginning of the dry season.

The conflict, negotiation and agreement between the Cuautla River Water Association and the Watercress Producer Association is based on the local conviction that the main source of irrigation water for all the downstream systems is the two large springs located upstream where the perennial flow in the Cuautla River begins, under the principle that as less water enters the upstream irrigation system, less water is drained as achololes. Irrigators from the tail irrigation system of the Cuautla River Water Association say that suspension of watercress production means up to a 30 % increase in irrigation water during the dry season.

In two specially dry years, 1992 and 2002, all the irrigators of the Cuautla River Water Association, by arrangement, took up their spades and in an orderly and pacific fashion went along the river bed destroying watercress crops and the infrastructure to dam and spread the river flow.

The horizontal agreement between associations as well as the effective mobilization of the irrigators to destroy the watercress crops is another evidence of the importance and extent of acholol water.

Case 4. River management. The Cuautla River Water Association and the Tenango Canal Water Association (based on Palerm-Viqueira et al., 2001; Rivas, 2005, 2004, 2000)

The Tenango Canal dam offtake is located between two dams of the Cuautla River Water Association, but for diverse historical reasons does not belong to the Cuautla River Water Association. The agreement between them was signed in 1999, and consists in a statement of mutual recognition of water rights, of adjustment of water use in the dry season in proportion to each association's water rights, and finally in the Tenango Canal giving due notice when it begins canal maintenance so that the downstream irrigation systems of the Cuautla River Water Association may anticipate using water from the Tenango Canal.

As the preceding case, it is a horizontal agreement for river management.

Case 5. Exchange of irrigation water for jagüey (small reservoir) use (based on Rivas, 2000).

The Tenango community had, at some point in time, access to water from the Amatzinac River and still has the water right, but this water is being appropriated by upstream water users on the Amatzinac River. The water from the Amatzinac River for the Tenango community was introduced into a small reservoir, but with no water, the reservoir had no use. At the same time, another community, Santa Ana, has access and the due water right to water from the Cuautla River transported through the Tenango Canal, and this canal goes though the Tenango community, but Santa Ana has no reservoir. Both communities negotiated an agreement in 1986 so that Santa Ana could use the reservoir. Santa Ana, in exchange for the use of the reservoir, gave the Tenango community 20 lps of Santa Ana's water right. The Tenango community also has to perform the maintenance tasks on the main canal and pay the water service fee to the Tenango Canal Water Association (Junta de Aguas Canal Tenango, A.C.). The first written agreement was signed by community authorities and the authorities of the Tenango Canal Water Association, and by an officer of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (Secretaría de Agricultura y Recursos Hidráulicos); the agreement was ratified by community authorities in 1998 before a federal government institution (the Procuraduría Agraria).

The Tenango community reservoir used to belong to another irrigation system that took its water from the Amatzinac River; nowadays, however, it is an integral part of the Tenango Canal that carries water from the Cuautla River. Through the agreement between the two communities, the Tenango community began its participation in the Tenango Canal, in water rights and in maintenance work. Probably, governance representation in the Tenango Canal Water Association is only through the Santa Ana community. The agreement between the Tenango and Santa Ana communities is horizontal and no new organizational tier has been created; each community checks that the other community is fulfilling the agreement terms.

 

Conclusions

Traditional indigenous organizations and those of newly turned-over irrigation systems feel very different in the field. What is the basis for this felt difference? The first obvious difference is the newness of the organizations of turnover irrigation systems, but even new indigenous organizations feel different. Our attempt is to isolate those characteristics that make for the felt difference in the field. That is: a) bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic management, where non bureaucratic management goes hand-in-hand with the existence of a local knowledge system; b) centralized and decentralized self-government, where decentralized government means the proliferation of organizational levels. Non-bureaucratic management, as well as proliferation of organization levels, implies organizational density that reinforces the local knowledge system: most everybody has to participate at some level of government and management and so has to learn. Self-management or non-bureaucratic management, decentralized self-governance and horizontal agreements for water governance and management demonstrate the capabilities of peasant irrigators. Peasant or small scale farmers have the know-how and can use this practical knowledge and organizational base for other endeavors. On the other hand, bureaucratic management, centralized self-governance and large-scale irrigation works and institutions may also signify the end of local knowledge systems and peasant communities' empowerment.

A horizontal agreement, apart from being a fact that shows peasant capabilities towards water governance and management, is theoretically puzzling. The evidence from the Pyrenees, from Spain, shows that the horizontal agreements may be of very long standing. Technological change, new water national legislation, and increased competition for the available water, are all possible reasons for breaking with horizontal agreements, but also the reinforcement and formalization of old-standing agreements, such as the New Mexico acequieros' defense of water sharing between acequias in water scarcity situations, instead of the proposed "first in time, first in right". Studies on types of horizontal agreements and cases of horizontal agreements newly arrived at, are needed, but we can point out that lack of institutions does not necessary mean lack of governance.

 

Acknowledgements

Most if not all the research is based upon work supported by CONACYT under Grants No. U 39682-S, 30479-S and 3242P-S9607, as well as a project contracted with CNA (project num. CNA-GDUR-CP-05/2001). Many thanks to Jose Rivera who made comments on the paper, as well as to Guillet with whom I exchanged emails on his paper "Rethinking Irrigation Efficiency: Canal Systems in Northwestern Spain".

 

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Notes

¹Also called "self-management", but as we wish to distinguish governance from management, we will use the term "self-governance".

²This observation has come out in all case studies of the research group "Organización Social y Riego", but has not been systematically recorded.

³For example: "Another interesting dimension of community-based rain water harvesting is that it helps to generate a community spirit within the village ... and to build up what economists call 'social capital'." (Agarwal et al., 2001, p. XXVII).

⁴For example: "Too much of the IMT literature uses a one-model-fits-all approach that ignores the scale and engineering complexity of a system. Small irrigation for 100-300 ha systems in countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, etc. have been sustained for hundreds of years with village level irrigators and management by village government officials. In these cases, much of the ISF payment can be in kind and the bulk of the maintenance requirements can be carried out by volunteer labor. On the other hand, 3000 to 20 000 ha irrigation associations in countries such as Mexico, Colombia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Albania, etc. require a higher level of management and, depending upon the degree of technical sophistication, a higher level of staffing. In these more technical irrigation systems, associations have cash costs for their staff as well as for technical maintenance activities such as dredging canals. Governance is by the board of users and management by hired or contracted staff -and ISF is paid by users to cover the costs of O&M. (...) A very interesting intervention (No. 75) by Charles Burt illustrates the problem of the small-scale systems. They are too small to have economies of scale and consequently they are stuck in a low-level technology trap. To increase their technical level of management they need to hire professional staff, yet they cannot do this as long as ISF is paid in kind and with volunteer labor. They also cannot justify modernizing their systems as the system is too small to bear the costs. Mexico realized very quickly that their WUAs had to be large enough to spread the fixed costs of maintaining a professional O&M staff. In recognition of this fact at present a number of small WUAs are sharing office facilities while other WUAs are combining together to reach the economies of scale needed to maintain a professional O&M program. In other countries, federating WUAs into FOs along a secondary or tertiary supply channel is one means of maintaining small, local WUAs but also creating critical economies of scale for improved management." (Johnson III, 2002).

⁵See Hunt (1988) for concepts of administrative authority [management] and authority structure [governance].

⁶How these cases and others link to the policies for river basin management, should be explored. The Mexican consejos de cuenca are paying very little or no attention to local problems in terms of management or governance.