Abstract

GRANDE-GARCIA, Israel. Autoconciencia prerreflexiva: dos argumentos contra las teorías representacionales de la conciencia. Valenciana [online]. 2009, vol.2, n.3, pp.63-87. ISSN 2007-2538.  https://doi.org/10.15174/rv.v0i3.256.

Representational theories of consciousness try to explain phenomenal experience by the use of terms without implying consciousness. The two main theories are representationalism and higher-order representational theories (HOR). The key argument for the first one is the transparency of experience according to which, it is impossible to discern, via introspection, any intrinsic properties of an experience of x that are not experienced as properties of x. Representationalism states that our experiences show qualitative features that are identical to the properties things are represented as having, and therefore, phenomenal character of experience is identical to its representational content. On the other hand, HOR theories account for conscious states in terms of higher-order representation, that may take the form of a quasi-perception or a thought that it’s directed to a first-order mental state. In this paper I put forward two arguments against representational theories, on the basis of a theory which affirms that every conscious experience has an implicit pre-reflective self-consciousness of some kind, that it is characterized of having a for-me-ness aspect (sense of ownership). The first argument is against representationalism. The argument asserts that this sense of ownership (1) is an intrinsic aspect of experience, and (2) is discernible via introspection; therefore, the phenomenal character of experiences is not identical to its representational content, and consequently, representationalism is false. The second argument is the problema being in a pain state p, but without having p. According to HOR theories, p is non-conscious, because it doesn’t exist. But, S’s having HOR about p, will cause that S would have a phenomenal experience of p. Nevertheless this result in incoherent. For pre-reflexive self-consciousness theory, on the other hand, p will not be a conscious state if it doesn’t belong to S, nevertheless S does have consciousness of p (being p different from pain, e.g., a believe, a mental imagery) therefore this sense of ownership is what makes p a phenomenal experience.

Keywords : phenomenal consciousness; pre-reflective self-consciousness; sense of ownership; representationalism; higher-order representation.

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