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Computación y Sistemas

On-line version ISSN 2007-9737Print version ISSN 1405-5546

Comp. y Sist. vol.27 n.1 Ciudad de México Jan./Mar. 2023  Epub June 16, 2023

https://doi.org/10.13053/cys-27-1-4541 

Articles of the thematic section

An Alternative Definition of Stable Models Via Łukasiewicz Logic

Mauricio Osorio1  * 

Aldo Figallo-Orellano2 

Diego Huerta1 

11 Universidad de las Américas Puebla, Departamento de Actuaría, Física y Matemáticas, Mexico. diego.huertaoa@udlap.mx.

22 Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Departamento de Informática e Matemática Aplicada, Brazil. aldofigallo@gmail.com.


Abstract:

Extensions of G3 (3-valued Gödel logic) were studied as tools for knowledge representation and nonmonotonic reasoning. One of these extensions was studied and baptized as G3 by Osorio et al. as a tool to define semantics of logic programming. In this work, we will explore the possibility to use another fuzzy logic for knowledge representation. In particular, we show that Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic (for short, Ł3) can be used for knowledge representation based on logic programming. Firstly, we prove that the definition of stable model for Ł3 is equivalent to the obtained through G3 for augmented programs, but when we consider more general programs we obtain more answers for stable models on Ł3 than G3. Finally, we present and explore a new definition of stable model based on Lukasiewicz n-valued logic via the use of Monteiro-Baaz Δ operator.

Keywords: Knowledge representation; stable semantics; Łukasiewicz logic

1 Introduction

Answer set programming (ASP) is a form of declarative programming based on the stable model (answer set) semantics of logic programming.

Recall that stable semantics allows us to handle problems with default knowledge and produce non-monotonic reasoning using the concept of negation as failure.

It was originally defined for the class of theories called normal programs [11]. Currently, ASP is robust and mature enough, offering many important language constructs like aggregation, (weak) constraints, different types of negations, and optimization statements to mention a few, as high-performance solvers do.

An example of a state-of-the-art and award-winning ASP solver is clasp [9] demonstrating its competitiveness and versatility, by winning first places at various solver contests since 2011 (e.g., ASP, CASC, MISC, PB, and SAT competitions).

The efficiency of such programs has increased the list of practical applications in the areas of planning, logical agents and artificial intelligence.

On the other hand, the term fuzzy logic emerged in the development of the theory of fuzzy sets by Zadeh in 1965, [14, 24].

Although the concept of uncertainty had been studied by philosophers, the significance of Zadeh’s work was that it challenged not only probability theory, as the sole agent for uncertainty, but also the very foundations upon which probability theory is based: Aristotelian two-valued logic.

When A is a fuzzy-set and x is a relevant object, the proposition “x is a member of A” is not necessarily either true or false, as required by two-valued logic, but it may be true to some degree, the degree at which x is actually a member of A [15].

Furthermore, fuzzy logic was introduced to study the question of uncertainty from a foundational point of view based on many-valued logics. In this sense, fuzzy logic can be considered as a degree-based approach to uncertainty.

Some systems like Łukasiewicz, product and Gödel logics are, just like fuzzy sets, valued over the real interval [0,1]. This supports the idea of fuzzy logic being as a kind of foundational counterpart of fuzzy set theory which is a discipline mainly devoted to engineering applications.

In particular, the infinite-valued Lukasiewicz logic Ł, introduced for philosophical reasons by Jan Lukasiewicz, is among the most important and widely studied of all non-classical logics. Later, MV-algebras were introduced by C. Chang in order to prove completeness with respect to the calculus Ł, see for instance, [3].

The logic Ł was introduced taking in mind that if statements about future events are already true or false, then the future is as much determined as the past and differs from the past only in so far as it has not yet come to pass.

In order to avoid the situations in which further development is impossible, it was proposed to reject the law of Excluded Middle, that is, the assumption that every proposition is true or false. The n-valued Łukasiewicz logic (Łn) was axiomatizated by Grigolia in 1977 in [12].

It is worth mentioning that initially Łukasiewicz proposed the 3-valued version of Ł that today is called Ł3. Afterwards, Lukasiewicz generalized his three-valued logic to n values and also to an infinite-valued system.

In this paper, we consider the Ł3 logic in order to show a non-standard application of fuzzy logic. Firstly, we show how Łukasiewicz logic can be used for knowledge representation based on logic programming.

In particular, we present a definition of stable propositional Łukasiewicz models using the {,,,¬,} connectives of Łukasiewicz logic. Secondly, we show that our definition is equivalent to the standard definition of stable models for augmented programs, due to Lifschitz et al. [16].

Moreover, we show that this equivalence fails when we consider the proposed definition of stable models for arbitrary propositional theories given in [23], see Remark 1. However, it is possible to reduce any propositional theory into the class of augmented programs [20].

Gelfond showed that the perfect models of stratified logic programs can be characterized in terms of extensions of the corresponding autoepistemic theory [10] . His characterization is based on the interpretation of nota as ¬a, where is Monteiro-Baaz operator.

In this paper, ¬a is interpreted as ¬a, where both operators ¬ and are the standard operators in Łukasiewicz logics. Some connections between Łukasiewicz logics and the stable semantics were recognized in [18, 22] but all results in this paper are new, to the best of our knowledge. Our paper is structured as follows.

In section 2, we summarize some definitions, logics and semantics necessary to understand this work. Besides, we present a characterization of the stable models semantics for augmented programs in terms of the intermediate logic G3.

Then, in section 3, we present our results; namely, we introduce the notion of Ł3-stable models. We show its correspondence with standard stable models for the class of augmented programs. Later on, we generalize theses results to many-valued Łukasiewicz logics. Finally, in section 4 we present some conclusions.

2 Background

In this section, we summarize some basic concepts and definitions necessary to understand this paper.

2.1 Logic Programs

A signature is a finite set of elements that we call atoms, or propositional symbols. The language of a propositional logic has an alphabet consisting of:

  • – propositional symbols: p0, p1,

  • – constant symbols: , .

  • – binary connectives: , , .

  • – unary connectives: ¬, G3, L3.

  • – auxiliary symbols: (, ).

where , , are 2-place connectives and ¬, G3, L3 are 1-place connectives. Theories and formulas are built up as usual in logic.

If x is any particular unary connective, we write Tx to denote a theory in which the unique unary connective allowed is x.

A program is a finite theory and by default, we assume that our formulas and programs are constructed using the ¬ connective, unless stated otherwise. In the following, we will say that:

A literal is either an atom a, called positive literal; or the negation of an atom ¬a, called negative literal.

A {,,¬}-formula is a formula built using only the connectives in {,,¬}.

An augmented clause is a formula of the form: HB, where both H and B are {,,¬}-formulas.

Besides, we call H the head of the formula and B the body of the formula. HB corresponds to the standard formula BH.

We define an augmented program P, as a finite set of augmented clauses.

The body of an augmented formula could be just the constant, in which case the formula is known as an extended fact and can be denoted just by the head formula H.

We write P, to denote the set of atoms that appear in the clauses of P.

Given a set of atoms M and a signature , we define ¬M˜={¬b|b\M} and ¬¬M={¬¬a|aM}.

Given a program P and a set of atoms M, we write P,M to denote the program: P¬M˜¬¬M.

Given the unary connective G3 and the program P,M, we write P,MG3 to the denote the theory obtained from P,M by replacing the connective ¬ by the connective G3.

Furthermore, it is worth observing that P,M is also an augmented program. Now, let us consider the following example:

Example 1. Let P be the following program:

{a¬b,b¬a}, (1)

And let M={a}, then P,M is {a¬b,b¬a}{¬b}{¬¬a}. So, P,MG3={aG3b,bG3a}{G3b}{G3G3a}.

2.2 Logics

Now, we will review some logics that are relevant to this paper to characterize different semantics of normal and more general programs.

Moreover, we present definitions in terms of true values as well as Hilbert style definitions for most of these logics. The logics considered here have the modus ponens as a unique inference rule.

2.2.1 Łukasiewicz’s Logic

Łukasiewicz logic is presented in the language {,¬}, further connectives are definable from and ¬ as follows:

  • ϕψ:=ϕψ.

  • ϕψ:=¬(¬ϕ¬ψ).

  • ϕψ:=(ϕψ)ϕ.

  • ϕψ:=¬(¬ϕ¬ψ).

  • φψ:=(φψ)(ψφ).

The truth constants are defined as follows: :=ϕϕ and :=¬. So, it is possible to define the following for every positive integer k:

  • (k+1)ϕ:=kϕϕ.

  • ϕ(k+1):=ϕkϕ.

When k=0 we have kϕ=ϕk=. It was originally defined as a three-valued Łukasiewicz logic, denoted by Ł3.

Afterwards, Łukasiewicz generalized his three-valued logic to n values and also to an infinite-valued system.

Recall that the propositional Łukasiewicz logic is defined as the following Hilbert style system of axioms and rule ([13, 3]):

  • – (Ł1) ϕ(ψϕ).

  • – (Ł2) (ϕψ)((ψχ)(ϕχ)).

  • – (Ł3) (ϕψ)(¬ψ¬ϕ).

  • – (Ł4) (ϕψ)(ψϕ).

  • – (MP) The rule of modus ponens: ϕ,ϕψψ.

Now, for every integer n2, the n-valued Łukasiewicz logic (for short, Łn) is defined as an extension of Ł by means of adding the following axioms ([12, 13]):

  • – (Ł1) (n1)ϕnϕ,

  • – (Ł2) (tϕ(t1))n(nϕ)t, for every t=2,3,,(n2) such that t does not divide n1.

A matrix for Łn, with n1 as the unique designated value, is MVn-algebra {0,1,2,,(n1)},,¬,0 where xy:=min(n1,x+y) and ¬x:=(n1)x, see [12, Examples pag. 4] and [3, Definition 1.1.1].

It is well-known that the class of MV-algebras is semantics for Łukasiewicz logic and its extension Łn has the class of MVn-algebras as algebraic semantics. For more details about the theory of MVn-algebras the reader can consult the book [3, Section 8.5].

2.2.2 Łukasiewicz’s 3-Valued Logic

The polish logician and philosopher Łukasiewicz began to create systems of multivalued logics in 1920. He developed, in particular, a system with a third value to denote “possible” that could be used to express the modalities “it is necessary that” and “it is possible that”.

To construct this logic, denoted by Ł3, we first have to modify the syntax of our formulas to allow only as primitive connectives: the constant (0-place connective) (false) and the 2-place connective (implication).

These connectives operate over a domain D={0,1,2}, with 2 as the unique designated value, and are defined as follows:

xy=min(2,2x+y). (2)

Other connectives in Ł3 are introduced in terms of and as follows:

  • L3A:=A.

  • :=L3.

  • AB:=(AB)B.

  • AB:=L3(L3AL3B.

  • A:=L3(AL3A).

  • A:=L3AA.

The truth tables of most connectives are shown in Table 1, the conjunction and disjunction connectives (not shown) coincide with the min and max functions respectively.

Table 1 Truth tables of connectives in Ł3 

x L3x x x 0 1 2
0 2 0 0 0 2 2 2
1 1 0 2 1 1 2 2
2 0 2 2 2 0 1 2

A syntactic characterization of the modal content of Ł3 is studied in [17], where the behavior of modal operators is checked against some of the relevant modal principles.

It is important to note that the algebra {0,1,2},,L3,0 is an MV-algebra in terms of [3, Definition 1.1.1], where ϕψ:=¬ϕψ using Table 1.

For more general results in Łukasiewicz logics, the reader can be referred to [3]. Another observation worth mentioning is that the modal operators and where considered in the context of Łukasiewicz logic by Cignoli, [2].

Furthermore, these operators was considered on Gödel-Dummmett logic by Baaz, [1]. Indeed, Baaz baptized this operator with Δ and it is known in the literature as Monteiro-Baaz operator.

This operator was studied on fuzzy logics by Esteva, Godo, Hájek, Montagna and others. These authors presented an algebraic study of these modals operators over certain fuzzy logics, see for instance [6, 7].

2.2.3 Gn Logic or Gödel n-Valued Logic

Gödel defined, in fact, a family of many-valued logics Gn with truth values over the domain D={0,1,,n1} and with n1 as the unique designated value. Logic connectives are defined as:

  • xy:=min(x,y); xy=max(x,y),

  • xy:=n1 if xy and y otherwise,

  • Gnx=x0.

Table 2 illustrates the implication and negation connective for G3. Notice that G3x can be expressed using Ł3:

G3x:=L3x. (3)

Table 2 Truth tables: connectives in G3 

x G3x 0 1 2
0 2 0 2 2 2
1 0 1 0 2 2
2 0 2 0 1 2

2.3 Semantics

We assume that the reader is familiar with the notions of interpretations, models, and logical consequence in the usual way. Recall that our interest is in the above non classical logics.

Both have only 2 as the only designated value. Hence a model of a theory P is an interpretation I, such that I(P)=2. Given a logic X, we use the notation Xα to indicate that the formula α is tautology in X.

With respect to Logic Programming, we adopt the following conventions. Given a set of atoms M and a signature , we define the interpretation IM based on M as: IM(x)=2 if xM, and IM(x)=0 otherwise, namely when x\M.

Notice that the values in {0,2} behave as in classical logic in our both non-classical logic considered in our paper. Hence IM models a theory P in G3 iff IM models P in Ł3.

Given a program P and a set of atoms M, the expression PXM will mean (in this paper) that IM is a model of P and for every formula αM, α is a logical consequence of P in logic X.

By abuse of the language we may sometimes say that M is a model of P if IM models a theory P. By our last considerations, we do not have to refer to any specific logic.

A very important remark on notation is the following. When we write any of the following statements: Xα, or α is a tautology in X, or QXM etc, it is understood that the behaviour of the connectives in our formulas correspond the standard connectives in logic X.

For instance G3{¬ab} assumes that ¬ and are the connectives of G3 logic. Similarly Ł3{¬ab} assumes that ¬ and are the connectives of Ł3 logic.

However, if one makes a particular connective such as G3 in Ł3{G3ab} explicit then of course, it is understood that is our implication operator of Ł3 logic, but G3 is the negation operator in G3 logic.

But, after all, it is also a non-primitive operator in Ł3 logic constructed using the primitive operators of the same logic.

2.4 Expressing Stable Semantics based on G3

We present a general characterization of stable models in terms of G3 logic. It is important to observe that in the following result we can use intuitionistic logic instead of G3 logic.

This characterization allows us to understand what stable models are without having to appeal to the original definition.

Theorem 1. [21] Given a general logic program P, a set of atoms MP is a stable model of P if and only if P,MG3G3M.

Example 2. Let P be the following program:

{a¬b}, (4)

And let M1={a} and M2={b}. According to the definition of stable semantics, since P{G3b}{G3G3a}G3{a}, then M1 is a stable model of P.

However, it is false that P{G3a}{G3G3b}G3{b}, hence M2 is not a stable model of P as the reader can easily check. In fact, M1 is the unique stable model of P.

Recall that in our programs we write ¬, but in the notation P,MG3, ¬ is substituted by G3.

Example 3. Let P be the following program:

{a¬b,b¬a}. (5)

And let M1={a} and M2={b}. According to the definition of stable semantics, since P{G3b}{G3G3a}G3{a} and P{G3a}{G3G3b}G3{b}, then M1 and M2 are stable models of P as the reader can easily check.

2.5 Some Examples

We now provide some examples of augmented programs and their stable models. This with the purpose that the reader could check the models and thus verify if the previously presented theory has been well understood.

  • – Program (example)

    • ab¬e,

    • e,

    • cae¬b¬a,

    • ¬bd¬e.

  • Stable models: {{b,e},{a,e}}

  • – Program (example)

    • dcab,

    • ¬ece¬d,

    • bd¬ba,

    • c¬a¬b,

    • e¬bed.

  • Stable models : {{c}}

  • – Program (example)

    • ad¬c,

    • ¬eb,

    • ¬aec.

  • Stable models : {{d},{a}}

  • – Program (example)

    • bcac¬e¬a,

    • ¬db.

  • Stable models : {{}}

  • – Program (example)

    • ¬e,

    • c¬dc.

  • Stable models : {}

  • – Program (example)

    • ce¬a¬b,

    • ba¬b¬c,

    • a¬ac¬d,

    • dae¬d.

  • Stable models : {{},{b},{a,e},{a,c}}.

3 Stable Models in Łukasiewicz’s Logic Ł3

In this section, we present our main results, namely, we introduce Ł3-stable models and we show their correspondence with standard stable models. Then we generalize this results to consider many-valued logics.

3.1 3-Valued Logics

Theorem 2. Given an augmented theory P and a 3-valued interpretation I, I models P in G3 logic iff I models PG3 in Ł3 logic.

Proof. It is enough to take an augmented clause C to prove the theorem. So, we have to see that for every 3-valued interpretation I, I models C in G3 logic iff I models CG3 in Ł3 logic.

Now, let C be an augmented clause and I a 3-valued interpretation. By definition, C has the form HB, where both H and B are {,,¬}-formulas.

Then I(H) and I(B) do not change their value when considering the two different logics. The only possible difference in C is in the implication: 10=0 in G3 logic and 10=1 in Ł3 logic.

But in neither of these two possibilities, the valuation takes true-valued 2. Consequently, if I models C in one logic, then I models C in the other. Thus, since P is a finite set of augmented clauses, we have I models P in G3 logic iff I models PG3 in Ł3 logic.

We have showed that Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic can be used for knowledge representation based on logic programming. Now, consider again our example 2:

Suppose that both implication and negation correspond to Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł3. Then clearly M2 would be a stable model of P, which fails the very basic notion of negation as failure in Logic Programming.

It is well accepted to consider negation as a failure a kind of modality operator, see for instance [19], which is considered as follows: G3x:=L3x. We adopt this negation operator (G3) in the following definition.

Definition 1. Given a logic program P, we define a set of atoms MP to be a Ł3-stable model of P if P,MG3Ł3M.

Here, we assume the use of Ł3 implication which behaves differently to the one of G3 logic. Furthermore, we will present a simple example that shows that in general the Ł3-stables model of P do not correspond to the standard stable models. To see this, we will display the following Remark:

Remark 1. Let us start by considering the following program Q={G3(a)}. Then, it is not hard to see that Q does not have stable models in G3 logic. In contrast, {a} is a Ł3-stable model of Q.

Theorem 3. Given an augmented logic program P and a set of atoms MP. M is a stable model of P iff M is a Ł3-stable model of P.

Proof. Recall that M is a stable model of P iff P,MG3M iff IM is a model of P,M in G3 logic and M is a logical consequence of P,M in G3.

On the other hand, M is a Ł3-stable model of P iff P,MG3Ł3M iff IM is a model of P,M in Ł3 logic and M is a logical consequence of P,MG3 in Ł3.

We have already noticed that IM is a model of P,M in G3 logic iff IM is a model of P,MG3 in Ł3 logic, this is thanks to Theorem 2.

Moreover, M is a logical consequence of P,M in G3 iff P,MG3 is a logical consequence of in Ł3. Hence, M is a stable model of P iff M is a Ł3-stable model of P as desired.

Notice that in the examples provided in Section 2.5, the theories belong to the class of augmented programs and therefore the stable models correspond to the Ł3-stable models.

Lemma 1. Let I be a 3-valued interpretation and S={α:I(α)=1}. Let IS be a 3-valued interpretation defined as:

IS(α)={I(α)ifxS,2ifxS (6)

Then, IS(β)=I(G3G3β) for every {,,¬}-formula β.

Proof. We will give the proof by induction on β. Indeed, let β be an atom. So, notice that if I(β){0,2}, then IS(β)=I(β) and if I(β)=1, then IS(β)=2. Therefore IS(β)=I(G3G3β).

Now, let us suppose IS(βi)=I(G3G3βi) as induction hypothesis. Let β be β1#β2 where # can represent or . Then, IS(β)=IS(β1#β2)=IS(β1)#IS(β2).

So, due to the induction hypothesis we have that IS(β1)#IS(β2)=I(G3G3β1)#I(G3G3β2)=I(G3G3β1#G3G3β2)=I(G3G3(β1#β2))=I(G3G3β). Therefore, IS(β)=I(G3G3β).

Finally, let β be G3β1, then we have that IS(β)=IS(G3β1)=G3IS(β1)=G3I(G3G3β1)=I(G3G3G3β1)=I(G3G3β). Therefore, IS(β)=I(G3G3β) and the proof is completed.

Theorem 4. Given an augmented logic program P and a set of atoms MP. M is a stable model of P iff for every 3-valued interpretation I:

I(P,MG3)=I((MG3M˜)), (7)

where the connective of implication used in the above expression could be any of the two defined in our 3-valued logics considered in this paper.

Proof. For this proof, we will consider the connective of implication of Ł3 logic and let P and MP be under the conditions of the hypothesis.

From left-to-right, let us suppose that M is a stable model of P. So, we have to prove that every 3-valued interpretation I fulfills that I(P,MG3)=I((MG3M˜)).

In the following, we will consider an arbitrary, but fixed 3-valued interpretation I, and suppose that:

  • I((MG3M˜))=0:

  • Then, I((M))=0, or I((G3M˜))=0. If I((G3M˜))=0, then automatically I(P,MG3)=0. Moreover, if I((M))=0, then αM:I(α)=0. So, αM:I(G3G3α)=0 and then I((G3G3M))=0. Consequently, I(P,MG3)=0.

  • I((MG3M˜))=1:

  • Notice that αP:I(G3α)=1, then it must happen that I((G3M˜))=2 and I((M))=1. Thus, αM we have that I(α)=1, or I(α)=2 and then, αM such that I(α)=1. Consequently, αM we have that I(G3G3α)=2 and then I((G3G3M))=2. Furthermore, αP\M:I(G3α)=2 then αP\M:I(α=0).

  • Recall the interpretation IM previously defined as: IM(x)=2 if xM, and IM(x)=0 if xP\M. Now, let us consider the interpretation IS defined in Lemma 1, notice that IS=IM.

  • Since M is a stable model of P, IM is a model of P,MG3, then pP:IM(p)=2. Recall that P is a set of augmented clauses and an augmented clause has the form HB, where H and B are {,,¬}-formulas.

  • Consider an augmented clause pP of the form HpBp such that I(p)=0, then I(Hp)=0 and I(Bp)=2, therefore IM(Hp)=IS(Hp)=0 and IM(Bp)=IS(Bp)=2, then IM(p)=0 which is a contradiction. Therefore pP:I(p)=0 and then I((P))0.

  • In this setting, we also have that I((P))2 because if I((P))=2, then I(P,MG3)=2, and M is a stable model of P then I((M))=2 which is a contradiction. Consequently, I((P))=1 and therefore I(P,MG3)=1.

  • I((MG3M˜))=2

  • Then, I((M))=2 and I((G3M˜))=2. Consequently, αM:I(α)=2, and also αp\M:I(G3α)=2 then αp\M:I(α)=0. Thus, I=IM. Besides, M is a stable model of P, then IM is a model of P,MG3. As a result, I(P,MG3)=2.

Therefore, every 3-valued interpretation maintains the desired equality. Then, the first condition is proved.

Now, let us prove the right-to-left direction. First, let I be an arbitrary 3-valued interpretation such that I(P,MG3)=I((MG3M˜)). Thus, we have to prove that M is a stable model of P. Indeed, consider the interpretation IM.

The value of the conjunction of all elements of M under IM is 2, that is, IM((M))=2. Moreover, the value of all the atoms that are not elements of M under IM is 0, then the value of their negation under IM is 2, that is, IM((G3M˜))=2.

Consequently, IM((MG3M˜))=2, and then IM(P,MG3)=2. Therefore, IM is a model of P,MG3.

Let I be a model of P,MG3, namely, let I be a 3-valued interpretation such that I(P,MG3)=2. Consequently, I((MG3M˜))=2 and then I((M))=2.

This means that every formula αM is a logical consequence of P,MG3. Therefore, we have that P,MG3M, thus M is a stable model of P. Hence, the second condition and the theorem have been proved.

Let us observe that in the proof of Theorem 4, the implication of Ł3 logic has been considered. The following Corollary is an immediate consequence of the last Theorem:

Corollary 1. Given an augmented logic program P and a set of atoms MP. M is a stable model of P iff:

P,MG3(MG3M˜). (8)

Is a tautology in any of our 3-valued logics considered in this paper.

3.2 Generalization

In this subsection, we will work on the family of logics Gn and Łn, for n3, see [5, 3, 13].

Recall that in the logic Łn, it is possible to define the binary operators and as follows:

xy=¬xy, (9)

xy=¬(¬x¬y). (10)

Furthermore, we can define the operator for the n-valued logic Łn recursively as follows:

x=x(n+1). (11)

It is not hard to see that Gnx=Lnx. We again adopt this negation operator (Gn) in Definition 2.

Theorem 5. Given an augmented theory P and an n-valued interpretation I, I models P in Gn logic iff I models PGn in Łn logic.

Proof. Let C be an augmented clause and I an n-valued interpretation. By hypothesis, we have that C has the form HB, where both H and B are {,,¬}-formulas. Then, I(H) and I(B) do not change their value when considering the two different logics.

Since I is an n-valued interpretation and n1 is the unique designated value, let us assume that I models C in Gn logic. So, BH=n1 in Gn.

From the latter and the order defined through the implication on Gn, we have that I(B)I(H). So, we have that:

  • 0I(H)I(B).

  • n1n1+I(H)+I(B).

  • min(n1,n1I(B)+I(H))=n1.

Therefore, we can infer that that BH=n1 in Łn logic. Thus, I models CGn in Łn logic if I models C in Gn logic as desired.

Conversely, by an analogous argument but now using the definition of the implication on Gn and the order relation given through Łukasiewicz implication, we have I models C in Gn logic every time that I models CGn in Łn logic, which completes the proof.

Now, we are in conditions to define the notion Łn-stable model via the following definition in which the use of Łn implication is involved. Indeed:

Definition 2. Given a logic program P, we define a set of atoms MP to be a Łn-stable model of P if P,MGnŁnM.

GnŁn

Here, we assume the use of Łn implication, which behaves differently to the one of Gn.

Theorem 6. Given an augmented logic program P and a set of atoms MP. M is a stable model of P iff M is a Łn-stable model of P.

Proof. Having in mind Theorem 1, we know that M is a stable model of P iff P,MGnM iff IM is a model of P,M in Gn logic and M is a logical consequence of P,M in Gn.

By Definition 2, we have that M is an Łn-stable model of P iff P,MGnŁnM iff IM is a model of P,M in Łn logic and M is a logical consequence of P,MG3 in Łn.

Taking into account Theorem 5, we obtain that IM is a model of P,M in Gn logic iff IM is a model of P,MGn in Łn logic. Thus, M is a logical consequence of P,M in Gn iff P,MGn is a logical consequence of in Łn, which completes the proof.

4 Conclusion and Future Work

ASP has proven to be a powerful tool to encode and solve problems in both academia and industry, becoming one of the most attractive KRR frameworks [8].

Therefore, ASP has applications in many fields, and it is widely used for knowledge representation due to its effectiveness.

In this paper, we have shown that Łukasiewicz logic can be used for knowledge representation based on logic programming.

Furthermore, we have also presented an alternative definition of stable models for general programs in terms of Ł3 logic and we have studied the circumstances in which they are equivalent to the standard stable models.

We have taken advantage of the fact that on Łukasiewicz’s logic Ł3 is possible to express the negation on G3 logic via the use an specific modal operators. Finally, we have defined Łn-stable models and we have generalized the results previously obtained to many-valued logics.

As future work, we will focus on the study of the correspondence of standard state models and Ł3 stable models when the theories do not belong to the class of augmented programs.

Remark 1 shows us that if we take more general programs, we can obtain more answers on Ł3. Moreover, a generalization of Theorem 4 for multivalued logics will also be studied.

Besides, the theory presented in this paper will be studied further with the aim of extending our characterization to model preferences in a natural way, following the work presented in [4].

Another important point that we are interested in is giving a notion of stable semantics in terms of MVn-algebras which would imply translating the result given here for generating algebra for a more general setting.

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Received: April 09, 2022; Accepted: June 06, 2022

* Corresponding author: Mauricio Osorio, e-mail: mauricioj.osorio@udlap.mx

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