

Political socialization and radicalization in militants of Communist Party of Peru-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL)

Socialización y radicalización política en militantes del Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL)

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Abstract: This article analyzes the process of socialization and political radicalization in militants of the Communist Party of Peru-Sendero Luminoso, who participated in the internal armed conflict in Peru between 1980 and 2000. Thus, through a phenomenological design, 16 in-depth interviews are performed, whose content analysis is carried out with support from the specialized software Atlas.ti 7.5. The results allow the identification of macro, meso and individual levels of socialization. Likewise, causal factors and catalyzing circumstances that influence and trigger radicalization are identified. It is concluded that there are not direct causes, but rather a progressive extremist escalation that crosses different levels of socialization, with emphasis on the meso and individual levels, and that exposed to catalyzing circumstances, either by rational or emotional way, leads to political radicalization.

Key words: socialization, political radicalization, causal factors, catalyzing circumstances, extremist escalation.

Resumen: Este artículo analiza el proceso de socialización y radicalización política en militantes del Partido Comunista del Perú-Sendero Luminoso, quienes participaron del conflicto armado interno en Perú en los años de 1980 a 2000. Así, mediante un diseño fenomenológico, se les realiza 16 entrevistas en profundidad, a las cuales se les efectúa un análisis de contenido con el soporte del software especializado Atlas.ti 7.5. Los resultados permiten identificar niveles de socialización macro, meso e individuales. Del mismo modo, se detectaron factores causales y circunstancias catalizadoras que influyen y desencadenan la radicalización. Se concluye que no existen causales directos, sino una escalada extremista que cruza por distintos niveles de socialización, con énfasis en los niveles meso e individual, y que expuesta a circunstancias catalizadoras sea por vía racional o emotiva conduce a la radicalización política.

Palabras clave: socialización, radicalización política, factores causales, circunstancias catalizadoras, escalada extremista.

Introduction

The political violence experienced in Peru between 1980 and 2000 was the bloodiest in all its history. The main actors were the Armed Forces and the Communist Party of Peru- Sendero Luminoso (PCP-SL) (Truth and Reconciliation Committee [CVR], 2003a: 17). According to the Official Register of Victims (RUV) (Consejo de Reparaciones, 2012: 11), 34,535 fatal victims were reported; however, the estimated number of affected would be over 69,280 (CVR, 2003b: 245). This conflict led to different consequences on the socio-political, economic and psychosocial levels (CVR, 2003b: 133).

Between 1995 and 2008, almost every psychosocial investigation related to the armed conflict was focused on the directly affected and their families (Malvaceda, 2010: 193). Despite the importance of its approach (Theidon, 2004: 15; Cáceres, 2013: 6; Malvaceda, 2014: 3), these works pay less attention to the 'other' involved in the process, the perpetrator. In the same line, as pointed out by many authors (Ferguson *et al.*, 2015: 199), there are few studies that deal with these actors.

Considering this, the paths and psychosocial causes that led ordinary people to a political extremism remain unknown. Thus, this work aims to know the political socialization and radicalization in militants of the PCP-SL that participated in the internal armed conflict between 1980 and 2000.

Political socialization and radicalization

Political socialization is a process that occurs throughout life. It is affected by different sectors of the society through which the individual learns attitude regulations and relevant behavior patterns, thus developing a reference framework that guides them to consider options around politics (Langton, 1969: 4). This process can provide the increasing implication of an individual in radical causes and lead to extreme actions (Botha, 2014: 900). As stated by Horgan and Taylor (2001: 18), the majority of this participation 'is due to the gradual exposure and socialization, to an extreme behavior'; where radicalization is just another via to link to it (Borum, 2011c: 3).

Different systematic revisions regarding political radicalization have been carried out (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2011 and 2010; Borum, 2011a and 2011b; Christmann, 2012; Kleinmann, 2012; Pisoiu, 2013; Hafez and Mullins, 2015; Klausen *et al.*, 2016; Scarella *et al.*, 2016; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017); however, an agreement has not been reached since

most models have not been submitted for exhaustive investigations (Borum, 2011b: 46), and they also present methodological deficiencies (Kleinmann, 2012: 281).

There is a difference between the radical belief (radicalism) and the radical action; there is an intensity difference in both of them, whether from a neutral opinion to a moral obligation in radicalism; or from an inert action towards actual radical actions (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: 211). In the same way, it must be taken into account that there is a non-violent radicalism as well as a violent radicalism and the latter does not necessarily mean doing extremists actions (Pisoiu, 2013: 247). Likewise, there are some people that commit these actions and are not politically radicalized (Borum, 2011a: 8).

As stated by Veldhuis and Staun (2009: 56 and ss), radicalization is a psychosocial process that involves emotional, cognition, and behavioral changes oriented to the increase of justification and preparation for the inter-group conflict. It is an individual process, understandable only in its social environment, and does not have a clearly defined purpose. Thus, radicalization requires personal commitment as well as sacrifice in defense of the in-group. It is different from the action paths, which refer to the involvement process in extremist actions (Borum, 2011a: 9). Different studies focus on identifying and highlighting the inter-dependence of the socialization levels (macro, meso, and micro-social) (Jordán, 2009: 198; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: 210), as well as on the causal factors (pre-conditioning) and catalyst circumstances (precipitant) (Crenshaw, 1981: 381) that act at each level and favor the radicalization.

Previous conditions of a favorable environment for radicalization are generated at a macro-social level. A first element is the historical context. According to Rénique (2015: 22), who traces the origins of political radicalization in Peru, until early 20th century, it was in the 1960's when the radical groups would take shape, influenced by the focalism in Latin America, the 'military revolution' and the Agrarian Reform of that government as well as the emergence of a new post-guerilla left-wing. The existence and dissemination of these extremist ideologies favor the radicalization (Cliff and First, 2013: 293).

During the 1970's decade the PCP-SL emerged, separating from its predecessors, assuming the 'long march' process and addressed peasants, doing taking ideologization actions in the Andean region (CVR, 2003c: 31; Degregori, 2011a: 163; Degregori, 2011b: 117; Rénique, 2015: 124). Nevertheless, it was not until 1980 that armed actions against the State

started, which sharpened in 1986 with the so called 'Peruvian prison massacres', where more than 200 hikers were executed (CVR, 2003d: 162), and, at the same time, constituted a precipitant social circumstance, since it encouraged the adscription to the PCP-SL, which caused the drastic reduction of armed actions until 2000.

Along with this, the social and political context of that time proofs a weak State, limited on its political control exercise; the empty Republic and the alien State identified by Lynch (2014: 69) show the structural violence of the country; this nuanced by the poverty and social injustice partly explain those particular feelings of humiliation, grievance or rebelliousness expressed on the major nation protests of teachers, parents and students, which make possible the conditions for the emergence of radicalization (Horgan, 2005: 72; Jordán, 2009: 198; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010: 38; Christmann, 2012: 26). Regarding this, members of the PCP-SL considered their actions as a defense reaction against an enemy (Degregori, 2011a: 106 and 2011b: 144); such explanation represents a bias of attribution of responsibility, which works as a control mechanism to legitimate their conduct (Horgan, 2005: 41).

Associated with that above, the cultural conditionings also result relevant in order to understand radicalization (Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 8; Moyano, 2010: 74; Portocarrero, 2012: 15 and 2015: 107). The PCP-SL started as an eminently regional organization, mainly constituted by professors, university students and teachers (Degregori, 2011b: 184; Rénique, 2015: 139)), who formed the peasant social base for the party, encouraged by the power of the idea, as well as the power idea (Degregori, 2011b: 188). In the same way, the origin of this critical mass implied the traditional peasant conception of the family roles, where the man represents and deals with the public space of politics, the order; whilst the woman is relegated to the private space, the intimate, the solidarity, the detachment, the care, as well as the suffering (Theidon, 2004: 73; Henríquez, 2006: 35, 36; Bracco, 2011: 1).

The direct sources of influence are found at a meso-social level, to whom the individual identifies with and compares to. The social and political environment networks such as friendship and relationship (Jordán, 2009: 208) are found at this point, and they can be connected inside the family, the educational institutions, and the community. Even though such networks are highly significant, they are not determining for the political radicalization (Horgan, 2005: 54).

The family as a primary socialization agent is extremely important in political socialization; it is considered such in many studies in Peru

(Degregori, 2011b: 186; Gavilan, 2013: 60) and other international contexts (Florez-Morris, 2007: 626; Moyano, 2010: 95; Paul, 2010: 496; Christmann, 2012: 20; Acharya y Muldoon, 2015: 6; Hafez y Mullins, 2015: 964), since the person accepts the world, the social representations and the internalization of the familiar culture (Mead, 1973: 200). This influence is considered the first step in the transmission of fundamental values (Botha, 2014: 897), and helps to define and give meaning to the appropriate and inappropriate behavior (Morales *et al.*, 2007: 436).

On the other hand, friendship networks are extremely important for social radicalization, since they can become the main normative values source, they provide emotional rewards, sense of belonging, totality and significance (Jordán, 2009: 209; Kleinmann, 2012: 283). For these formations, geographical and interdependence aspects match in shared activities (Jordán, 2009: 210). In that sense, it is in the educational institutions and the community where those links are formed.

Many national (Ansión *et al.*, 1993; CVR, 2003a; Lynch, 2006; Degregori, 2011a; Uccelli *et al.*, 2013) and international investigations (Christmann 2012; Wilner y Dubouloz 2010; Hafez y Mullins 2015) say that the proximity to radicalized pairs (as in educational institutions) is a predictor of radicalization (Veldhuis y Staun, 2009: 40), since it involves searching for answers, starting the identification with radical groups. On that basis, universities constitute political socialization spaces as well (Degregori, 2011b: 185). Here, there is a better ideological comprehension of the radicalized groups; at the same time, their presence and influence is much bigger (Lynch, 1990: 45). In Peru, both on schools and universities there was a very strong influence of teachers as instructors and authorities at the same time (Ansión *et al.*, 1993: 142; Degregori, 2011b: 161).

In addition, radicalized communities, physical and virtual, networks around leaders, social networks in prisons (Asencios, 2013: 85), and the proximity to radicalized groups are potential influences for political radicalization (Moghaddam, 2005: 163; Jordán, 2009: 211; King and Taylor, 2011: 609; Christmann, 2012: 15). Thus, identity processes are generated, and involve decisions consistent with belonging and collective action to a certain group. In the case of radicalized groups, clandestine militancy generates a particular identity, which creates more intense relationships, since they suppose loyalty, sacrifice and intimacy (Sageman, 2008: 68; Kleinmann, 2012: 284).

These groups are constituted as primary groups, which, in turn, generates greater group cohesion; furthermore, the presence of friends and/or relatives

in the group makes the betrayal less likely; likewise, the rupture between the individual and those who are not part of their new group is demanded, thus generating more isolated groups; finally, the identity elements of the group dehumanize the enemy, making the violence towards him more acceptable (Jordán, 2009: 208).

Finally, at the microsocial or individual level, there are the rational, emotional and normative psychosocial factors, tending to political radicalization (Jordán, 2009: 201), which synthesize the previous levels and have been addressed by different researches (Moyano, 2010; Botha, 2014, Veldhuis and Staun, 2009, McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017, Aly et al 2016, Kleinmann, 2012, Horgan, 2005). The rational aspects are understood as the decisions resulting from a cost-benefit calculation and in correspondence with a certain strategy. Among the benefits of belonging to the radical group, is to provide a sense of belonging to the individual, rewarding the personal bond, increased status, mood and self-esteem, considering them heroes and glories, support from colleagues and family members, as well as increase of the sense of risk, emotion and danger (Crenshaw, 1981: 385; Christmann, 2012: 27; Pisoiu, 2013: 252).

Regarding the emotional aspects, the action is considered driven by the passions; in this category feelings are framed as frustration, relative deprivation, anger at one's own injustice and others, desires for revenge (Moghaddam, 2005: 162), among others. This is visible in events such as the “killing of criminals” (CVR, 2003e: 43). In this regard, King and Taylor (2011: 610) claim that the most important aspect in the decision to radicalize is the affective component, due to the emotions caused by the injustice experienced.

Regulatory aspects are those decisions adjusted to the subject's value framework, which is identified with the moral values of the radicalized group and that, in turn, gives moral legitimacy to their actions (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010: 34). From this he identifies who belongs to the ingroup and the outgroup; it creates a driving force for radicalization, which is based on conscience and the feeling of injustice, which falls on a collective to which the individual belongs or to which he is supportive; and finally, the conviction that it is possible to overcome injustice through collective mobilization or insurrection (Ibarra and Letamendía, 1999: 395).

Extremist actions can be organized with the metaphor of the “stairway to terrorism”, proposed by Moghaddam (2005), which must be considered jointly, since none of its levels is capable of explaining by itself the process of radicalization. They also act at different times and not necessarily chained in

an ascending process (Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010: 45, Pisoiu, 2013: 246, Klausen et al., 2016: 70). According to the model, people would have a base of perceptions of injustice and relative deprivation, which would provoke the desire for political, economic, social or religious change. These aspects are linked to the historical, social and cultural influence mentioned above.

On the first floor the person would explore their options to fight against this situation; if no solution is found, the person is likely to continue ascending. On the second floor, the aggression moves towards an external group, such as social institutions in search of answers: personal or collective. At a third level the person is persuaded to commit to the morality of the organization, where the ingroup is morally just, and the outgroup is morally disengaged. At this point, violent actions are justified; here we can point out the influence of radicalizing peer groups (Cragin, 2014: 340). On the fourth level the person is immersed in the social relations and activities of the group, generating a categorical thought and a perceived legitimacy of the extremist organization and its goals, under the belief that the ends justify the means and polarizing in relation to others groups. Also, possible rewards are raised. Finally, the fifth level is where the person displaces the inhibitory mechanisms necessary to effect the damage to a third party; here there are two subprocesses: social categorization and psychological distance, necessary to carry out extreme acts.

Added to the levels of socialization, there are the causal factors and the catalyzing circumstances (Crenshaw, 1981: 381). The first are the previous or predisposing conditions of radicalization; they are situations that do not necessarily lead to radicalization. On the other hand, the catalyzing circumstances are the precipitants of radicalization; they are presented as significant episodes, such as the start of armed actions or extreme police brutality, such as massacres or other critical actions, which can initiate or reinforce radicalization processes (Horgan, 2005: 73, Wilner and Dubouloz, 2011: 421; Klausen et al., 2016: 77). It should be noted that more than the emphasis on the critical moment lived, it must take into account the representation of that moment for the person, because although they may be fundamental for the participation of some, may not be of importance to others (Borum, 2011b: 57).

As it was mentioned before, the process of political radicalization is vital to understand why people execute extremist actions. Although the models have levels and psychosocial factors that explain radicalization, it is pertinent to explore them based on the particularity of the phenomenon in Peru, where literature and official memory have generally paid more attention

to the study of victims, and more limited attention to the perpetrators. In this work, it is intended, precisely, to study the process of socialization and political radicalization in the militants of the PCP-SL that participated in the mentioned internal armed conflict.

Methodology

An investigation with a qualitative approach was carried out, using the phenomenological design (Creswell, 2013: 42) that seeks to understand reality from the frame of reference of the subject who experiences it. For the preliminary construction of the sample, the criteria of theoretical sampling (Strauss and Corbin, 2002: 219) and of socio-structural representation (Mejía, 2000: 166) were proposed, seeking the representativeness and heterogeneity of the sample. Subsequently, the criterion of confirmatory sampling was used (Creswell, 2013: 93), to complement the cases until reaching saturation.

There were 16 people, militants of the PCP-SL, who participated in the armed conflict. Of the total, 9 are men and 7 women. The average age is 54 years. 75% have university studies; a similar percentage is confined in a Penitentiary Establishment of the capital. 56% comes from urbanized cities (Lima, Arequipa, Cusco and Callao). Also, the average age at which they began in the armed conflict was 21 years. Finally, 87% of the militants joined after the armed actions began.

Regarding the collection of information, the technique used was the semi-structured in-depth interview. For its construction, the objective of the research was based on the theoretical analysis carried out (Strauss and Corbin, 2002: 45). The interview guide was validated through a pilot interview. The interviews were conducted between October 2015 and March 2016.

Ethical aspects were considered, such as obtaining the necessary permits from the corresponding authorities to conduct the interviews in the Penitentiary Establishments of Peru. In addition, we had the informed consent of all the participants, which, by express request, was verbal. The interviews were renamed with a code, thus guaranteeing the confidentiality of information and the protection of personal data.

Regarding the analysis of information, a qualitative analysis of thematic content was made, from the critical discourse analysis approach (Íñiguez, 2002: 93). The data were edited following the transcription conventions of Jefferson (1984: 368). The analysis procedure was carried out using the

qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti 7.5 and consisted of three stages: 1) coding from the textual citations of the interviews, allowing open, axial and selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 2002: 110 and ss.); 2) structuring of information through semantic maps presenting the megacategories, categories and subcategories of meaning generated; and 3) theorization process, which consolidates the theoretical dialogue between constructed theory and empirical data (Martínez, 2004: 278). During the process, a system of theoretical and methodological analytical memos was carried out (Strauss and Corbin, 2002: 250 and ss.).

Following Milles et al. (2013: 277 et seq.), the tactics considered for the construction of meaning were the frequency of the categories (number of citations linked to a particular category, represents the basis of the category) and the theoretical density (number of links that has a category with others, indicates the explanatory importance of a category). Both aspects represent the extension (breadth) and understanding (semantic depth) of the concepts (Martínez, 2004: 294). For the analysis of results, only those categories with high frequency (≥ 10) and density (≥ 3) (placed in parentheses after each category used) were considered significant, discarding those that do not meet the criterion.

Results

According to the analysis (see Figure 1¹), five socialization levels (1-5) were identified, from which causal (1.1 - 4.2) and psychosocial factors (1.1.1 - 4.2.2, 5.1 and 5.2) emerge, which influenced the political radicalization of militants of the PCP-SL.

At the macrosocial level, the militants of the PCP-SL identify that in their process of political socialization there existed a deep social influence of the international context, as well as of the social movements (either of teachers or students) at the national level (49-7), this influenced the normalization of the revolutionary discourse (19-6), as well as the positive perception towards the so-called “armed struggle” (21-6). Both aspects are highly significant in the understanding of radicalization; they recreate each other, showing a dialectical relationship:

All those situations shaped in me my vision, also my readings, also the revolution of the communist parties, the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, among others. In that time it was spread and the readings were in function of that. The parties also felt the need to use armed struggle for the transformation of the country (JCC, 55 years old, 38:38)

1 This figure can be found in the Appendix, at the end of the article (Editor's note).

At the community level, living with impoverished social classes (36-4) is very important, which allowed them to develop empathy and, consequently, a greater sensitivity to the feeling of injustice towards them and others in a similar situation (32-7). This last aspect is very important, because it allows explaining other types of influences, such as individual and family, which is reflected in the following:

I come from a peasant household, my parents were pawns in a hacienda. I have seen closely the life of the peasant, the difference of classes in the sixties. While the landowners lived in a way, the peasants had another way of life ... we have always worked, the children of the peons had an education until the third grade of primary school (IA, 54 years, 29: 29).

Community influence affected the family level on moral principles, which entail a burden of traditional culture developed in a given environment (10-9). Although this category was not well founded (scarce frequency), it is also highly explanatory (high density) to understand the radicalization in the members of the PCP-SL. Despite this, the militants of the PCP-SL did not identify direct referents (11-6) in their participation, as indicated below: "In my family there is an old military tradition, my father fought in the war of 42 against Ecuador, my brother remained in the air force, then, my mother was very chauvinist, in my family there was a lot of that tradition, courage "(AM, 52 years old, 44:44).

The moral principles imparted and the traditional culture generated a paternal influence in terms of politics, order and study (16-3); while women reported having a maternal influence in terms of solidarity (13-3), which is associated with the feeling of injustice seen at the community level. The influence of other family members (siblings, partners, children) was not significant.

My training has been familiar, of being a supportive person, and if I see an injustice, try to do something to change that. Training in feelings of helping others and solidarity is what changes one. From my mother I learned solidarity. My father and my uncles were military. My father belonged to the Navy. The discipline, the order, the concern for the study, was for my father (VA, 55 years old, 33:33).

At the level of educational institutions, the presence of social concerns in schools was highly significant, which led to an identity profile in the students (30-5); In turn, this was found associated with the presence of significant teachers as figures of authority (27-4). Both aspects are influenced by the circumstances of the national and international context.

The teacher who trained us was talking little by little about politics - he belonged to Red Fatherland -, so, one day we asked him: how many groups of the left existed, and

he named 16 leftist groups, then he told us there was one more but it was clandestine... Me and my friend, who has also been a militant of Sendero, said: "If it was not a threat, then it would not be clandestine. There we said: let's look for that" (AM, 52 years old, 34:36).

On the other hand, the university influence was so significant that it generated a political environment (21-5), which allowed the meeting and participation in political organizations (25-4), as well as in radicalizing pairs (14-6). This generated a political awareness of the radical approaches, and led to a legitimacy and justification of the violence. It is worth mentioning that these aspects were influenced by the normalization and positive perception of the armed struggle.

During the 80's and in college I met the PCP, at that time I identified with them, because I considered it correct. When we were in class I became linked. We were talking, until they invited me to participate with them, and since then I was interested in the debate. We debated whether or not the armed struggle was correct (JCC, 55 years, 51: 51).

Finally, at the individual level, there are those who point out that their participation in the organization was due to their moral autonomy (21-5), product of a profound cognitive process. Thus, they explain that their decision was not constrained by other agents; on the contrary, they refer that it was for personal reasons.

I integrated myself to participate in the PCP-SL in the early 1980's. I put everything in a balance and I said: "I join", a decision that I thought was the best, and I decided to fight for the transformation of society. One could not be a simple spectator. It was with conviction, giving one's life (VA, 55 years, 48: 48).

Conversely, there are those who attribute the reasons to external triggers (11-4), as it was the official misconduct against members of that organization. It should be remembered that people were already politically sensitized by the organization, a situation that motivated their involvement.

The experience of the *Frontón* [Peruvian prison massacres] was the one that motivated me and moved me, what it did was to make me move forwards, to go back, this happened to me on a personal level, it was also social, since many people decided to support as a result of that genocide (GA, 49 years, 48: 48).

The aspects outlined allow to plot routes in the socialization and subsequent political radicalization followed by the militants of the PCP-SL. As it is observed, there are no absolute answers that define it, only links that, duly linked, unleash radicalization.

Discussion

In the present study it is proposed to know how the process of socialization and political radicalization occurs in the militants of the PCP-SL. Sixteen in-depth interviews with them are analyzed. The results allow us to construct a framework of interpretation to understand this phenomenon, which, far from being monocausal, incorporates different progressive and interdependent paths in the process of socialization. Likewise, causal and catalysts for radicalization are identified, which obey rational, passionate and normative ways. These findings are deepened taking into account the theoretical contributions previously indicated (Borum, 2011b; Christmann, 2012; Jordán, 2009; Kleinmann, 2012; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Veldhuis and Staun, 2009; Wilner and Dubouloz, 2010).

At a macrosocial level, the results reaffirm what Botha (2014: 900) explained, in terms of the existence of a profound historical, social, political and cultural influence on political socialization that generated favorable conditions for radicalization. Indeed, the historical (guerrilla movements in Latin America, Agrarian Reform, Military Revolution), sociopolitical (empty Republic, alien State, structural violence) and cultural conditions (peasant social base, traditional conceptions of family roles) led to the normalization and positive perception of the discourse of armed struggle (Moghaddam, 2005: 163). This is important in understanding the preconditions of radicalization; however, they are far from detailing the specific influence from other agents (Botha, 2014: 897).

At a mesosocial level, it is recognized that the community experience with impoverished social classes led to build social representations about the situation of injustice of the needs of the other (Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 161, Botha, 2014: 902). This social identification with another disadvantaged allowed the future members of the PCP-SL to develop empathy with the radicalized groups, creating the conditions for a future radicalization (Moghaddam, 2005: 163; Asencios, 2013: 85; Cáceres, 2013: 44).

On the other hand, the importance of the family, from that peasant social base, is remarkable regarding the principles taught, since it establishes the boundary between right and wrong (Morales et al., 2007: 436; Paul, 2010: 496; Hafez and Mullins, 2015: 964). The incorporation of such principles takes place in community experiences, which are influenced by the Andean culture and present, in turn, a traditional conception of family roles (Theidon, 2004: 73, Henríquez, 2006: 35 and 36).

The militants of the PCP-SL presented a paternal influence linked to politics, order and study; this aspect is consistent with international studies (Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 161). In Peru, the influence of maternal relationships on the militants was characterized by solidarity, care and detachment (Bracco, 2011: 31 and ss.). Along with this, the results also indicate the absence of direct references that have led to radicalization, which is consistent with several investigations (Acharya and Muldoon, 2015, Botha, 2014, Florez-Morris, 2007, Horgan, 2005).

The results allow the PCP-SL to be understood as an organic structure with profoundly traditional cultural roots (Theidon, 2004: 73, Bracco, 2011: 2, Degregori, 2011b: 185, Portocarrero, 2012: 15 and 2015: 107). In that sense, they allow to support that the family influence over radicalization is due to the representation of family roles in a specific cultural context, than to the people themselves. The family influence is important yet not determinant, since later significant others emerge and take their place, such as the pairs group.

In schools, social concerns are raised, both related to the national and international context, as well as to their community experiences concretized in the feeling of injustice towards others. This aspect has been one of the most recurrent in the PCP-SL studies (Lynch, 2006: 165 y ss.; Degregori, 2011b: 117). This is very important, since it allows the student's political profile (Degregori, 2011a: 163 and ss.). An aspect linked to the above is the presence of significant teachers, who represent authority figures and sources of indoctrination, which, in turn, is supported by different investigations (Degregori, 2011b: 161; Uccelli *et al.*, 2013: 29).

On the other hand, the university became a space of influence on the part of the political organizations that inhabit it (Lynch, 1990: 45; Ansión *et al.*, 1993: 142). In particular, the radicalizing pairs and ideologues present at the university generated political sensitization towards radical ideas; this allowed to generate legitimacy and justification of extremist actions (Cragin, 2014: 340; Degregori, 2011b: 185). In the university different options are explored to answer the questions of their reality; thus, the future militants of the PCP-SL had previous participation in political organizations (Lynch, 1990: 83). This was influenced by the positive perception towards the armed struggle; however, not all those who formed radical beliefs triggered actions of that type (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017: 206). As it can be seen, the political experiences in the educational spaces, more than the spaces themselves, constituted a moment of high significance for the assumption of a radical position (Lynch, 1990: 45).

In this stage, the preconditions are perceived as soluble, leaving the interested party to respond to it. Individuals who decide to continue with the development of a polarized posture, elaborate interpretative discourses that justify and legitimize the use of violence as a political resource (Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 42, Moyano, 2010: 100). This point is of vital importance in the decision to be a militant; hence, unlike the causal factors, the catalytic circumstances (Crenshaw, 1981: 381) that trigger membership in the PCP-SL are relevant.

In this regard, there are two reasons that members of the PCP-SL point out regarding their relationship. On the one hand, those who started before or at the beginning of the armed struggle expressed motivations linked to an autonomous morality, not constrained by external factors, but by their own conviction. It can be suggested that this type of decision was mainly cognitive, ideological, based on an evaluation and study of its reality. This autonomy is debatable, since there are multiple influences that lead the person to make such a decision (Horgan, 2005: 72, Arena and Arrigo, 2006: 53). This does not cancel your agency; on the contrary, it allows to understand it better from its determinants.

Another explanation of those mentioned is the presence of external triggers, as it is the abuse of authority applied against the group with which the person is identified; that is, the PCP-SL. This, in turn influenced by the feeling of injustice towards others, generated solidarity and a massive ascription to the group in question. Unlike the previous explanation, in this case the reasons turn out to be mainly of affective cut. It is worth remembering that after the killing of the prisons the national deployment of the violence took place (CVR, 2003e: 43), causing a greater incorporation of militants to the PCP-SL. This explanation is also debatable insofar as it represents a responsibility attribution bias, which reduces personal responsibility for the acts committed (Horgan, 2005: 41).

Although two determinants are indicated in terms of the decision to be part of the PCP-SL - the rational and the emotive one-, they do not leave aside the normative aspect, which underlies both, since over the decisions that are taken, is the normative framework of the subject, assigned to the reference group.

Conclusions

The political socialization that led people to identify with the PCP-SL was presented as a dynamic escalation of radicalization. There are no determining factors; On the contrary, we can point out a frame of reference for radicalization, which goes from the macrosocial levels as generators of the previous conditions, in terms of the positive perception of the armed struggle and the normalization of the discourse of revolution.

Subsequently, the mesosocial level allows the community level to pick up the feeling of injustice in the face of inadequate conditions for others. The family was of great importance in terms of the principles of life fostered from the paternal and maternal roles of the traditional family in the Andean region.

In parallel, from educational institutions, social concerns, significant teachers (ideologists), the political environment, radicalized peer groups and participation in political organizations increased this sensitivity towards radical approaches.

The research does not provide evidence about significant people in radicalization; however, it indicates that the influence is due to the representations of the roles assumed by such people, be it in the community, the home or the educational instances.

Finally, at the microsocial level, two explanations are raised regarding adherence to the PCP-SL. On the one hand, a rational way, based on an evaluation of the situation; and on the other, an emotional path that had as a catalyst an external situation. Both are framed within the normative conditions, imposed by the group and assumed by the individual.

As it can be seen, there is no single path towards radicalization; On the contrary, there is a multiplicity of paths. However, it is pertinent to consider the approach of levels, causal factors and catalytic circumstances to understand how people adopt radical positions. Knowing this is of vital importance to continue struggling in the struggle so that it does not happen again.

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
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Appendix

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Figure 1
Levels of socialization, causal and psychosocial factors present in the radicalization of militants of the PCP-*SL*.



Source: Own elaboration

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