Abstract

GUASTINI, Riccardo. Legal Realism as a Positivistic Theory of Law. Isonomía [online]. 2020, n.53, pp.127-137.  Epub June 09, 2021. ISSN 1405-0218.

Since the Sixties, following Norberto Bobbio, everyone is (or should be) used to distinguish among methodological, theoretical, and ideological legal positivism (LP). By the way, in Italian legal-philosophical literature, LP is often opposed to legal realism (LR). One has to wonder, however: what kind of LP and what kind of LR are we talking about? As to LR, those scholars who oppose realism and positivism have in mind most of all Scandinavian Realism, especially Olivecrona and Ross. As to LP, those scholars who oppose realism and positivism have in mind either the 19th century prevailing theory of law or Kelsen’s pure theory. The opposition between LR and the pure theory is sound. Nonetheless, such an opposition does not arise from a supposed anti-positivistic stance of LR. It depends on two non-positivistic theses endorsed by Kelsen: the concept of validity as binding force, and the normative theory of legal science, conceived of a set of deontic (non-factual) sentences echoing valid (i.e., binding) norms. The opposition between LR and 19th century LP is equally sound, but does not hold when referred to contemporary LP, which is mainly conceived of as a methodological (Benthamite) attitude towards the law. LR is an openly positivistic view about the law. To be sure, not all positivist legal scholars are realist, but all realists are (“hard”) positivists.

Keywords : methodological legal positivism; theoretical legal positivism; ideological legal positivism; legal realism.

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