Abstract

RAMOS-UMANA, Leonardo. Philosophy of Desire 1: Aristotle and Thymós. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2022, n.62, pp.65-95.  Epub Mar 28, 2022. ISSN 0188-6649.  https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v62i0.1638.

Whit the aim of clariflying what exactly is the human phenomenon of akrasía or incontinence in the fullest sense (namely, that caused by epithymia or appetite), in Nicomachean Ethics VII.4-10 Aristotle introduces a type of incontinence by analogy, that is, incontinence due to thymós or courage. Despite his intentions, the explanation of the latter only complicates understanding the former, and the reader ends up without a clear understanding of either. The purpose of this article is to shed some light on the subject of akrasía due to thymós, trying, specifically, to answer three questions: (1) what exactly is this passion? (2) Who are worse, those who get carried away by their appetites (such as those who misbehave out of lust or gluttony) or those who get carried away by their anger (such as those who misbehave out of anger or jealousy), and why? Finally, (3) are we responsible for the mistakes we make in a fit of anger?

Keywords : thymós; incontinence; Aristotle; moral responsibility.

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