Abstract

SOVILLA, Bruno  and  MORALES VELASCO, Cristal Edali. Incomplete fiscal federalism and secessionist threat in Mexico. Inv. Econ [online]. 2025, vol.84, n.332, pp.84-112.  Epub Oct 27, 2025. ISSN 0185-1667.  https://doi.org/10.22201/fe.01851667p.2025.332.90846.

Since the fiscal decentralization process began in 1980, territorial inequality among the poorest and richest regions of the Mexican Republic has grown.

In this work, states are divided into two groups: Those that contribute more to the federal budget than they receive and are considered fiscally surplus, and those that contribute less and are in deficit.

It is shown that the fiscal deficit of the poorest states has been able to be financed through oil revenues. However, this situation is not sustainable and to maintain the current levels of transfers to the most deficient regions, it will be necessary to squeeze more from the taxpayers of the richest states.

Without a new fiscal pact between the states, demands for greater autonomy in the richest regions will increase, as has recently happened in other countries.

Keywords : Fiscal federalism; fiscal decentralization; fiscal subsidy; transfers; oil.

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