Abstract

PARDO OLAGUEZ, José Antonio. The Ineffability of Existence. Rev. filos.open insight [online]. 2022, vol.13, n.28, pp.29-54.  Epub May 19, 2023. ISSN 2395-8936.  https://doi.org/10.23924/oi.v13i28.531.

According to Gilson, the most original thesis of Aquinas is that «being» is not a concept. This is a paradoxical thesis, for apparently, if it was true, then it was ineffable. Gilson denies the paradoxical conclusion, even if he admits that «being» is unconceptualizable, nevertheless is intelligible by the judgment, but not by the concept. This claim es akin to Frege’s, according to which, there is a categorial distinction between objects and concepts. While to say that the existence of such categorial distinction is impossible, nevertheless is expressible by an adequate notation. «Being» is unconceptualizable, therefore, ineffable; but one could show it, not necessarily by a conceptography, but by an analogical speech.

Keywords : Analogy; Aquinas; being; ineffability; Frege; Wittgenstein.

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )