Resumo

GIANNATALE, Sonia Di. El componente de largo plazo de la relación entre la remuneración al ejecutivo y el desempeño de la empresa.Traduzido porEduardo L. Suárez. El trimestre econ [online]. 2005, vol.72, n.288, pp.735-764.  Epub 07-Fev-2023. ISSN 2448-718X.  https://doi.org/10.20430/ete.v72i288.572.

In this paper we study the effect of short and long-term components of managerial compensation in the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. We propose a dynamic agency model with capital accumulation to represent the decision making process of the principal regarding the optimal allocation of resources within the firm. From a numerical solution of this model, we produce model-generated data to compute pay-performance sensitivities that can be compared to those obtained in the empirical literature on CEO compensation. Our results are consistent with some of the observations reported in this literature. Our contribution in this article is the finding that past performances affect more the future compensation part of executive pay, while contemporaneous performances influence more the salary component of executive pay.

Palavras-chave : información asimétrica; acumulación de capital; contrato dinámico; compensación gerencial.

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