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But, as soon as it is conceded that the law is a purposive institution, it becomes unavoidably normative: law in general and the law of particular jurisdictions consists not only of a collection of standards, requirements or prohibitions, but also of a range of purposes that animate them... what we expect of good judges deciding hard cases is *judgement*, where what is meant is not simply a resolution of the dispute, but a discerning assessment of what the law and its underpinning purposes or values require in the particular case.

Certainly, in hard cases, factual or fictional, such as the Elmer's case,³⁹ the Ida White's —or the vanished legacy— case,⁴⁰ the Speluncan explorers' case,⁴¹ and even the "No dogs (in the airport/railway station/subway)" rule⁴² or the "No vehicles in the park" rule,⁴³ the fidelity to law and to its purposes or values necessitates *LAI*. It will guide the judge in doing a virtuous judgement from the abstract to the concrete and back of what the law and its purposes or values truly need not only in most cases but also in exceptional ones that cry for a mitigation of the rigidities of the written law. In sum, I endorse Lucy's *LAI* and will like to push the argument even further.

³⁹ See *Riggs v. Palmer* 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E.188 (1889). See also Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (n 14) 23 and (n 13) 15-20.

⁴⁰ See Fred L. Gross, 'The Vanished Legacy', in *What Is the Verdict?* (MacMillan Company 1944) 115-161. See also Luis Recaséns Siches, *Nueva filosofía de la interpretación del derecho* (Fondo de Cultura Económica 1956) 256-269, and *Tratado general de filosofía del derecho* (Porrúa 1959) 647-654; and Imer B. Flores, 'La técnica jurídica en la aplicación del derecho' (1995) 45: 201-202 *Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de México* 17-55, 20-21.

⁴¹ See Fuller (n 37) 616-645. See also Peter Suber, *The Case of the Speluncan Explorers. Nine New Opinions* (Routledge 1998).

⁴² See Imer B Flores, 'The Problem about the Nature of Law *vis-à-vis* Legal Rationality Revisited: Towards an Integrative Jurisprudence', in Wil Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), *The Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law* (Oxford University Press 2013) 101-126, 118-122. See also Recaséns Siches (n 40) 645-647.

⁴³ See HLA Hart, 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) 71 *Harvard Law Review* 593-629, 606 (reprinted in *Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy* (Oxford University Press 1983) 49-87, 63); and, Hart (n 13) 124 (127). See also Imer B Flores, 'H.L.A. Hart's Moderate Indeterminacy Thesis Reconsidered: In Between Scylla and Charybdis?' (2011) 5 *Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho* 147-173, 157-158 and 171-172.