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Contaduría y administración

Print version ISSN 0186-1042

Abstract

WANG, Haiping  and  WERBIN, Eliana Mariela. The compensation of CEOs and the relevance of fair value accounting. Contad. Adm [online]. 2018, vol.63, n.spe2, pp.1014-1032. ISSN 0186-1042.  https://doi.org/10.22201/fca.24488410e.2018.1624.

The purpose of this article is to investigate the impact of executive compensation and its relation to the value relevance of fair value accounting. Using a sample of companies from 2007 to 2016 and based on a modified model of Ohlson (1995), we find that the bonus intensity in executive compensation provides a positive incentive for managers to disclose their insider information in financial reporting, which results in greater value relevance of fair value information. The results also show that this positive motivation only applies to Level 2 fair values, where there is still a comparative market price. However, when there is no information about the market price of an item reported in the financial statements, managers tend to manipulate the valuation of Level 3 fair value inputs, which results in less value relevance of fair value accounting. The results help to improve the knowledge of management incentives in the determination of valuation in financial reporting. The findings also shed light on the conditions of decision usefulness of fair value accounting. This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the moderating role that executive compensation plays in the usefulness of fair value accounting.

Keywords : J30; J33; J39; M52; Accruals; CEO compensation, Bonus intensity, Fair value accounting, Value relevance and Decision-usefulness.

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