Resumo

MARIN AVILA, Esteban. Value Perception? Some Difficulties in Describing the Experience of Value from Husserl’s Phenomenology. En-clav. pen [online]. 2026, vol.20, n.39, pp.92-113.  Epub 27-Jan-2026. ISSN 2594-1100.  https://doi.org/10.46530/ecdp.v0i39.765.

The problem of the evidence of value is central to Husserl’s theory of practical rationality and ethics. For him, acting rationally involves, among other things, doing what one values. But how does a person know what is valuable to them? Husserl answers that someone has evidence that something is valuable when this value is manifested through feelings. Value awareness is an intentional experience in which values of objects or situations are apprehended in an affective or sentimental way, through sensations that include feelings. By calling this type of experience “valueception” [Wertnehmung], Husserl suggests that it has structural features analogous to those of perception [Wahrnehmung]. This article addresses, from a Husserlian perspective, the problem of providing a phenomenological description of the evidence of value and highlights aspects that make it more complex than that of perception. First, valueception is not independent of doxical evidence and is linked to practical intentionality. Second, the feelings in which values are manifested are more opaque and more difficult to identify than the sensations of perception. Finally, unlike perceived objects, what is valued is subject to constant change. In relation to this topic, the role of instincts in the awareness of value is reflected upon, as well as the relevance of fantasy and art in the constitution of new values, suggesting that valueception has a flexible and indeterminate relationship with its intentional object.

Palavras-chave : Valueception; Wertnehmung; axiology; ethics; phenomenology of feelings; philosophy of value.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )