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Tópicos (México)
versión impresa ISSN 0188-6649
Resumen
PLACENCIA GARCIA, Luis. Kant and Hegel on the Nature of Intentional Action. Continuity or Rupture?. Tópicos (México) [online]. 2018, n.54, pp.171-200. ISSN 0188-6649. https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v0i54.863.
This paper aims to present some shared aspects of Kant's and Hegel's conception of intentional action. Such aspects, I claim, form the basis of other well known divergences between them. Since Kant's and Hegel's conception of intentional action have been studied by many scholars in the last years, I will focus just on one point: The differences between kantian and hegelian approches and contemporary causal-reductive framework. Finnaly, I will suggest that the most important difference between Kant and Flegel in practical philosophy can be better understood in this context.
Palabras llave : intentional action; causal theories of action; Kant; Hegel.