Resumo

CANTALA, David  e  MENDOZA-PALACIOS, Saúl. Treating equals equally and unequals unequally in one-sided matching markets. Estud. Econ. (México, D.F.) [online]. 2025, vol.40, n.1, e461.  Epub 23-Maio-2025. ISSN 0186-7202.  https://doi.org/10.24201/ee.v40i1.e461.

We introduce in the one-sided assignment game by Shapley and Scarf (1974) the requirement called “Treating equals equally and unequal unequally” (TEEUU). We model an assignment as a measurable function that assigns a type of good to each type of agent. We establish: 1) a method, originated in optimal transportation theory, to find a TEEUU assignment in the core whenever it existsby searching a Pareto optimal assignmentand 2) conditions under which a TEEUU assignment in the core always exists.

Palavras-chave : one-sided matching; optimal transportation theory; Pareto optimality; core; C61; C62; C78; D51; D79.

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