Abstract

FLORES DIAZ, Jorge Gerardo. The reduction of public funding for political parties in Jalisco (2017-2022). Rev. Mex. Sociol [online]. 2025, vol.87, n.2, pp.429-455.  Epub May 02, 2025. ISSN 2594-0651.  https://doi.org/10.22201/iis.01882503p.2025.2.62743.

This article focuses on the behavior of the political parties involved in the approval, implementation and abrogation of the reform to reduce public funding for political parties in Jalisco, which was in force from 2017 until 2022. In addition, it analyzes the usefulness of both the revenue maximizing and the electoral economy perspective (rational choice theory) to understand this case. Results show that the behavior of political parties changes according to the political context and their position in the party system. The largest parties (PRI, PAN and PMC) opted as a priority to waive public funding to obtain a relative advantage in the electoral competition (electoral economy model), and they only opted to increase public funding to themselves when the electoral cost seemed low; while the minority parties (PVEM and PESJ-Somos) sought at every turn to increase public funding to themselves (revenue-maximizing model).

Keywords : public funding for political parties; political parties in Jalisco; rational choice theory.

        · abstract in Spanish     · text in Spanish     · Spanish ( pdf )