Fordism and Green Revolution

With the passing of time, Mexico has experienced different accumulation regimes, understanding by regime a “modality, historically defined, of the functioning of capitalism, which displays specific forms of capitalist valuation and accumulation, through which the system processes its contradictions and drives the process of growth and development” (^{Valenzuela, 1991}).

In the mid-1940s and until the 1980s, the Fordist regime of accumulation was experienced, which was characterized mainly by the standardization for mass production of merchandises; in agriculture it was the homogenization of sowing methods. In Mexico, this regime arrived with a national organization that suggested the state influence as priority in productive and social management. This period is known as “Welfare State” (^{Rubio, 2012}).

The model of “Import Substitution” was developed under this context of state management and Fordist regime, which gave the industry in Mexico an important role in food production for the first time. In this sense, an articulated regime of accumulation was established, which was based on the production of consumption goods focused on domestic consumption, leading to one of the conditions of this regime being that salaries were linked to food prices (^{Rubio, 2012}).

In this dynamic of state intervention and homogenization, a general initiative for agricultural modernization is produced, which was accompanied by the creation of agricultural technologies and practices to increase the yields, as well as the support for genetic research to create new varieties. This initiative of promoting a “modern and productive” agriculture is known as the Green Revolution (^{Hewitt, 1976}). Industry and technology were fundamental for this logic of production, which is why it is very important to mention that during this period the industrialization of the farmland was prioritized and developed considerably (^{Bartra, 2014}; ^{Rubio, 2012}).

The importance that agricultural industrialization acquired led to establish a relationship of subordination and indirect dominion of industry over agriculture, in which the State defined the prices of agriculture and livestock products; it worked to maintain an articulated regime of accumulation where industrial goods were produced for popular consumption (^{Rubio, 2012}).

However, producing foods under an industrial logic and subordinating agriculture to this logic gradually made visible the drastic deterioration that territories suffered by shaping, deforesting and altering their ecosystems. Likewise, the inequality in the distribution of economic benefit from production was observed, which benefited medium and large scale producers with the capacity to produce in a production scheme similar to the United States, with a geographic environment similar to the North American flatlands (^{Bartra, 2014}; ^{Hewitt, 1976}).

It is important to mention that the Green Revolution needed state support, which was given through the production of institutions, programs, etc., with an adequate legal framework to regulate the advances that arose from this development, as well as to channel new technologies, from the research centers to the daily scope of agricultural life. Within this context, of a Welfare State true to the import substitution premise, as well as the national agricultural modernization, the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds emerged in 1961.

Throughout the document, the law sought to mediate and regulate agricultural research in terms of the production of seeds and the modifications that could be achieved (Table 1)⁵. The result from the improvement and classification proposed “certified” seeds as the elements that represented the varieties cataloged as improved, which had to be promoted and sown to reach advantages in production (^{Hewitt, 1976}).

The Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds from 1961 was part of the institutional unfolding that proposed institutions and committees in charge of reaching the objectives mentioned previously. This institutionalism was focused on connecting scientific and technological development with the Mexican farmland, and producing for the domestic markets; however, because it was not viable for Mexico to produce the whole technological package that the Green Revolution required, importing was necessary and, therefore, the commercial dependency on the United States because it was the seller of agrichemicals and machinery needed to produce under the new scheme (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Hewitt, 1976}).

Likewise, dependency was created on the economic backing that the United States granted through the Rockefeller Foundation during the six-year administration of Manuel Ávila Camacho, as a “program for technical support” to improve agricultural productivity in Mexico. Therefore, although there was a paternalistic State that sought to improve the Mexican production yields, the technological dependency on North America was also indispensable to achieve it. It can be said, therefore, that the Mexican Fordist regime of accumulation, despite sharing characteristics of a global historical context, also had particularities together with Latin America due to the region’s dependency on the economies of developed countries (^{Hewitt, 1976}; ^{Polanco and Puente, 2013}).

The economic, technological and industrial dependency played an important role for the consolidation of the Green Revolution, as well as for the agricultural and livestock dominion that the United States claimed during that time; in this sense, Mexico had an ecological element that was a key piece for this consolidation, an element that was used as biological input for the reproduction of capital through its management and exploitation. This element was the genetic wealth that was generated due to years of selection and exchange practices (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Hewitt, 1976}).

As one of the most important crops in the Mexican diet, maize was immersed in these dynamics. By modernizing maize production, the relationship of the farmer was redefined by science, technology and the capitalist economic model under its Welfare State form, through the integration of fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, machinery, new varieties and irrigation management; all of this within traditional agricultural activities and education in agricultural universities (^{Espinosa et al., 2003}; ^{Hewitt, 1976}).

What is known today as the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) was created in 1964, with the objective of supporting and accelerating the conservation and recollection of genetic material which in that same decade contributed to generating dozens of improved varieties of maize. Between 1960 and 1965, approximately 100 thousand pesos were invested by the State and the Rockefeller Foundation for agricultural research and years before, at the end of the 1950s, a third of the annual expenditure for research was invested in maize. Science and technology during this whole historical period were essential elements for the development of productive techniques in agreement to the logic of maximum profit (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Hewitt, 1976}; ^{Polanco and Puente, 2013}).

In Mexico, the regime of articulated accumulation extended until the mid-1980s. By then, the private companies, positioned in the market through other technological products of the Green Revolution -agrichemicals and machinery- began to open a path in seed research. At the same time, the government institutions that had been created as a result of the 1961 Law began to be neglected. This is the case of PRONASE, institution that by the 1980s had lost strength, since the number of species that it had to handle was reduced, as well as the operative infrastructure (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Barquera et al. 2001}).

This was how, in 1987, Northrup King, Hybrid Seeds (Delkab), Ciba-Geigy (Funk’s), and Mexican Asgrow, together with Semillas y fertilizantes de Sinaloa e Investigadores Agrícolas S.A., became the first private companies to receive official authorization to research in Mexico about maize and to request registry with the aim of performing genetic selections (^{Aboites, 2012}). This market opportunity for private companies allowed for the private sector to participate with seed sales at a scale of 13 % to 90 % from 1970 to 1993 (^{Espinosa et al., 2003}).

Therefore, the change from Welfare State to Neoliberalism represented a political-economic transition that was accompanied by changes in the power relations between private companies and the State -understanding the State as a “form of social relationships or a relational process between human beings”, which is a changing and dynamic process that is transformed with the institutionalism it produces” (^{Roux, 2005}). These changes had implications in the forms of seed property, as well as the law that regulated the scientific-technological advancement made on them (^{Roux, 2005}; ^{Sunder, 2007}).

Entry of the neoliberal accumulation regime

The change of regime from Fordism to neoliberal was official starting in the 1980s, accompanied by structural reforms in the national and international economy, causing implications in different spheres. Mainly, the domestic markets were opened and a new relationship of industry-agriculture domination was established (^{Rubio, 2012}).

This time the regime went from being disarticulated accumulation, where the industry defines directly - without state mediation - the times at which the farmland should produce, as well as the purchasing conditions, the prices and the physical characteristics, among others. This is what Rubio calls “exclusive subordination under direct dominion” where the prices of foods should no longer be linked to salaries, that is, that the production of consumption goods is no longer focused on the domestic market, but rather on exports (^{Rubio, 2012}).

The dilution of state institutions in the development and sale of new technologies, and the resulting strengthening of the private sector in the market did not modify the productivity and modernizing view that the Green Revolution promoted. The implications that this had were, on the one hand, the simplification of agro-cultural systems, continually prioritizing the monocultural management over any other form of sowing. On the other hand, the privatization of varieties that began with Fordism increased and this implied that seeds gradually became merchandises apt to be sold and to have intellectual property rights over them (^{Aboites, 2012}).

First modification to the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds

Thanks to these political-economic and scientific-technological changes, a legal reorganization that could officially represent the new form that the State had acquired was necessary, where it delegated most of the development of new varieties to the private sector and was limited to administrative functions. For these reasons, in 1991, years after the entry into the new accumulation regime, the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds from 1961 was replaced by a law with the same name, which differed substantially in content (Table 2) (^{Aboites, 2012}).

In this first modification from the 1961 law to the 1991 law, it can be seen that the State went from playing a more administrative role than of technological development. In this sense, it does not propose the set of institutions that will develop, regulate and channel the varieties of plants developed to the Mexican farmland. The priority now will be to manage, monitor and sanction the research and the business of improved seeds sales through a committee that will be regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Diario Oficial de la Federación, 1991}).

Origin of the Federal Law on Plant Varieties

At this time transgenic technology was not a detailed object of the law; however, it was considered necessary to refer to transgenic organisms as high-risk materials. Although it was a theme that was starting to become part of the laws, it was not until 1996 - year when transgenic plants began to be used commercially - when the importance of regulating intellectual property led to the creation of the Federal Law on Plant Varieties. Specifically, it would regulate the breeder’s rights to the modifications performed (Table 3) (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Diario Oficial de la Federación, 1991}).

As can be seen, the Federal Law on Plant Varieties is designed to regulate a right - of breeders - that emerged from scientific and technological development influenced by the view of maximum earnings. Each improved seed became merchandise that needed legal support to be protected in case of a use not in agreement with the law. Although in that year transgenic maize was not allowed for sowing in Mexico, there had been hybrids and improved varieties since decades before, as well as other transgenic organisms of other species such as cotton and soy (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Hewit, 1976}; ^{Piñeyro et al., 2013}).

The need to create the Federal Law on Plant Varieties in 1996 coincided with the first global incursion of transgenic technology into the commercial sphere, since, according to statistical information from the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), it was in that year when the first commercial cultivation lands were established, occupying 1.7 million hectares in different parts of the world (^{James, 1997}). This date also agrees with the first permit granted for field trials with transgenic maize in Mexico, which, by causing worry among specialists from the National Committee on Agricultural Biosecurity (Comité Nacional de Bioseguridad Agrícola, CNBA) about the vulnerable situation of maize, led to declaring a de facto moratorium in 1998 (^{Polanco and Puente, 2013}).

After three years of the modification of the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds, the legal declaration of transgenic organisms as “high-risk materials” contradicted the discourses that promoted technology as auxiliary in the problem of world hunger. On the one hand, according to ^{James (1997}), Mexico participated as pioneer, together with the United States, with 1 % of the world’s transgenic production, supporting the previous discourse; on the other, the legal framework suggested extreme precaution in their use.

In Mexico, since 1996 and until the next modification of the Law in 2007, a framework for protection of breeder’s rights was created, and transgenic plants were sown. However, in the particular case of maize there was no legal backing for the discourse of private institutions that promoted sowing transgenic organisms, phenomenon that was already happening year after year. This speaks of a moment, important part of coproduction, in which scientific advances move at a fast pace, detach from institutionalism, since there are no laws to regulate it, and this exerts pressure for the legal rearrangement based on their demands (^{Jasanoff, 2004}; ^{James, 1997}).

The importance in the priority over protecting breeder’s rights during the whole decade of the 1990s showed, according to ^{Delgado (2008}), a spectacular increase in the number of patents in the area of biotechnology in the United States of America (country where transgenic technology arose). This growing interest for patenting was eased, on the one hand, by the creation of “University offices” that allowed strengthening the links between industry and universities, and, on the other hand, thanks to political considerations about what was considered worthy of being patented and what was not. This phenomenon where research slowly acquires a more corporate form is what ^{Sunder calls “corporatization of the life sciences” (Sunder, 2007}).

Another example of this phenomenon is that the investments made by businesses in universities are mostly of a technical and technological nature. The demands from the business sector require effective products and in the short term, as marked by the commercial dynamic, and this guides the science financed by the private sector towards projects in this productive line. In the United States, since 1970, scientific-technological parks are consolidated, which were built strategically to be made up of Universities, state Research Institutes, and private companies. The aim is to strengthen the relationship between the production of innovations and their channeling to the market (^{Delgado, 2008}).

Law for Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms (Monsanto Law)

Since 2000, one of the most important global organizations, namely FAO, in face of the scientific-technological revolution being experienced, declared its position about genetic engineering, which is definitive until today:

FAO recognizes that genetic engineering has the potential of helping to increase the production and productivity in the agricultural, forest and fishing sectors. It can, in turn, lead to increasing fields yields of marginal lands in countries that cannot produce enough food to feed their population (^{FAO, 2016}).

This could have exerted pressure on the Mexican State, since that same year it dissolved the CNBA (organization responsible for the de facto moratorium on transgenic maize sowing), and it consolidated the Intersecreterial Commission of Biosafety and Genetically Modified Organisms (Comisión Intersecretarial de Bioseguridad y Organismos Genéticamente Modificados, CIBIOGEM).

In one of the base documents for the creation of the CIBIOGEM, the following is mentioned:

“Our country must take advantage of the processes that lead to scientific and technological innovations that are taking place in matters of biotechnology, biosafety and management of genetically modified organisms, in different countries of the world.” (^{Diario Oficial de la Federación, 1999}).

This agrees with the changes that are still being observed in the new Neoliberal Regime, since the support to scientific-technological development by the State to its own institutions continued decreasing. INIFAP (formerly INIA) is increasingly more limited and with low capacity to extend the varieties it develops, and PRONASE - the institution that was in charge of multiplication and preparation for seed sales - was closed in 2000 and formally in 2007 with the second modification to the LPCCS (^{Espinoza et al., 2014}).

Two years before the last modification to the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds, the Law for Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms was created, which seeks to regulate specifically the transgenic technologies (^{Aboites, 2012}). This law proposes a whole regulatory and administrative framework that would be in the hands of the State and various actors from different disciplines that would be in charge of fulfilling the objective of the law (Table 4) (^{Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2005}).

As can be observed, the objective of the law is focused specifically in regulating transgenic technology. It is a law that proposes already existing Institutions to assign them the responsibilities of regulation, administration, sanction and monitoring; in addition, it proposes new institutions such as CIBIOGEM.

Likewise, the law emphasizes the support that the State seeks to give transgenic organisms. This can be seen in the special mentions made in some articles, such as two and nine, to “promote scientific and technological research in biosafety and biotechnology”, and “support technological development and scientific research on genetically modified organisms that can contribute to the needs of the nation” (^{Diario Oficial de la Federación, 2005}).

In addition to this, it is the first Law related to seeds that mentions the National Council on Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT) as a supporting element between economic-political interests and scientific-technological development. Specifically, in Article 19, it grants CONACYT responsibility in the formulation and coordination of administrative policies related to biosafety.

In this context, some important elements can be observed:

In response to the law, social demands emerged in contrast to its elaboration; there was criticism about its application implying making the conditions to privatize seeds easier, in addition to openly promoting the production and import of transgenic organisms. Likewise, it was associated to Monsanto -from there, its nickname “Monsanto Law”-, leading company that controlled 90 % of the transgenic technology in 2005 and which has been in constant public intervention, requesting for its products to be approved in Mexico (^{Montecinos, 2014}; ^{Ribeiro, 2005}). For Monsanto, Mexico is its third largest market, with 3.6 % of all its earnings which, according to the Bloomberg agency, reaches 537 million dollars (RT, 2016).

The anti-establishment response has been diverse; from academic groups to peasant organizations have participated actively and jointly in the search to stop the introduction of transgenic maize for commercial sowing. Decades of conflict have resulted in the sowing still being prohibited; likewise, various groups have been created which have strengthened the links between a science that seeks not to subordinate knowledge to the market, and indigenous, peasant and civil society groups. The response from these groups has marked considerably the coproductive relationship⁶.

Despite all the controversial response from groups of the civil society, academia and peasantry in Mexico, the advancement that scientific-technological development had reached by then in the area of gene delivery continued to open a path towards other fields (^{ANEC, 2016}; ^{GRAIN, 2014}). This is the case of maize production to generate ethanol or its transgenic modification to produce substances, such as plastics, solvents and pharmaceuticals. Since 2002, transgenic plants were sown experimentally in the United States, which were capable of producing pharmaceutical compounds, and the requests for commercial approval of these increased with the years (^{Ellstrand, 2003}).

Although they developed since years back, these modifications began to gain importance in a political-economic scenario that was facing a crisis in 2007, date by which the largest maize producer (United States) set out to generate 36 thousand million annual gallons of ethanol by 2022. Both the modifications to produce substances for the industry and to produce fuel have paved the way of scientific development focused on sowing plants that are very important in the basic diet, without dietary aims (^{Rubio, 2012}; ^{Ellstrand, 2003}).

In this sense, two phenomena can be observed; the growing interest for patenting the species developed with transgenic technology and the production of maize that decreases its extension for maize destined to food. Both elements exemplify, on the one hand, the direct dominion of the industrial sector on agriculture - characteristic of the neoliberal regime. On the other hand, they allow seeing the corporatization of the life sciences with their technological products focused on producing merchandises based on the knowledge of genetic elements (^{Rubio, 2012}; ^{Sunder, 2007}).

The LBOGM has stimulated various critiques; Silvia ^{Ribeiro (2005}) declared:

“[…] the legal ruling approved denies the principle of precaution, does not foresee public consultation, but does give room to the transnational companies appealing if a request is not approved, affirms the monopoly rights of transnationals through their patents, exempts them from responsibility by contamination, does not even consider warning those who could be contaminated and, in fact, blames the victims by leaving them without protection to face trials that the companies can present over their «inadequate patent use »”. (^{Ribeiro, 2005})

With this information, it can be said that the creation of the Law for Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms is an example of the pressure from companies that produce transgenic organisms to liberate their technologies. On the other hand, the response from the civil society, academia and peasantry, is an example of the pressure that this whole group can exert on the State as a counter response. In this sense, with maize, state participation seems to be in the middle of the discussion, since up until now it has not authorized the commercial sowing of transgenic maize, but it did create the legal framework for its introduction.

Second modification to the LPCCS

Until this point, a recap about the context that Mexico experiences regarding coproduction can be established, as well as the elements that can allow reaching the following conditions. In sum, there are the following elements for 2007.

These events are some of the factors that trigger a new modification to the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds, which, in general, results as follows (Table 4).

What can be seen through the last modification to the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds is that for the State there is null priority to maintain the scientific and technological development from the Institutions that the Fordist Regime proposed. The National Institute of Forest, Agricultural and Livestock Research (INIFAP, formerly INIA) was the only organism focused on the development of varieties that survived and by this year the difference in production of varieties contrasted with the private sector.

The PRONASE, already officially extinct, leaves the SNICS that is proposed 1961 as a guarantee of quality for sale, it remains as such and other tasks that are completely administrative are added, such as the elaboration of norms, monitoring and evaluation of policies related to seeds, as well as sanctioning in case of not complying with the law.

This indicates an acceptance on technological dependency towards the United States, a continuous discourse that supports the logic of maximum earnings, by continuing to promote the increase in yields as only solution in face of Mexico’s “productive deficiency”, which implies continuing to promote the technological packages that were established since the Green Revolution and which have remained until today (^{Alimonda, 2013}).

In this sense, speaking of the Green Revolution leads to observing that scientific-technological development has not changed in form, while it continues to be dependent on the same products that it created since its start. Although it has expanded to genetic fields with transgenic plants, the objective in the discourse continues to be the same: “Competitiveness, profitability, productivity”, and the control products are also the same (agrichemicals, machinery, modernized irrigation, etc.), even when the negative environmental effects of these products have been widely proven. It is possible to state that the Green Revolution is not experienced in a different way, but rather that it has become more violent with its transgenic element and with the modification of laws in favor of the market and the business of live species (^{GRAIN, 2014}).

In this sense, within the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds, this fact is reinforced by showing that the state priority is to regulate and promote the improvement of seeds and their use, which implies that any other form of production that is not in agreement with what has been promoted since the Fordism years will be left in last place; since then the laws showed an inclination towards industrial agriculture and protection of breeder’s rights. This can be seen in Article 33, which shows the intention to make illegal any practice that makes available seeds that are not labeled or purchased with an invoice (^{Dyer et al., 2014}).

In these terms, the present law seems to be the most radical in terms of control measures towards the traditional forms of reproduction and management of seeds, and with it (if it were to be implemented), it would seek to have power and total subordination of the culture and diversity of maize under capital (^{Espinosa et al., 2013}; ^{Montecinos, 2014}). It is what Silvia Federici has called a violent appropriation of nature in the moments of capital reconstruction, with the practices of traditional selection and exchange, game relationships, and products from scientific-technological development, being catalysts of exploitation (^{Navarro, 2015}).

This is because the emergence of this law coincides with the economic crisis that began in 2007, year when the oil price, essential raw material for the production of agrichemicals and the use of machinery, rose and reached exorbitant levels, affecting the monopolies that produce technology. If in prior decades it was, according to Blanca Rubio, the surplus crisis of the post-war period, a factor that allowed the agrifood dominion of the United States over Mexico, it is possible that there is also a connection between the changes to the Law for Production, Certification and Commerce of Seeds, and the civilizing crisis that drives the capital to seek new forms of accumulation (Rubio, 2014).

The first stage of the FZ002 project was launched that same year, which was financed by the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (Comisión Nacional para el Conocimiento y Uso de la Biodiversidad, CONABIO), and had the objective of “exploring and collecting native maize varieties and their wild relatives to determine their current diversity and distribution”, with the exception of Oaxaca and Michoacán (^{Ortega et al., 2013}). This information refers to a state interest for delving into the knowledge of the live heritage that in recent decades has served to create all the varieties of the current market. The interest over creating databases about diversity also agrees with the race for patents that developed countries have in Latin America, zone recognized for its ecological wealth.

Scenario present in the legal framework since the last modification

Since 2007 and until today, eleven years have passed and although there are no new modifications to the seed laws, there are intentions to modify them. There is an initiative about modifying the Federal Law on Plant Varieties from 1996 which, according to Alejandro Espinoza Calderón, is linked to the state’s interest to place Mexico in Act 91 of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). This situation would pressure every farmer to become incorporated to the National Catalog of Plant Varieties (Catálogo Nacional de Variedades Vegetales, CNVV) to be able to be deserving of seed grading, mandatory activity, according to Article 33, which would make illegal any other type of exchange or sale (Espinoza et al., 2014).

It is important to highlight that Article 33 has not yet been implemented and this can be related to the fact that forcing to label each maize variety can be a task that finds such a huge diversity, that it becomes impractical to carry out the task of control. In addition to this, there is still not such a strong institutional complex to monitor, sanction, manage, certify, etc., each and every one of the thousands of varieties, as well as each one of the thousands of maize producers in Mexico.

Presently, through INIFAP, technology is still developed and produced; however, its participation in these activities (0.5 %) contrasts considerably with the private companies (95.7 %). In addition to this, it is known that the institution mentioned is immersed in one of the most critical periods of its history, related to the massive layoff of researchers, corruption and budget cuts, thus marking the future of Mexican research in matters of seeds (^{Aboites, 2012}; ^{Pérez, 2014}).

In contrast, there are private monopolies that control the market and the research on seeds, which lead the path of scientific and technological development in the production of foods with a limiting productive strategy that adheres to massively producing the same modifications since the first commercial incursions of 1996: resistance to herbicides (57 %), resistance to insects (28 %) and piled events (a plant with both characteristics) (15 %) (^{James, 2014}). This underlines the scientific subordination to the development of profitable merchandises, which, for one of the companies that produces globally most agrichemicals, just in 2014, meant earnings of 14 thousand million dollars (^{2000Agro, 2013}).

In this sense, and in order to close this section, we can observe that the neoliberal regime has shown many changes in seed laws in favor of private rights. Likewise, the development of science has continued at microscopic horizons with commercial aims.

In this sense, there is both the regime and the scientific-technological development interfered by a type of capitalism that rebuilds with the support of both elements, and it is through moments of crisis that it seeks new dimensions of exploitation. As ^{Polanyi expressed well: “the motive of earnings surpassed that of subsistence” (Polanyi, 2015}).

Definitively, the relationship of industry-agriculture dominion is a relationship that represents the dominion of the market over life, specifically its forms of reproduction - in this case of seed reproduction, and of seeds as a first link in the food chain. This is due to the quest for controlling them to be able to commercialize them, and thus continue reproducing more capital. Its contradictory existence is prolonged with this, through the most violent practices there are towards life and Earth (^{Navarro, 2015}).

Final considerations

When we refer to commercialization of life in this work, we refer to complex acts of creation of institutions, knowledge, conceptions of nature under the intention of accumulating capital. In the quest for becoming integrated into life on Earth, this transforms cultural, ecological and evolutionary processes. The economy that could apply the premise of reproducing life, focusing on the values of use and vital needs, in Capitalism becomes an economy precisely of the capital that is centered on the values of change and the conquest of every element that makes up life -genes, work, seeds, food, etc. -with accumulation as a single objective (^{Machado, 2011}).

In turn, science faces the complex element that assists capitalism and which has been created by man to understand, dissect and use the elements that integrate life. According to words by Lynn ^{White: “scientific knowledge means a technological power over nature” (White , 2007} [1967]).

Currently this is the viewpoint that marks the way of researching, creating knowledge, and intervening in the processes of reproduction of plant and animal species (^{Machado, 2011}). Biotechnology is not disarticulated from the logic of maximum earnings, or from the search to accumulate more capital; for some specialists it is considered an enterprise (^{Sunder, 2007}).

As Kunder Sunder Rajan explains, specifically in the theme of transgenic organisms, the legal status of DNA sequences depends on the technological mechanisms that produce it; meanwhile, the production and continuous use of these sequences depend absolutely on the legal status. In this sense, the coproduction is based on a contextual rather than chance relationship, that it, the life sciences are well determined by the economic-political structure that is currently ruled by capital (Sunder, 2007).

However, it is important to mention that science is not subordinate completely to the economic-political regimes, since it also exerts pressure with the advances that arise to modify social organization, and as could be observed in the development of the study: “political institutions direct and are directed in the same proportion by investments in science and technology” (^{Jasanoff, 2004}).

This study refers to this context of coproductive relationship, insofar as the existence of the regimes of accumulation and the existence of science are ways that human beings have of understanding their environment which are modified mutually and simultaneously, exerting power one over the other while one advances more than the other (^{Sunder, 2007}; ^{Jasanoff, 2004}).

It is essential to observe that in this path of understanding the world, the way in which human beings situate their existence determines the relationship they establish with the ecosystem and with their own lives. The path of commercialization of life has reflected an anthropocentric vision that has marked the forms of regimes of accumulation and scientific-technological development (^{Machado, 2010}).