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Gestión y política pública
Print version ISSN 1405-1079
Gest. polít. pública vol.16 n.1 Ciudad de México Jan./Jun. 2007
Gestión y organización
La independencia de las agencias reguladoras en México. El caso de los sectores energético y de telecomunicaciones1
The Independence of Regulatory Agencies in Mexico: The Case of the Energy and Telecommunications Sectors
1Licenciado en Derecho por el Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México y maestro en Regulación por la London School of Economics and Political Science. Asociado en el despacho de abogados Barrera, Siqueiros y Torres Landa, S. C. Paseo de los Tamarindos 150 Edificio Norte D, Bosques de las Lomas, 05120, México, D. F. Teléfono: 5540 8000. Correo electrónico: fha@bstl.com.mx.
El presente artículo aborda el tema de la independencia de las agencias reguladoras a partir de la experiencia en los sectores de energía y telecomunicaciones en México. Para ello, se propone una medición de la independencia de las agencias reguladoras en materia de energía y telecomunicaciones tanto desde el punto de vista formal como desde una perspectiva dinámica, para posteriormente analizar los resultados en ambos casos.
Palabras clave: agencia reguladora; principal-agente; diseño institucional; energía; telecomunicaciones
This article addresses the issue of the independence of regulatory agencies based on the experience in the energy and telecommunications sectors in Mexico. To this effect, it is proposed a measurement of the independence of the energy and telecommunications regulatory agencies from a formal standpoint and from a dynamic perspective, and subsequently the results are analyzed.
Keywords: regulatory agency; principal-agent; institutional design; energy; telecommunications
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DOCUMENTOS LEGALES
Decreto de la Comisión Reguladora de Energía en www.sener.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Ley de la Comisión Reguladora de Energía en www.cre.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Ley Federal de Responsabilidades de los Servidores Públicos en www.cddhcu.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Decreto de la Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones en www.cft.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones en www.cft.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Regulación Interna de la Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones en www.cft.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Regulación Interna de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes en www.sct.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Regulación Interna de la Secretaría de Energía en www.sener.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Ley del Servicio Público de la Energía Eléctrica en www.cre.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Ley Orgánica de la Administración Pública en www.cddhcu.gob.mx. [ Links ]
Ley Reglamentaria del Artículo 27 Constitucional en materia de Petróleo en www.cre.gob.mx. [ Links ]
SITIOS EN INTERNET
www.cft.gob.mx [ Links ]
www.cre.gob.mx [ Links ]
www.elfinanciero.com.mx [ Links ]
www.economista.com.mx [ Links ]
www.reforma.com [ Links ]
www.sct.gob.mx [ Links ]
www.shcp.gob.mx [ Links ]
1La información utilizada en este trabajo está actualizada a agosto de 2003, por lo que debe leerse tomando en cuenta dicha fecha. Sin embargo, el análisis y las conclusiones son válidas para el tiempo revisado y ofrecen una perspectiva de dicho periodo hasta el presente. Traducción del inglés de Susana Moreno Parada.
Recibido: 19 de Julio de 2005; Aprobado: 21 de Septiembre de 2006