From Mexico-U.S. Undocumented Migrations
to Documented Flows of Laborers

De las migraciones indocumentadas desde México a Estados Unidos
a los flujos documentados de trabajadores

Gustavo Verduzco e Igartú

ABSTRACT
The objectives of this article are several: 1) To propose possible explanations for the migratory changes of the last years by sharply reducing the number of undocumented migrants and an increase to more than 200,000 legal workers using visas H2 per year; 2) to remark the importance of the historic labor contribution of Mexican workers to the U.S. labor market; 3) due to these facts, rethink the Mexico-U.S. relationship so that Mexico may be considered as a highly collaborative neighbor to the historical development of the United States. This work has been elaborated by integrating several research results from different sources, as well as with data from Emif-Norte and other statistical sources. Also, incorporating the author’s research experiences.

Keywords: 1. migration, 2. policies, 3. relationship, 4. Mexico, 5. United States.

RESUMEN
Son varios los objetivos del trabajo: 1) Plantear posibles explicaciones sobre el cambio migratorio de los últimos años al bajar fuertemente el número de migrantes no documentados a la vez que en pocos años aumentaron a más de 200,000 los trabajadores documentados con visas H2; 2) señalar la importancia de la histórica contribución laboral de los trabajadores mexicanos al mercado laboral de Estados Unidos; 3) con base en lo examinado, replantar aspectos varios de la relación de México con Estados Unidos más en el sentido de ser considerado como un vecino altamente colaborativo con lo que ha sido el desarrollo histórico de Estados Unidos. El trabajo ha sido elaborado a partir de la integración de resultados de investigación diversos, así como con datos de la Emif Norte y otras fuentes estadísticas e integrando las propias experiencias de investigación del autor.

INTRODUCTION

Migrations from Mexico to the United States, as well as mobilizations to Mexico from Central America aiming at the Mexico-U.S. border, have become highly recurring topics in the media. The first has been present for many years, but not so the second, which as of late has been gaining huge presence on the national stage and on the Mexico-U.S. border, and which appears novel, although in part only because it has been given greater media exposure, first due to the caravans and later due to the interventions of former President Donald Trump and the issue of possible refugees waiting on the Mexico-U.S. border, as well as due to greater presence of the National Guard (Guardia Nacional) in Mexico, especially on the southern border. In this regard, it must be recognized that these situations have been taking place in a context of very particular complexities, which is why they are outside the scope of this work.2

The main issue that will be dealt with below are the recent changes in the migration flows of Mexicans to the United States.

The peak in cases of undocumented Mexicans crossing the northern (Mexico-U.S.) border was reached in 2007, which later fell almost brutally in a few years. Such rapid decline was explained on grounds of the economic crisis of 2007-2009, however, as the crisis diminished, these undocumented migration flows were not seen again at the same scale; yet by 2013 and the years that followed, the new dominant pattern of Mexican migration to the United States was that of documented temporary flows that, first being few, were growing in intensity, focusing mainly on agriculture and services, and then the lesser professional flows, in this case both with temporary and resident visas. These changes were unprecedented and unexpected, and also different from those of the past due to their legal status. In this regard, we must remember the strong obstacles and deterrents by the U.S. government to even think about the possibility of agreements on legal migration from Mexico. In reality, what has happened lately has taken place in a somewhat surreptitious way, as part of a dynamic of labor supply and demand that has been occurring between the two countries in recent years, but without being clearly seen by the two governments, in such a way that now it is surprising that there is such an intense legal Mexican migration, taking place before an apparent government silence from both countries.

In studies on migration, attempts have been made to find different explanations for each period according to the set of characteristics evidenced by each of them. These characteristics have to do with changing situations of the contexts at both sides of the border, as well as with the characteristics of those who migrate at each moment in time. Discovering these dynamics

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2 It is an issue that has become more complicated as of late and that will not be dealt with here since, due to its breadth and difficulty, it calls for a central role that would now distract from the proposed objectives of this paper. However, it should be noted that the current migratory problem in this region of the world requires a broader vision encompassing all the countries, as is well suggested in the shared work of Giorguli-Saucedo, García-Guerrero, and Masferrer (2016). As of 2018, undocumented crossings of Mexicans have increased again, a situation that will not be discussed here either; still, a gradual but huge increase in the granting of temporary work visas is foreseen.
is somewhat complex and difficult, but also in our case we should not disconnect these more conjunctural analyzes from the broader long-term process, since Mexican labor contributions to the U.S. labor market have been continuous, although intermittent in intensity, for more than a century, and it is this continuity that tells us about a clearly defined labor integration.

On the other hand, we should raise awareness on the fact that these labor participations from Mexico have only been partially acknowledged both by the United States and Mexico; this has been so because for the United States the Mexican labor contributions have been illegal in most cases, thus not allowing for full consideration, and because for Mexico there is a guilt of sorts for the, in most cases, surreptitious border crossings that prevents from clearly pondering the value of the enormous historical labor contributions from Mexico. Yet legal or not, with or without guilt, Mexican labor contribution to the historical development of the United States has been forceful, as have been its economic and diverse repercussions for Mexico. This is the scenario to which we now have to add the new forms of labor insertion for Mexicans that we mentioned at the beginning.

With this background in mind, these are the objectives of this paper: the main one is to not only point out the novelty of the current changes, but above all to introduce a number of hypotheses on the circumstances that have probably had to do with these transformations. It is important to inquire on the meaning of this enormous decrease in undocumented migration flows: to which factors could it be due? Has the Mexican economy improved? Have immigration controls on the Mexico-U.S. border been more effective? Or is it a combination of both? Does the Mexican demographic dynamics have something to do with it? These are questions and scenarios that have to be accounted for.

A second objective is to point out various aspects of what has been an enormous Mexican labor insertion in the U.S. labor market, a situation that until now has not been properly addressed or calibrated, although what is going to be presented here in this regard is merely a starting point. I also believe that this enormous Mexican labor contribution to the U.S. economy, currently ongoing with the temporary and legal labor mobilizations of several hundred thousand people each year, should lead us to rethink important aspects of this bilateral relationship.

Migrations to “the North” have been taking place for more than a hundred years, migrations that have frequently been accompanied by frictions with the U.S. authorities, especially due to the whole issue of border crossings by that majority who have crossed without immigration documents.

Perhaps with the exception of the last few years, neither the Mexican nor the United States government really cared for what was happening, since the Mexican policy was not to have a policy regarding the migration issue, and that of the United States’ was to see with merely some suspicion how thousands of laborers arrived at no cost to them (Alba, Weintraub, Fernandez de Castro, & García y Griego, 1997). In practice, those who wanted to work there came and went at will with little inconvenience until perhaps a little over a decade ago, when
increased border surveillance made crossing much more difficult and costly (Anguiano & Trejo, 2007).

To begin, and going back a bit to the past for some brief examples, I will present quick information from the beginning of the 20th century: the Mexican Revolution years brought contingents of the Mexican population to the United States for refugee reasons; on the other hand, the prohibition of importing Chinese and later Japanese labor in the U.S. favored making use of Mexican labor, especially between 1910 and 1929 (García y Griego, 1989). The two World Wars of the 20th century also brought Mexican laborers to the United States under different circumstances at each moment; yet also in the midst of these events there was a great expulsion of Mexicans back to Mexican territory (García y Griego, 1989). Then, the end of the migratory quota system in the United States in 1965 opened the door to contingents of the world’s population that previously could not go to the United States. Later, the IRCA immigration reform of 1986 served as a great key to continue and expand migration to the United States, having clearly discernable effects on the increase in migration from Mexico (Bean, Edmonston, & Passel, 1990).

On the other hand, the development of Mexican cities on the northern border, particularly during the 20th century, has provided a large Mexican demographic base that has helped maintain intense interaction with the Mexican, Mexican-American, and U.S. population on the other side (Alegría, 1989, 1990; Cruz, 2010). Surely as a corollary, the North American Free Trade Agreement (now USMCA) can be understood as an important part of a process of much greater intensity in the rapprochement between the two countries.

The above are just a few examples of specific events, whether conjunctural such as wars or arising from public policies, forged over “long” periods of time as responses to specific problems and needs, but that in the case of Mexico and the United States have led to an interaction process of unimagined intensity.

As we know, the Mexican population living in the United States grew like never before and doubled in just one decade, going from 2.2 to 4.3 million (Passel, Cohn, & González-Barrera, 2012). Then, it doubled again and rose to 9.1 in 2000 and 11.7 in 2010, reaching 12.3 million in 2019 (Fundación BBVA Bancomer [BBVA Bancomer Foundation], Conapo & Segob, 2020). But aside from the total numbers we know that the documented population from Mexico was also increasing in those periods, and it has been estimated that more than half of that population stock has documents (Passel, Cohn, & González-Barrera, 2012). This is another reality, that of the U.S. having now a large contingent of documented Mexican population together with another perhaps smaller contingent without legal status. In addition, and although it may seem strange in view of the border protection paraphernalia by the U.S. government, hundreds of thousands of people from Mexico continued to come and go without documents each year, as the Survey on Migration at the Northern Border of Mexico

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3 A number of strategies and policies were implemented on the U.S. side that, although initially had little impact on undocumented crossings, in the long run made this type of entry into the United States more difficult. Plenty of literature is available on this topic (Anguiano & Trejo, 2007).
(Emif Norte, for its acronym in Spanish) (El Colef et al., 2010) has reported over the years, and according to the reports of the United States Border Patrol; it is only in recent years that these numbers have dropped considerably, as we will see later. Also, a more sensitive return of Mexicans was taking place not only due to forced returns but also because of voluntary repatriations (Masferrer & Roberts, 2012).

Above, global figures were mentioned on the estimates of the “stock” in the United States in various years, but there are also data on the changing flow of those who go to the United States according to the Survey on Migration at the Northern Border of Mexico, as can be seen in Graph 1.

Graph 1. Flow of people from the South bound for the United States

![Graph 1](image-url)


Graph 1 allows us to observe the trajectory of the flow of people from Mexico who have intended to cross into the United States by land and air, as captured by the Emif Norte in recent years (2000-2017). Included are people who declared going with and without immigration documents to cross into the United States.

First of all, the huge drop in those who went to the U.S. from 2007 should be noted, from 856,000 to 46,000 in 2017. Certainly, the flow dynamics have slowed down.

In this regard, there are also estimates from other sources on the number and percentage of households in Mexico whose members state having household members who are migrants to the United States. The households in Mexico with emigrants to the United States went from being 3.96% of the total households in the country in the year 2000, to being only 1.94% in 2010. On the other hand, the households with returnees went from 0.87% in the year 2000 to 2.19% in 2010 (Inegi, 2013). These figures come from a source other than the Emif Norte,

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4 This survey has become a very useful knowledge tool over the years.
which is the Mexican Population and Housing Census (Censo de Población y Vivienda), whose figures help corroborate the information on the decrease in emigration from Mexico and a greater return. On the other hand, the 2000 and 2010 censuses also show that households with circular migrants remained at very similar levels: 0.97% in 2000 and 0.92% in 2010, obviously with reference to the total data for each period; what is interesting about this last piece of data is that it shows a migratory characteristic that remained a trend on both dates alongside the global decline (Inegi, 2013). I point out this feature because I believe circular migration to be the central and specific characteristic of Mexican migration to the United States throughout the many years it has been taking place.

In order to complete our information, another stock of migrants in Mexico that is hardly talked about and that has had enormous importance should be mentioned: all those residents in Mexico who over many years have gone to work in United States for varying seasons, perhaps once or twice or several times, who then at some point in their lives have decided not to go anymore. Most of the research in the field over the years clearly show that the involvement of the Mexican population, mostly low-income, has been extremely high in the U.S. labor market over the decades of the last century. Evidence of this can be found in the Emif Norte, but this information has also been reported in abundance in community studies. For example, data from 2000 and 2001 show that between 60 and 70%, respectively, of the hundreds of thousands who were returned in that year by the United States Border Patrol had already crossed to work in the U.S., between two times and more than six; a clear example of this continuous circular labor migration (El Colef et al., 2004). These data show an extensive labor collaboration of many people throughout their lives.

For this reason, to speak only of those who are there or of those who come and go (reported by the Emif Norte), although evidences central aspects of the composition of the “migratory group”, is insufficient since it is also necessary to add this other group of people of both sexes who, although having worked in the United States for one, two or more seasons, have later decided not to go there anymore. This vision would allow us to finally glimpse at the enormous contribution of Mexican labor force in the United States labor market, that has in turn contributed to its well-being (Canales, 2009).

After so many years of migration experiences with the United States, we arrived at the first years of the beginning of the 21st century, accustomed to a migratory situation between Mexico and the United States that did not seem to change much, either in the volume of departures or in the explanations on those flows. The repeated economic crises in Mexico were mainly blamed as the occasions for that “escape valve” to operate, which consisted in migrating “to the north”.

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5 There were indeed changes such as migrants coming from and arriving in more areas, the greater participation of women in the migration flow, the change from circular migration to longer stays, as well as some others, yet overall, the picture remained largely the same (Alba, Fernández, & Verduzco, 2010; Leite, Angoa, & Rodríguez (2009).
The Selectivity of Migrants

In migration studies, being able to identify the characteristics of those who migrate to a given destination, in this case the United States, is very important. Commonly, when there are migration flows in significant amounts to a particular country, these are made up of people of all kinds in a socioeconomic sense. Men and women; youth and adults; people with many and few years of schooling; there are farm workers, workers and professionals, etc., but it is still important to be able to know if people with certain similar characteristics prevail in these migration flows, as this allows us to identify their profiles and thus we can relate some aspects of their contexts of origin, as well as the possibilities that they have or would have in the destination according to the characteristics of the labor markets they will arrive in. This has been termed “migration selectivity” and has been used as an important yet limited heuristic tool. It is assumed that under normal conditions when there is an emigration flow from a place, it is most likely that there will be no emigration of all or almost all of those who live in the areas of origin (this would only occur in cases of war or catastrophes), but mostly some people with certain characteristics would leave. Obviously, this is an assumption that must be confirmed with data, but it allows us to know to a certain extent some of the socioeconomic fragilities of the contexts of origin, as well as certain possibilities of insertion in the destination society (Browning & Feindt, 1969).6

Main Characteristics of the Migration Flow to the United States (1993-2017)7

The composition of the outgoing flow has always been predominantly male, although the percentage of women has gradually increased from 7% in 1993-94, to figures averaging between 20% and 25% over the last 10-15 years.

Between 1993 and 2009, the average percentage of people aged 20 to 39 migrating to the United States was 65%. A few years later, between 2010 and 2017, that percentage would drop to 54%; the total outgoing and return flows were already declining in those years. In the entire period from 1993 to 2017, the average has been 61.5% with a standard deviation of 14.5 and a median of 62.5; clearly, these age groups have been the majority. It has been a young population at the best of their labor possibilities.

As for the average schooling level of this outgoing flow, in the 1990s those who had completed primary school or less were a majority of around 60-65%, and between 20-25% had some years of secondary school or had completed secondary school; those who had a few years of high school or perhaps a little more barely reached 10-15%. These trends

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6 Migration selectivity has been central to migration studies ever since the first attempts at a scientific understanding of this phenomenon were made.

7 The data presented below were issued by the Survey on Migration at the Northern Border of Mexico (Emif Norte) from 1993 to 2017 (El Colef et al., 2020).

8 Outgoing flow data is presented because it is to this outgoing flow that new migrant population is added each year, while the return flow includes people who have surely spent more years in the United States and, in that sense, it has a more heterogeneous composition.
gradually reversed, until the members of these flows appeared as follows in the years between 2010 and 2017: 37% having completed the lowest levels of primary school, or less; 32% at the high school level; and 31% those who had a few years of high school or more (these are averages). In fact, between 2010 and 2017, the average years of schooling increased from 7.4 to 10 years among this migrant population. Thus, it can be seen that the people in this flow reflected with certain fidelity the changes in this respect occurring in Mexico in general, although also maintaining the global characteristic of being a flow of people with low educational levels still within the context of the changes that were taking place in the country.

On the other hand, although we know that the origin of migrant workers from rural areas has changed over the years with significant increases in those who came from urban areas of the country, most declared having been employed as “field laborers” in their place of origin. The average in this regard for the last 24 years is 42.6% with a standard deviation of 7.4 and a median of 45.3%. However, with respect to this occupational characteristic, I believe that we must also consider that in the reality of the country’s communities, faced with an agriculture that for various reasons has had low productivity, the labor channel that most of the men in those places has had at their disposal has been that of construction activities, whether they carry it out in their own communities or in cities in the region.

As shown by various field studies, it is common for those who work their farming plots to at some point work in construction, either themselves or their children (for women, their option has been mostly housekeeping in the cities). Hence, I have decided to group together in one category those who said they were “field laborers” in Mexico and those who said they were “construction workers”, since these are two occupational strata that feed off each other (Arias, 1992; Lara Flores, 1996; Verduzco, 2007). For the last 16 years of the Emif Norte, the average in this joint category has been 59.2%, with a standard deviation of 9.7 and a median of 62.6%. Occupationally in Mexico, this has been the predominant group in outgoing flows to the United States. It is interesting to note that laborers in the agricultural sector in Mexico have gone from 22% in 1990 to 16% in 2000, and only 11% in 2010, in relation to the total working population as a whole. That is the occupational stratum from which Mexican migration to the United States has been coming for many years, and so the drop in these numbers has to do not only with internal changes in rural activities in Mexico, but also with the departures to the United States of that population.

As for regional origins, we know that, although flows have come from all corners of the entire national territory, the majority of them originated in center-west areas and in some of Puebla-Oaxaca, as well as coming later from the center-north and other areas in the country over the years, until finally coming from all corners of all the regions of the territory. This has been another unusual fact in that during the first eighty years of the last century, migrations to the United States had been circumscribed to the great region of the center-west,

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9 Let us remember that in the common data of the most general surveys in Mexico, the “urban” categorization is applied to places from 15,000 inhabitants on, places often populated by a high number of people related to agricultural activities.
plus some others from the center and the north, and from there they expanded to all the country, although in a restrained way (Zúñiga & Leite, 2006).

With the above information, it is clear that those who have made up the majority of this flow have been predominantly young men, although with a growing presence of women. Most of the men worked in agriculture in Mexico, as well as in construction activities. As for schooling, these migrants have mostly been people with low schooling levels despite the fact that over the years these levels have been increasing in line with the general increases in this regard in Mexico. This highlights the importance of this type of profile as more specific to Mexican migration to the United States, which in turn is directly connected to the issue of “migration selectivity” that was already mentioned.

It is also important to highlight that these data from the Emif Norte, which have a wide coverage in space and time, match in general terms with what was shown in the dozens of community studies carried out in Mexico in those years, where it was clearly seen that the “typical migrant” (the one who has mostly migrated from the communities) has been above all a young man mostly occupied in rural activities, with little schooling (Calvo & López, 1988; Dinerman, 1982; Donato, 1994, 2001; López Castro, 1986; Massey, Alarcón, Durán & González, 1990; Mines & Massey, 1985; Massey, Goldring & Durand, 1994; Verduzco, 1995; Verduzco & Unger, 1997).

However, to complement the above, it is not superfluous to explain that when pointing out the main socioeconomic characteristics of the majority of those migrating to the United States, there have also been other migrants who, although in smaller numbers, have been part of that flow and displayed different socioeconomic profiles. This should lead us to be careful not to try to encompass or understand these flows as totally focused on what is now being pointed out as the most common characteristics. As stated above, migration selectivity is useful as a heuristic tool, but also limited.

It was already pointed out that such high migration flows began to decline as of 2007, until they became relatively small, hence the topic of the possible factors that have had to do with these changes becomes relevant.

A number of questions arise; among them: why has this migrant flow suddenly decreased according to what is presented in the figures from various sources?

It has been repeatedly stated that the decrease in migration trends from Mexico to the United States in recent years has been mainly due to the economic crisis of 2008-2009, although a demographic issue has also been brought up when pointing out that the general fertility rate in Mexico having dropped in previous years, this decline ultimately influenced the downward trend of Mexican emigration (Passel & Cohn, 2018). Likewise, the greater

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10 It should be noted that a good part of those who worked in Mexico as agricultural laborers or construction workers, have worked in the United States mostly outside the agricultural sector, although in low-skilled jobs.
strictness of border control by the United States has been mentioned as another cause (Anguiano & Trejo, 2007).

As for the first point about the economic crisis, as has happened on other occasions, economic crises either in Mexico or the U.S. without a doubt have repercussions on migration flows: sometimes more Mexicans leave or more come back, yet those ups and downs have been circumstantial and have usually readjusted to general trends in a short time. However, in the 2008-2009 crisis, the previous flow intensity never reestablished itself, as can be seen in the first Table of this work, despite the fact that the crisis was overcome.

Suggested Hypotheses to Explain the Decrease in Flow

In addition to what was said in the above paragraph, I first propose a set of three hypotheses where one of them seems central to me, but which is accompanied by two others that would also be important, although less than the central one; then I will provide other complementary arguments. In addition, and this is relevant, I affirm that although there has been a significant decrease in Mexican migration to the United States, there have also been important changes in the characteristics of contemporary migrants that have implied an important continuity in labor flows.

The central hypothesis that I propose is that since for a little more than two decades it was mainly young people who were migrating en masse, in the end this source of young labor was exhausted, and it is this exhaustion of a specific and selective type of supply which has mainly been observed in the decrease of these migration flows. Note that I am not referring to the decline as an effect of the decrease in general fertility rates, as has been otherwise repeatedly proposed (Passel, Cohn, & González-Barrera, 2012), but rather to the changes in the profile of specific age groups.11 Let us recall the data presented from the Emif Norte (El Colef et al., 2020) where it is observed that the largest age group of the flow was made up of young people.

As we know, in the basic population equation the sources of population loss are deaths and emigration, so in order to know how much is due to emigration and how much to mortality, it would be necessary to monitor specific age cohorts.

The country’s population data shows, for example, that the following age groups lost significant volumes of population between 1990 and 2000, as follows:

11 The decrease in a general population rate cannot show the variations within age groups, and in this case it cannot serve as an indicator, especially if we take into account that the 1990s have been considered as beneficiaries of the so-called demographic dividend.
Table 1. Follow-up of the youngest age cohorts in Mexico, 1990-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group in 1990</th>
<th>Age group in 2000</th>
<th>Gross population loss in the age group</th>
<th>Mortality losses by age group</th>
<th>Possible net emigration estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>-1 506 660</td>
<td>94 618</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 to 24</td>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>-692 640</td>
<td>117 164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>-51 974</td>
<td>120 184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 to 34</td>
<td>40 to 44</td>
<td>-192 786</td>
<td>125 692</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>45 to 49</td>
<td>-507 025</td>
<td>140 177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 951 085</td>
<td>597 835</td>
<td>2 353 250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated for this study based on information on mortality from Inegi (2003) for the different periods and age groups.¹²

Note especially the great loss of the youngest of all, who are those who were 15 to 19 years old and 20 to 24 years old in 1990. The total gross loss of those two groups was 2 199 300 people for those years alone. Mortality in these cases was 211 782. The mortality loss for the next three age groups was 386 053. Based on this information, the probable population loss due to emigration to the United States for those years would be 2 353 250,¹³ counting only those age groups that we know have been the majority.¹⁴

The loss of the young population is undoubtedly a serious problem insofar as it implies, among other things, the effects of a future slowdown in aspects of economic growth by a reduction of the working population. As we will see later, this situation has clearer and more forceful effects at the local levels, where the shortage of labor is becoming noticeable.

The above data regard the country in general, but we know that emigration to the United States does not affect the different regions equally, since there are areas of a high migratory intensity and others where, although existent, the phenomenon has a very minor presence.

I summarize this information with data for the state of Michigan: in the case of an entity and unlike what was presented before for the country, here three effects are found together, that of mortality, that of internal migration that enters and leaves the state, and that of international migration; however: a) Michoacán has not been a state that attracts population

¹² In these data there surely are variations not taken into account here, since the exact ages cannot match given that the censuses were not carried out on the same dates; however, the effects would not be substantial.

¹³ It is estimated that emigration to the United States account for 98% of the country’s total emigration.

¹⁴ During the nineties of the last century and the first decade of the present century, migration flows of people born in Mexico crossing into the United States were estimated between 360 000 and 458 000 people per year, according to Conapo (2010) and calculations based on the United States census by the American Community Survey and the Current Population Survey (Galindo & Ramos, 2009; Passel, Cohn, & González-Barrera, 2012). The emigration figures in the first decade of this century have been greater than those of the previous one.
from other states; b) Michoacán occupies the third place in the index of migratory intensity towards the United States with “very high” migration (Conapo, 2010); c) between 1990 and 2010, the original cohort of 15 to 19 years lost 32% and the initial cohort of 20 to 24 years lost 20%.

Certainly, such large losses of the young population have negative repercussions for future economic growth, as pointed out in a study on demography and migration by Gómez de León & Tuirán (1998).

Now let us see a local case in Michoacán known by the author and about which there is ethnographic information, that of the municipality of Chavinda.

It has been a municipality wherein emigration to the United States is typical. Between 1990 and 2010, not only did population did not grow, but it also had a net loss of 1 060 inhabitants, equivalent to 9.6% of its original population in 1990. Yet in specific age cohorts, between 1990 and 2010 it lost 34.7% of the original population between 15 and 19 years old, and 52.05% of the population that in 1990 was between 20 and 24 years old (see Table 2).

Table 2. Follow-up of the youngest age cohorts in the municipality of Chavinda, Michoacán

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Age cohorts</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Age cohorts</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>15 to 19</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>20 a 24 años</td>
<td>999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>25 to 29</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>30 a 34 años</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>35 to 39</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>40 a 44 años</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Losses (%)</td>
<td>559/34.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>520/52.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Censo de Población y Vivienda (Inegi, 2013). Elaborated for this work.

As in the case of Michoacán, here we can see the joint effects of mortality and those of internal and international migrations, yet from studies of that community we also know that although there are and have been migrations to the nearby city of Zamora and to other parts of the country, emigration to the United States has been of central importance (Massey, Alarcón, Durand & González, 1987). One issue that I wish to highlight is that of the loss of local labor force, which, as can be seen, has been very acute, especially between 1990 and 2000. Let us also remember that these are selective migration flows that have mainly affected the local working population mainly dedicated to agricultural and construction activities, as can be read in the referred works. The local consequences of this phenomenon had clear positive and negative effects on productive conditions. On the one hand, when labor was scarce, it became more expensive, a situation that can be seen as positive as related to an increase in wages. On the other hand, this scarcity also led to necessary changes in the production structure, both with the introduction of machinery and with the introduction of different crops that require less labor. It should be noted that municipalities such as Chavinda cease to be a source of new migration flows simply because the local workforce that was “available” (selectively available) has been exhausted. This is seen from a local point of view,
but at a global level, situations like this were also leading to new communities from other parts of the country to participate in the migration flow to the United States. This is why over the last 25 years migrations to the United States, which were at first very localized in the center-west and north of Mexico, have gradually reached more towns in states of the country that previously did not participate in that job market. This was and continues to be a logical way in which the labor supply of that specific type of labor continued and has continued to provide arms to the type of demand that partially continues to exist in the United States.

Now I propose a second hypothesis on the possible deterioration of wages in the United States in the labor niches where migrants usually position themselves. To begin with, I will cite the main conclusions of a study presented in the Binational Study (Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs & U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, 1998). Davies, Greenwood, Hunt, Kohli, and Tienda (1998) ask themselves whether low-skill Mexican workers are labor force substitutes or complements and, in each case, what would be their impact on wages? They conclude that this type of worker is not a substitute for the native labor force but that it does compete with the same type of worker, so one of the effects has been that when more low-skill Mexican workers arrive in labor markets where such type of workers already exists, this impacts on their wages negatively. This occurs, according to the authors, mainly in California and Texas, which are places where there is a great number of Mexican migrants.  

Given this, I interpret that surely because of this negative effect on wages in certain places, many of the migrants from Mexico in the United States began to explore new destinations in other states, as we later saw in both personal accounts and in U.S. statistics from subsequent years. Mexican migrants gradually switched destinations the more traditional migration locations (California, Texas, Chicago, New York and nearby) to others such as Arizona, Nevada, Kentucky, North Carolina, Georgia and some central and southern states (Giorguli, Gaspar, & Leite, 2009). These changes took place over at least twenty years, from 1990 to 2010. It was a process in which, based on the knowledge acquired from their U.S. experiences, Mexican workers discovered other niches in places not known before, a situation that expanded the possibilities of that labor market a little more in time and space to the point where a certain limit was reached, at which labor demand began to weaken. On the other hand, the likely decrease in wages for this demand had the effect of wages no longer being able to compete with the costs of an increasingly expensive and risky trip. In addition, probably for many of the new potential labor suppliers in Mexico, this type of job offer was falling outside their expectations, having achieved higher schooling levels as of late.

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15 A similar study by George J. Borjas (2007) reaches similar conclusions, but referring to the entire United States.

16 In 2008 I interviewed several people (male and female workers) in New Haven, Connecticut, who recounted their initial work experiences in California, and expressed how, once learning of better wages in the Northeast, moved there.

17 In the 2014 National Survey on Demographic Dynamics (Encuesta Nacional de la Dinámica Demográfica) (Inegi, 2014), Table 9.9 indicates that of those who had migrated to the United States between 2009 and 2014, 20.5% stated having had to return to Mexico due to lack of jobs.
These were processes that took place during those years in which, for demographic and economic reasons, and because of the peculiar characteristics of this type of selective migrant, an incidence occurred that later decreased the total flow from Mexico. Yet I must insist that it has oftentimes been easier to blame the most immediately apparent, as was in this situation the 2008-2009 economic crisis in the United States.

On the other hand, and to add more elements to the arguments proposed, other changes have taken place in Mexico that, although not leading the entire population to be in a situation of overarching well-being, have indeed represented certain improvements, such as an increase in the years of schooling of young people who, upon achieving more education, try to turn to other types of activities requiring higher qualifications. Likewise, there are other factors that may be less direct but that can still be forceful, and that in general terms have already been presented in other studies on migration in general. These are the most extensive changes that have taken place in the population distribution in Mexico. Although for a long time there has been a shared belief that it is a country with few large cities, much has changed; in a not so long period of time, the number of cities in Mexico with more than half a million inhabitants reached 26, nine of them with more than 1 million. These cities are spread over the various regions of the territory, so probably the migration flows that previously went to the three large cities and the United States have now been at least partially directed to the large cities of their own regions. This new situation has surely also had some impact on the flow previously bound to the United States.

Two issues are still to be addressed, having had a strong impact both on what has to do with Mexico’s labor contribution to the United States, and on various aspects of the relationship with that country. I will first address the issue of the border strip that has to do with both. Then we’ll take a look at recent changes in the rates of migration to the United States.

The Border Strip

The border strip of Mexico is that geographical area that, as the name expresses, goes around the border with the United States. It is not a geographically or economically homogeneous region, but perhaps it can be defined rather by that strong neighborhood with the country with which it shares that same space, the United States. Perhaps it is that intense relationship with the populations on the other side, altogether with that mixed culture, that would best define this sociodemographic space. It was populated and grew even more on the Mexican side during the 20th century based on very clear policies by several administrations, especially the federal government. García (2010), Aboites (2010) and Cruz (2010) clearly summarize the

18 In the north: Monterrey, Tijuana, Hermosillo, Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, Torreón-Gómez Palacio, Saltillo, Durango, Culiacán, Matamoros and Tampico. In the great central region: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Aguascalientes, León, San Luis Potosí, Querétaro, Toluca, Puebla, Acapulco, Morelia, Veracruz and Cuernavaca. In the southeast: Mérida, Villahermosa and Tuxtla Gutiérrez (the possible conurbation of some cities was considered in the elaboration of this list).

19 It is not possible to address this broad and complex matter in depth here; there is abundant bibliography available on it. One interesting synthesis is listed in the references under Lee et al., 2013.
settlement processes of that large area from the time of the Mexican Independence to the present day and, on the other hand, Valenzuela Arce (2002, 2003) in several of his works exposes the cultural richness of those mixed sub-cultures that have been shaped over the years across the border. It is a region where the inhabitants at both sides of the border have daily binational experiences of diverse order. Cruz (2010) speaks of 35 to 38 municipalities on the Mexican side. Alegría (1990) has carried out important works on the northern border from the perspective of urban development. For this work I have made a count of the current population of those municipalities, to which I have added the population of the U.S. border counties, covering approximately 100 kilometers on each side. The total population that lives there reaches a little more than 15 million people. Along the border strip there are urban complexes only divided by the line marking the national limits, but still sharing important aspects of daily life and the natural resources in the surroundings. Many of the inhabitants of this large area have relatives on either side, whom they visit very frequently and with whom they share information on various topics pertaining jobs, the prices of various items, and job, educational and cultural options.

The U.S.-Mexico border is considered one of the most dynamic and complex in the world. According to the U.S. Bureau of Transportation, annual vehicle crossings between 1997 and 2000 averaged 277.5 million per year, equivalent to 754.7 thousand per day (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, n. d.).

The border strip, with its very peculiar characteristics, has a great weight in the economy, politics and social relations, particularly when it comes to state entities in the two countries. The labor contribution of Mexicans, especially those living on the Mexican side of the border, to U.S. economic sectors is enormous, since thousands of them go to work there daily (Santibáñez & Cruz, 2000). This matter, although well known, has not been sufficiently accounted for as another aspect of the great Mexican labor contribution to the U.S. economy.

Changes in the Migration Modalities from Mexico to the United States

It has been a clear fact that the flow of Mexican laborers to the United States has dropped considerably; that is at least true for that traditional, mostly undocumented flow, of which we seek to account for here. However, there are other recent data that, while not contradicting the above, show that labor flows from Mexico continue in figures that are certainly lower than those of 2007 and previous years, but still very high and important; is this factual?

Let us remember that the bulk of the migrant flow from Mexico was made up primarily of young people with low educational levels long-experienced as agricultural laborers. In another section we attempted to show that probably for various reasons, such as the demographic depletion of these particular groups in thousands of locations in Mexico, as well as due to certain gradual decline in wages in the United States (for these groups of laborers), as well as because of the rise in transportation costs to destinations as an effect of the greater difficulties at crossing, it became more problematic for undocumented migrants to access that labor market in the U.S. In addition, it is likely that for today’s young people, in a
situation of relatively increasing schooling, low-skilled jobs in the United States are now less attractive, to some of them at the very least.

New Migration Flows to the United States

For many years there has been a labor channel that allows the U.S. Department of Labor to employ foreign laborers in agriculture and some other services, in case of a shortage of these laborers in the various U.S. localities. These are temporary labor contracts through H2-A visas for agriculture and H2-B for services. In Mexico, Trigueros (2015) has been one of the pioneers in collecting data and analyzing aspects of these types of contracts. Unfortunately, until now, very little is known about the experiences of laborers who have arrived in the U.S. with these visas. In the field, we often find laborers who have crossed with these visas, but have only been able to obtain some rather general and anecdotal data from them. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social) in Mexico City also lacks much more information other than that coming to them through some U.S. agricultural entrepreneurs looking for laborers. This according to interviews I had with the official in charge of these matters. Below I present the data on the granting of temporary work visas, obtained through various U.S. government portals; I accessed this information based on my long-time held suspicion of an increase in hiring with temporary work visas, that I was still to seek confirmation for.

Graph 2. Granted visas for temporary workers

![Graph 2. Granted visas for temporary workers](image)

Source: U.S. Department of State (n.d.).

Both H2-A and H2-B visa workers and professionals are referred to as temporary workers. They are people who applied for a temporary work visa, processed it and paid for it, and were granted it. I clarify this because there are other statistics that refer to admissions that are “events”, and this is not the case.

The increase in “granted visas” from 2010 to 2018 has been 173.7% for workers with H2-A and H2-B visas. As can be seen, 2014 has been the year in which the growth of these workers experienced a great rise, as some of us studying the topic had begun to suspect. For their part,
professionals had a 167.5% growth in the same period. Now these data show that there are also many thousands of Mexican professionals who have been obtaining “temporary work visas” each year. Together, both types of temporary workers together reached 294,628 people in the last year, a figure that although lower than the annual averages of other times, remains quite large and, most importantly, these are legal annual flows; this situation has come to change the way migration had traditionally been undertaken before; also, the participation in this flow of so many professionals speaks to us of other types of circumstances under which labor migration from Mexico is taking place, that we will have to keep in mind in the future.

CLOSING REMARKS

As for these new flows of documented low-skilled workers, they surely now originate not mainly in traditional migration locations where few young people have remained, but in towns in other regions where there would still be a young labor force with few years of schooling.

However, before reaching my conclusions, it would be convenient to clarify an issue that is not minor and refers to the collection of data and statistics on migrants. How can we explain that, according to the Emif, the annual outward flow to the United States has decreased so much while, on the other hand, in Graph 2 I showed that between 150,000 and 247,000 workers per year have crossed to the U.S. since 2015? Why is it that these high figures, at least partially, would not be reflected in the statistics reported by the Emif according to Graph 1? In this regard, very specific characteristics should be taken into account, both of the ways in which the Emif collects information, and of the procedures of the trip to the north, at least by the laborers who cross with H2 visas.

When it comes to the Emif, the data is obtained from interviews with people who are in the bus stations of border cities, as well as in Mexican airports that have connections with cities in the United States. This modality leaves out of possible interviews those who travel to the United States in situations that have nothing to do with bus stations or airports. In this sense, we know from several reports, among others the one by Trigueros (2015) already mentioned, that workers who are contracted with H2 visas travel in private buses directly to Monterrey and to other cities on the northern Mexican border where there are U.S. consulates, in order to obtain the specific visas and, once obtained, they continue their journey on the same buses until they cross into the United States. That is why the data approximations that we obtain through the Emif do not allow us to get ahold of information on the tens of thousands of workers who legally go to work in the U.S. every year, at least that is so when it comes to those who cross with work visas. However, as noted above, statistics on this type of worker can be obtained on the website of the United States Department of State.

On the other hand, this author, as well as colleagues who have also dedicated themselves to research on migration flows to the U.S., have found in recent years in the towns where research has been carried out that, as a matter of fact, the flows of undocumented migration have decreased considerably, and that it is now mainly young men and women with H2 visas that have been crossing to work in the U.S.
Unfortunately, obtaining H2 visas is achieved through the mediation of private contractors sent to Mexico by U.S. businessmen with no knowledge of the Mexican government. This would not be problematic or serious if it were not for the known abuses and serious breaches of workers’ labor rights by both contractors and employers for whom they work under commonly exploitative conditions. In this regard, we must not forget those bad practices undertaken under the Bracero Program, also keeping in mind the good and bad experiences migrants have had in the more than 46 years of the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program with Canada. This binational program, agreed upon by both governments and not a superfluous effort. In programs of this type workers have at least certain basic protections, without this meaning that programs such as these are exemplary in themselves, but still they are undoubtedly an instrument that in some aspects prevents conditions of worker exploitation. In addition, we know that now more than two hundred thousand people a year are crossing the border to work in the United States both in agriculture and a number of other services, this being something that should not be overlooked and addressed by either government, particularly so as we are dealing with populations of scarce resources.

Still, various types of abuse have been reported in Mexico, especially fraud in alleged hiring of H2 workers that end up not happening at all, but are still charged to applicants. Without a doubt, the presence of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is missing and necessary, at least as a guarantor of contracts, a role indeed fulfilled in the case of the labor program with Canada. But while this gets to happen, it remains important for us to work on demanding basic protections for H2 workers by supporting the social and civil organizations that exist in Mexico and the United States and that, as we know, sometimes achieve greater effectiveness in some points than that achieved by governments themselves. I state this without disregarding how important it is for the Mexican government to take serious action on this matter, although unfortunately until now it seems to be completely unaware of what happens to these hundreds of thousands of Mexican nationals who each year work in the fields and cities of the United States.

Looking back at our shared history with the United States, it is clear that on the one hand the contributions of the Mexican labor force to its economy have been enormous for at least a hundred years, but not only that, these contributions have continued to be very important to date both for sending hundreds of thousands of workers each year, and for border interrelationships of all kinds, to which commercial, productive and tourist exchanges are added, just to mention what stands out the most. All this should lead to a rethinking not only of Mexican immigration policies in relation to the United States (and now to the Central American phenomenon), but also of broader Mexican policies before the United States, since Mexico is and has been an extremely important neighbor for the U.S. Unfortunately, until now, none of the Mexican administrations, including the current one of AMLO (Andrés Manuel López Obrador), has had the insight, perhaps not even genuine interest, to rethink the very terms of our interrelations with the government and authorities of the United States, since Mexican people has collaborated in an important way, now and in the past, and to a great extent, with the great economic development of the United States. It is most desirable
that one day Mexican politicians raise their heads and express with intelligence and honor the demands required to achieve a new form of interrelation with our neighbors to the north.

Translation: Fernando Llanas.

REFERENCES


