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Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho
On-line version ISSN 2448-7937Print version ISSN 2007-4387
Abstract
LAISE, Luciano D.. Semantic Conventionalism and Legal Interpretation. Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho [online]. 2017, n.11, pp.273-339. ISSN 2448-7937.
This article has three objectives. First, I will offer a reconstruction of the main versions of semantic conventionalism applied to legal interpretation according to the main discussions of contemporary analytical jurisprudence that assesses that conventionalism maintains an identification between shared linguistic usage and the meaning of legal statements. I argue that this identification does not operate in the same manner and consider convenient to distinguish between different levels of identification between common linguistic usage and meaning of legal statements. Second, I will describe the main difficulties for a theory of legal interpretation that relies on conventional semantics: a) the impossibility to escape from an infinite regress of interpretations; b) the unavoidable confussion between arbitrariness and judicial discretion. And, finally, I will offer a reply to the difficulties for semantic conventionalism grounded on “new theories of reference” that aim at attributing a priority to the reference of concepts over social construction of meaning.
Keywords : Semantics; semantic conventionalism; legal interpretation; arbitrariness; judicial discretion; infinite regress; new theories of reference.