

Table A1: Demographic Descriptive Data from Survey Sample

Demographic Variable		Average	St. Dev.	Frequency	%
Age		45.43	11.23		
	Under 25			43	1.20
	25-39			1108	31.01
	40-54			1537	43.02
	55-64			687	19.23
	65+			156	4.37
Gender	NA			42	1.17
	Male			1815	50.80
	Female			1727	48.33
	Other			16	0.45
Education level	NA			15	0.42
	None			9	0.28
	Primary			24	0.74
	Secondary			238	7.31
	Post-Secondary, not University			194	5.96
	University			1006	30.91
Years Employed by Government	Post-graduate			1784	54.81
		14.35	10.23		

Demographic Variable		Average	St. Dev.	Frequency	%
Department	Agriculture			125	3.97
	Business			38	1.21
	Communica- tion			85	2.70
	Culture/ En- tertainment			41	1.30
	Defense			60	1.90
	Economy			96	3.05
	Education			684	21.17
	Energy			40	1.27
	Environment			119	3.78
	Family Ser- vices			22	0.70
	Foreign Rela- tions			49	1.56
	Health			244	7.74
	Immigration/ Migration			16	0.51
	Infrastructure			104	3.30
	Insurance			11	0.35
	Justice			306	9.71
	Labor			34	1.08
	Legislation			38	1.21
	Public Fi- nance			86	2.73
	Public Mana- gement			387	12.28
	Public Secu- rity			43	1.36
	Science			110	3.49
	Social Deve- lopment			82	2.60
	Tourism			11	0.35
	Transporta- tion			28	0.89
	Other			292	9.27
Appointed vs. Hired	Appointed			150	5.09
	Hired			2795	94.91

Demographic Variable		Average	St. Dev.	Frequency	%
Assessment of President's Performance	Very Bad			948	36.38
	Bad			537	20.55
	Neither Good nor Bad			625	23.92
	Good			382	14.62
	Very Good			121	4.63
Ideology	0 (Left)			90	3.58
	1			136	5.41
	2			251	10.00
	3			339	13.50
	4			287	11.43
	5 (Middle)			418	16.64
	6			246	9.79
	7			268	10.67
	8			236	9.39
	9			103	4.10
	10 (Right)			138	5.49
Country Economic Perceptions	Better			362	13.54
	Same			588	21.99
	Worse			1724	64.47
Safe	Very Unsafe			503	18.74
	Somewhat Unsafe			825	30.74
	Somewhat Safe			1045	38.93
	Very Safe			311	11.59
Corruption Perceptions	Very Uncommon			58	2.19
	Uncommon			373	14.06
	Common			1043	39.31
	Very Common			1179	44.44

Demographic Variable		Average	St. Dev.	Frequency	%
Trust in Others	Never			209	7.20
	Sometimes			1559	53.74
	Most of the Time			1035	35.68
	Always			98	3.38
Personal Finance	Much Worse			464	16.02
	Somewhat Worse			746	25.76
	About the Same			1153	39.81
	Somewhat Better			476	16.44
	Much Better			57	1.97
Trust in Legislature	Not at All			982	34.60
	A Little			1042	36.72
	A Moderate Amount			673	23.71
	A Lot			141	4.97
Trust in Parties	Not at All			1284	45.15
	A Little			1013	35.62
	A Moderate Amount			473	16.63
	A Lot			74	2.60
Frequency of Watching the News	Never			55	1.93
	A few times a year			103	3.62
	A few times a month			182	6.40
	A few times a week			712	25.04
	Daily			1792	63.01
Took the Civil Service Exam	No			1302	43.39
	Yes			1346	44.85
	Don't know			353	11.76
Union Membership	No Available Union			247	8.20
	No			1754	58.25
	Yes			1010	33.54

Demographic Variable		Average	St. Dev.	Frequency	%
Time Spent Supervising Others	None of my time			1060	35.38
	A little of my time			596	19.89
	Some of my time			742	24.77
	Most of my time			598	19.96
Brazil Treatment	Control			235	7.55
	Treatment			203	6.06
	Not Part of the Experiment			2913	89.93
Mexico Treatments	Control			114	3.37
	Treatment One			120	3.55
	Treatment Two			91	2.69
	Not Part of the Experiment			3,117	98.08
Peru Treatments	Control			43	1.27
	Treatment One			45	1.33
	Treatment Two			35	1.03
	Not Part of the Experiment			3,263	96.37
Country	Argentina			146	4.09
	Brazil			553	15.50
	Chile			543	15.22
	Colombia			1050	29.44
	Mexico			413	11.58
	Panama			489	13.71
	Paraguay			227	6.36
	Peru			139	3.90
	Other			11	0.31

Table A2: Control Selection Justification

Control	Description	Citations
Ideology	Populist attitudes are exhibited most often by those on the ideological fringes, or those who affiliate with far-left or far-right parties. Populist attitudes also have a strong association with specific issue positions, such as socioeconomic issues. Ideology therefore may be a predictor of populist sentiments.	Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018 Singer, 2018 Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2017 Bakker & Schumacher, 2016 Ackermann et. al, 2023 Fossati, Muhtadi, & Warburton, 2022
Support for President	Satisfaction with the executive branch/ president may be willing to sacrifice democratic principle in favor of stronger power delegation to the president. This may be an indicator of both populist sentiments and lowered support for liberal democracy.	Singer, 2018 Ruth, 2018 Aytaç, Çarkoğlu, & Elçi, 2021 Hunter & Vega, 2022 Gidengil, Stolle, & Bergeron-Boutin, 2022 Şaşmaz, Yagci, & Ziblatt, 2022
Trust in the Legislature	Populists may support executive aggrandizement (a major mechanism of democratic backsliding) due to declining trust in democratic institutions. This variable is therefore correlated with both populist attitudes and support for liberal democracy.	Mauk, 2020 Monsiváis-Carrillo, 2023 Geurkink, et. al, 2020
Personal Finance	Fluctuations in government economic performance influences support for democracy. Personal income, as a signal of financial security or insecurity and a potential signal of government economic effectiveness, may thus influence our outcomes. Personal income may also be associated with populist sentiments, our independent variables.	Claassen & Magalhães, 2022 Mudde & Rovira, 2018 Rooduijn & Burgoon, 2018 Elchardus & Spruyt, 2016
Country	Our data is comprised of data from multiple countries. The status of democracy and political situations of each of these countries is vastly different. Therefore, we used country fixed effects in our model.	Nature of the data (panel style data)
Treatments	Data comes from experimental survey data. Some respondents received a prime intended to shift their reported support for democracy. These primes are controlled for by adding treatment controls.	Nature of the data

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Table A3: Populism Measures and Satisfaction with Democracy

	Dependent variable:	
	Satisfaction with Democracy	Assessment of Country's Democracy
	(1)	(2)
Anti-Elite Populist Dimension	0.086* (0.037)	-0.514*** (0.057)
Pro-People Populist Dimension	0.011 (0.026)	-0.088 (0.047)
Manichean Populist Dimension	-0.004 (0.056)	-0.237*** (0.056)
Ideology	-0.007 (0.019)	0.190** (0.072)
Support for President	-0.133** (0.051)	0.456** (0.146)
Trust in Legislature	-0.148*** (0.027)	0.501*** (0.063)
Personal Finance	-0.005 (0.013)	0.029 (0.036)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.008*** (0.282)	5.157*** (1.109)
Observations	1818	1818
R2	0.294	0.255
*p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01		

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country. Controls included for treatments.

Table A4: Populism Dimensions and Support for Democracy

	Dependent variable:			
	Conceptual (1)	Legislative (2)	Parties (3)	Demonstrations (4)
Anti-Elite Populism Dimension	-0.005 (0.098)	-0.026 (0.063)	-0.074 (0.066)	0.205** (0.065)
Pro-People Populism Dimension	0.221* (0.086)	0.147*** (0.039)	0.235*** (0.050)	0.275*** (0.067)
Manichean Populism Dimension	-0.218* (0.091)	-0.252*** (0.032)	-0.204*** (0.038)	-0.123* (0.051)
Ideology	0.041 (0.028)	-0.038 (0.029)	-0.040 (0.024)	-0.053* (0.026)
Support for President	-0.157*** (0.047)	-0.461*** (0.061)	-0.278*** (0.034)	-0.216* (0.088)
Trust in Legislature	0.150* (0.072)	0.088 (0.048)	-0.020 (0.048)	0.029 (0.095)
Personal Finance	-0.045 (0.023)	0.011 (0.036)	0.032 (0.026)	0.025 (0.034)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	5.592*** (0.895)	6.329*** (0.394)	6.857*** (0.425)	3.875*** (0.280)
Observations	1817	1816	1814	1814
R2	0.089	0.192	0.135	0.125

* p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country. Controls included for treatments.

**Table A5: Populism Dimensions and Satisfaction with Democracy,
Individual Index Populism Dimensions**

	Dependent Variable					
	Satisfaction with Democracy			Country is A Full Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-Elite Populism Dimension	0.062 (0.046)			-0.390*** (0.076)		
Pro-People Populism Dimension		0.018 (0.023)			-0.125*** (0.038)	
Manichean Populism Dimension			-0.017 (0.062)			-0.182* (0.081)
Assessment of President's Performance	-0.114** (0.040)	-0.119* (0.049)	-0.122** (0.047)	0.364*** (0.090)	0.421*** (0.095)	0.416*** (0.097)
Ideology	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.021)	0.209*** (0.063)	0.209** (0.072)	0.207** (0.072)
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.006)
Gender	0.065 (0.040)	0.058 (0.039)	0.062 (0.037)	-0.221 (0.118)	-0.193 (0.124)	-0.188 (0.109)
Education	0.008 (0.020)	0.008 (0.018)	0.008 (0.027)	0.039 (0.082)	0.039 (0.088)	0.007 (0.088)
Country Econ	-0.065 (0.047)	-0.069 (0.050)	-0.068 (0.049)	0.264 (0.266)	0.286 (0.274)	0.280 (0.267)
Safety	-0.012 (0.033)	-0.020 (0.032)	-0.014 (0.031)	0.138 (0.080)	0.146* (0.071)	0.140 (0.076)
Corruption	0.043 (0.023)	0.051 (0.028)	0.052* (0.026)	-0.271** (0.105)	-0.329** (0.102)	-0.322** (0.107)
Trust	-0.017 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.027 (0.034)	0.155 (0.101)	0.193 (0.127)	0.162 (0.111)
Personal Finance	0.003 (0.015)	-0.004 (0.012)	-0.001 (0.015)	0.046 (0.041)	0.043 (0.052)	0.050 (0.044)
Legislative Trust	-0.074* (0.030)	-0.088** (0.031)	-0.084* (0.034)	0.300** (0.096)	0.336*** (0.090)	0.356*** (0.098)

	Dependent Variable					
	Satisfaction with Democracy			Country is A Full Democracy		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Party Trust	-0.086* (0.037)	-0.090** (0.034)	-0.086** (0.030)	0.152 (0.119)	0.185 (0.103)	0.201 (0.108)
News Trust	-0.054* (0.023)	-0.064** (0.022)	-0.060** (0.021)	0.267*** (0.056)	0.294*** (0.058)	0.281*** (0.057)
Income	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.076 (0.044)	0.079 (0.045)	0.076 (0.041)
Brazil Treatment	0.118*** (0.007)	0.102*** (0.004)	0.116*** (0.008)	0.483*** (0.024)	0.360*** (0.020)	0.441*** (0.022)
Mexico Treatment 1	0.014 (0.011)	0.023* (0.011)	0.019* (0.009)	-0.578*** (0.050)	-0.631*** (0.049)	-0.631*** (0.045)
Mexico Treatment 2	-0.140*** (0.021)	-0.143*** (0.023)	-0.151*** (0.018)	-0.009 (0.058)	0.025 (0.053)	0.013 (0.054)
Peru Treatment 1	0.075 (0.041)	0.117*** (0.007)	0.123*** (0.028)	-0.128 (0.104)	-0.423*** (0.047)	-0.338*** (0.071)
Peru Treatment 2	0.063 (0.034)	0.097*** (0.018)	0.099*** (0.023)	-0.057 (0.045)	-0.280*** (0.055)	-0.251*** (0.053)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.156*** (0.375)	3.423*** (0.274)	3.504*** (0.317)	2.425* (1.035)	1.208 (0.984)	1.268 (1.002)
Observations	1,786	1,775	1,781	1,786	1,776	1,781
R2	0.313	0.309	0.307	0.286	0.277	0.275

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country * p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01

Table A6: Populism Dimensions and Satisfaction with Democracy, extended controls

	Dependent variable:	
	Satisfaction with Democracy	Assessment of Country's Democracy
	(1)	(2)
Anti-Elite Populism Dimension	0.049 (0.041)	-0.342*** (0.071)
Pro-People Populism Dimension	0.010 (0.029)	-0.106** (0.038)
Manichean Populism Dimension	-0.010 (0.062)	-0.203** (0.074)
Assessment of President's Performance	-0.115** (0.044)	0.362*** (0.096)
Ideology	-0.012 (0.016)	0.193** (0.072)
Age	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.010)
Gender	0.078* (0.035)	-0.243* (0.117)
Education	0.021 (0.018)	0.027 (0.108)
Country Econ	-0.066 (0.053)	0.306 (0.266)
Safety	-0.027 (0.035)	0.127 (0.077)
Corruption	0.047 (0.025)	-0.262* (0.125)
Trust	-0.022 (0.036)	0.174 (0.120)
Personal Finance	-0.012 (0.010)	0.070 (0.044)
Legislative Trust	-0.086** (0.028)	0.293** (0.099)
Party Trust	-0.070* (0.027)	0.130 (0.142)

	Dependent variable:	
	Satisfaction with Democracy	Assessment of Country's Democracy
	(1)	(2)
News Trust	-0.056* (0.023)	0.262*** (0.041)
Income	0.002 (0.007)	0.052 (0.052)
Years Employed	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)
Appointed Position	0.026 (0.097)	-0.187 (0.170)
Union Membership	-0.041 (0.029)	-0.000 (0.177)
Supervisory Level	-0.026 (0.023)	0.103** (0.038)
Took Civil Service Exam	-0.047 (0.027)	0.160*** (0.041)
Brazil Treatment	0.111*** (0.009)	0.436*** (0.029)
Mexico Treatment 1	0.034*** (0.007)	-0.695*** (0.067)
Mexico Treatment 2	-0.115*** (0.025)	-0.087 (0.075)
Peru Treatment 1	0.086 (0.056)	-0.251 (0.148)
Peru Treatment 2	0.098* (0.039)	-0.049 (0.147)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Department Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.462*** (0.462)	2.765 (1.638)
Observations	1638	1638
R ²	0.325	

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country

* p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01

Table A7: Populism Dimensions and Support for Democracy,
Individual Index Populism Dimensions

Dependent variable:											
Conceptual			Legislative			Parties			Demonstrations		
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Anti-Elite Popu- lism Dimension	0.039 (0.103)		0.039 (0.071)			-0.010 (0.059)			0.254*** (0.066)		
Pro-People Popu- lism Dimension	0.214* (0.103)			0.140*** (0.031)			0.250*** (0.050)			0.239*** (0.070)	
Manichean Popu- lism Dimension		-0.200* (0.087)			-0.191*** (0.024)			-0.157*** (0.033)			-0.093 (0.058)
Assessment of President's Per- formance	-0.155*** (0.019)	-0.157*** (0.021)	-0.426*** (0.055)	-0.419*** (0.046)	-0.429*** (0.048)	-0.222*** (0.034)	-0.214*** (0.038)	-0.224*** (0.038)	-0.202* (0.091)	-0.235* (0.092)	-0.236* (0.099)
Ideology	0.039 (0.020)	0.047* (0.021)	-0.041 (0.026)	-0.033 (0.024)	-0.043 (0.028)	-0.050* (0.021)	-0.038* (0.019)	-0.052* (0.021)	-0.057* (0.026)	-0.047 (0.028)	-0.063* (0.031)
Age	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008* (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.000 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.010** (0.003)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.011** (0.003)
Gender	0.012 (0.074)	0.005 (0.075)	0.183*** (0.076)	0.199*** (0.046)	0.176*** (0.048)	0.214*** (0.082)	0.220** (0.078)	0.208* (0.081)	0.223*** (0.069)	0.212** (0.081)	0.219** (0.078)
Education	0.075 (0.050)	0.067 (0.050)	0.135** (0.043)	0.131** (0.044)	0.105* (0.041)	0.140* (0.057)	0.124* (0.055)	0.117 (0.063)	0.055 (0.043)	0.047 (0.045)	0.055 (0.041)
Country Econ	0.021 (0.081)	0.009 (0.083)	-0.143* (0.064)	-0.144* (0.062)	-0.147* (0.065)	-0.197*** (0.037)	-0.202*** (0.038)	-0.192*** (0.038)	0.001 (0.034)	-0.015 (0.040)	-0.003 (0.041)

Dependent variable:												
Conceptual			Legislative			Parties			Demonstrations			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Safety	0.066	0.063	0.052	0.053	0.054	0.041	0.089*	0.093*	0.082*	0.103	0.107*	0.094
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.055)
Corruption	0.054	0.058	0.062	-0.175*	-0.161*	-0.165*	-0.039	-0.032	-0.030	0.151***	0.201***	0.192***
	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.088)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Trust	0.127*	0.113	0.101	0.245***	0.234***	0.230***	0.256***	0.234**	0.236**	0.315***	0.280***	0.286***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.055)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.042)	(0.043)
Personal Finance	-0.048*	-0.044	-0.045	-0.003	0.005	-0.004	0.023	0.037	0.025	0.040	0.045	0.034
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Legislative Trust	0.010	0.014	0.007	0.014	0.018	0.016	-0.108	-0.093	-0.106*	-0.033	-0.071	-0.064
	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.092)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.083)	(0.088)	(0.086)
Party Trust	0.180*	0.183*	0.179*	-0.027	-0.039	-0.034	0.024	0.031	0.043	0.030	0.027	0.013
	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.082)	(0.076)	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.081)
News Trust	0.106*	0.090	0.093	0.126***	0.121***	0.120***	0.153***	0.141**	0.139**	0.110**	0.080	0.093*
	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.045)
Income	0.060***	0.059***	0.062***	0.078***	0.078***	0.077***	0.053**	0.050**	0.056**	0.043	0.038	0.039
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.022)	(0.025)
Brazil Treatment	-0.171***	-0.162***	-0.160***	0.137***	0.147***	0.123***	-0.293***	-0.275***	-0.257***	-0.050**	-0.000	-0.058**
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Mexico Treat- ment 1	-0.274***	-0.241***	-0.283***	0.112***	0.132***	0.098***	0.511***	0.541***	0.500***	0.098***	0.157***	0.116***
	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.025)

Dependent variable:												
Conceptual			Legislative			Parties			Demonstrations			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	
Mexico Treatment 2	0.037	0.071*	-0.003	0.218***	0.238***	0.179***	0.198***	0.243***	0.172***	0.330***	0.336***	0.279***
	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Peru Treatment 1	-0.245***	-0.185**	-0.144***	-0.996***	-0.947***	-0.903***	-0.750***	-0.718***	-0.706***	0.014	0.220***	0.222***
	(0.060)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.057)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.058)
Peru Treatment 2	0.054	0.088	0.091	-0.455***	-0.428***	-0.413***	-0.236***	-0.233***	-0.228***	-0.020	0.137**	0.132**
	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.049)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.769***	3.065***	4.552***	4.504***	3.983***	5.314***	4.676***	3.557***	5.135***	2.091***	2.171***	3.507***
	(0.625)	(0.395)	(0.395)	(0.490)	(0.305)	(0.464)	(0.294)	(0.307)	(0.453)	(0.409)	(0.582)	(0.244)
Observations	1785	1775	1780	1784	1774	1779	1782	1772	1777	1782	1772	1777
R2	0.102	0.111	0.111	0.224	0.225	0.230	0.170	0.182	0.177	0.145	0.145	0.135
Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country												
* p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01												

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country * p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01

Table A8: Populism Dimensions and Support for Democracy, Extended Controls

	Dependent variable:			
	Conceptual (1)	Legislative (2)	Parties (3)	Demonstrations (4)
Anti-Elite Populism Dimension	0.030 (0.099)	0.032 (0.079)	-0.017 (0.066)	0.222*** (0.065)
Pro-People Populism Dimension	0.199 (0.107)	0.111** (0.039)	0.216*** (0.053)	0.209*** (0.061)
Manichean Populism Dimension	-0.200** (0.071)	-0.189*** (0.009)	-0.130*** (0.029)	-0.067 (0.043)
Assessment of President's Performance	-0.162*** (0.022)	-0.400*** (0.061)	-0.219*** (0.032)	-0.201* (0.084)
Ideology	0.042 (0.024)	-0.042 (0.029)	-0.044** (0.014)	-0.035* (0.015)
Age	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.007)
Gender	0.024 (0.075)	0.165* (0.069)	0.176* (0.084)	0.255*** (0.069)
Education	0.057 (0.051)	0.046 (0.046)	0.104 (0.054)	0.024 (0.058)
Country Econ	0.006 (0.094)	-0.155** (0.051)	-0.183*** (0.021)	-0.019 (0.042)
Safety	0.068 (0.053)	0.045 (0.060)	0.104* (0.045)	0.115** (0.043)
Corruption	0.066** (0.022)	-0.167 (0.099)	-0.025 (0.082)	0.146*** (0.028)
Trust	0.106 (0.077)	0.185** (0.070)	0.196* (0.078)	0.269*** (0.054)
Personal Finance	-0.020 (0.030)	0.013 (0.040)	0.051 (0.031)	0.043 (0.046)
Legislative Trust	0.072 (0.098)	0.020 (0.070)	-0.137* (0.069)	-0.036 (0.083)
Party Trust	0.182* (0.074)	-0.047 (0.065)	0.042 (0.049)	0.017 (0.072)

	Dependent variable:			
	Conceptual (1)	Legislative (2)	Parties (3)	Demonstrations (4)
News Trust	0.037 (0.050)	0.101*** (0.029)	0.117* (0.051)	0.110** (0.041)
Income	0.062*** (0.012)	0.086*** (0.019)	0.065*** (0.018)	0.054* (0.027)
Years Employed	0.001 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.007)
Appointed Position	0.085 (0.097)	-0.037 (0.242)	-0.089 (0.172)	0.107 (0.177)
Union Membership	-0.051 (0.047)	-0.048 (0.070)	-0.091 (0.067)	0.077 (0.058)
Supervisory Level	-0.009 (0.032)	0.033 (0.047)	-0.041 (0.031)	-0.053 (0.030)
Took Civil Service Exam	0.050 (0.092)	0.085 (0.083)	0.144*** (0.035)	0.035 (0.074)
Brazil Treatment	-0.196*** (0.022)	0.129*** (0.036)	-0.244*** (0.035)	-0.005 (0.026)
Mexico Treatment 1	-0.319*** (0.038)	0.005 (0.063)	0.446*** (0.028)	0.064 (0.046)
Mexico Treatment 2	0.006 (0.062)	0.054 (0.064)	0.124*** (0.034)	0.345*** (0.045)
Peru Treatment 1	-0.103 (0.089)	-0.965*** (0.075)	-0.813*** (0.068)	0.039 (0.093)
Peru Treatment 2	-0.098* (0.049)	-0.498*** (0.073)	-0.384*** (0.101)	-0.058 (0.105)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Department Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.285*** (.868)	4.55*** (.576)	3.944*** (.481)	1.032 (.611)
Observations	1637	1636	1634	1634
R2	0.152	0.241	0.215	0.181

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country

* p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Table A9: Populism Measures and Satisfaction with Democracy,
Individual Measures of Populism

	Dependent variable:	
	Satisfaction with Democracy	Assessment of Country's Democracy
	(1)	(2)
Populism Measure 1 (Anti-Elite Dimension Measure 1)	.034 (.029)	-.22*** (.061)
Populism Measure 7 (Anti-Elite Dimension Measure 2)	.036 (.02)	-.171*** (.043)
Populism Measure 2 (Pro-People Dimension Measure 1)	-.005 (.012)	.014 (.059)
Populism Measure 3 (Pro-People Dimension Measure 2)	.014 (.019)	-.099*** (.017)
Populism Measure 4 (Manichean Dimension Measure 1)	-.024 (.027)	-.091 (.059)
Populism Measure 5 (Manichean Dimension Measure 2)	.016 (.034)	-.094* (.04)
Assessment of President's Performance	-.113** (.043)	.368*** (.085)
Ideology	-.01 (.018)	.201** (.066)
Age	.001 (.002)	-.007 (.007)
Gender	.06 (.039)	-.195 (.122)
Education	.01 (.024)	.02 (.091)
Country Econ	-.066 (.048)	.27 (.264)
Safety	-.018 (.032)	.144* (.074)
Corruption	.038 (.024)	-.257* (.113)

	Dependent variable:	
	Satisfaction with Democracy	Assessment of Country's Democracy
	(1)	(2)
Trust	-.012 (.029)	.155 (.11)
Personal Finance	-.006 (.011)	.047 (.049)
Legislative Trust	-.074** (.028)	.274** (.091)
Party Trust	-.08* (.035)	.165 (.117)
News Trust	-.059** (.021)	.269*** (.053)
Income	0 (.006)	.074 (.045)
Brazil Treatment	.097*** (.007)	.404*** (.027)
Mexico Treatment 1	.021** (.007)	-.61*** (.044)
Mexico Treatment 2	-.138*** (.02)	-.062 (.06)
Peru Treatment 1	.08 (.051)	-.086 (.116)
Peru Treatment 2	.054 (.041)	-.011 (.064)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.179*** (.501)	3.256** (1.282)
Observations	1762	1762
R2	.314	.291

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country

* p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01

Table A10: Populism Measures and Support for Democracy,
Individual Measures of Populism

	Dependent variable:			
	Conceptual	Legislative	Parties	Demonstra- tions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Populism Measure 1 (Anti-Elite Dimension Measure 1)	.057 (.045)	-.005 (.06)	-.008 (.037)	.235*** (.06)
Populism Measure 7 (Anti-Elite Dimension Measure 2)	-.058 (.058)	.055 (.045)	-.005 (.043)	-.007 (.036)
Populism Measure 2 (Pro-Peo- ple Dimension Measure 1)	.335** (.122)	-.102** (.038)	.045 (.051)	.13** (.054)
Populism Measure 3 (Pro-Peo- ple Dimension Measure 2)	-.029 (.029)	.145*** (.027)	.146*** (.018)	.093** (.029)
Populism Measure 4 (Mani- chean Dimension Measure 1)	-.027 (.043)	-.062* (.029)	-.08*** (.016)	0 (.033)
Populism Measure 5 (Mani- chean Dimension Measure 2)	-.156** (.052)	-.123*** (.026)	-.063** (.024)	-.077*** (.021)
Assessment of President's Performance	-.138*** (.024)	-.419*** (.049)	-.223*** (.035)	-.196* (.083)
Ideology	.042* (.022)	-.035 (.028)	-.04* (.018)	-.045* (.022)
Age	.002 (.004)	-.007** (.003)	.001 (.004)	-.008** (.003)
Gender	.016 (.067)	.194*** (.049)	.213** (.081)	.221** (.08)
Education	.021 (.05)	.107** (.04)	.117 (.068)	.031 (.046)
Country Econ	.002 (.082)	-.151* (.065)	-.201*** (.039)	-.004 (.039)
Safety	.06 (.052)	.04 (.043)	.085* (.041)	.109* (.052)
Corruption	.058** (.024)	-.166 (.089)	-.026 (.08)	.153*** (.032)

	Dependent variable:			
	Conceptual (1)	Legislative (2)	Parties (3)	Demonstrations (4)
Trust	.075 (.063)	.222*** (.048)	.214** (.074)	.254*** (.048)
Personal Finance	-.016 (.031)	-.009 (.038)	.032 (.03)	.054 (.04)
Legislative Trust	.019 (.105)	.024 (.062)	-.099 (.057)	-.021 (.079)
Party Trust	.174* (.086)	-.03 (.062)	.042 (.043)	.042 (.077)
News Trust	.068 (.052)	.125*** (.03)	.137** (.053)	.089* (.041)
Income	.061*** (.014)	.081*** (.018)	.054** (.018)	.035 (.022)
Brazil Treatment	-.158*** (.016)	.136*** (.017)	-.227*** (.013)	-.029 (.02)
Mexico Treatment 1	-.3*** (.025)	.12*** (.029)	.538*** (.023)	.102*** (.025)
Mexico Treatment 2	.056 (.045)	.199*** (.037)	.205*** (.027)	.368*** (.024)
Peru Treatment 1	-.175*** (.048)	-.919*** (.065)	-.658*** (.051)	.038 (.083)
Peru Treatment 2	.183*** (.046)	-.461*** (.041)	-.225*** (.039)	.013 (.073)
Country Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	3.211** (.961)	4.874*** (.444)	4.29*** (.274)	1.497*** (.296)
Observations	1761	1760	1758	1758
R2	.151	.24	.19	.171

Note: Robust Standard Errors clustered by country

* p< .10, **p<.05, ***p<0.01