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vol.37 issue144El gobierno como empleador de última instancia: una alternativa de programa público de empleo (PPE) author indexsubject indexsearch form
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Problemas del desarrollo

Print version ISSN 0301-7036

Abstract

CABALLERO, Gonzalo. Abriendo la caja negra del estado español: reglas, vetos, intereses y jerarquía en la formación de la política económica. Prob. Des [online]. 2006, vol.37, n.144, pp.193-219. ISSN 0301-7036.

The new institutional economy has incorporated into the organizations the agenda of economic research based on renewed theoretical bases, in which the State appears as a key element. This paper tries to open up the black box of the Spanish State to study such elements as the establishment of parliamentarianism and the relationship between the political system and property rights. At the same time, it investigates the Spanish system for resolving trade-offs between resoluteness-decisiveness and public-private regard in the formation of public policies, and analyzes the relationship of vertical agency by which economic policy is formed. The State's organizational structure therefore established an institutional framework that biases the formation of public policies.

Keywords : institutional economies; State; parliamentarianism; vertical agency; public policies.

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