

## The representation of the world in national Arab news agencies: an exploration of (trans)national networks in the official Arab media

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**Abstract:** The purpose of this paper is to draw a map of the representation of the world and of Arab states as reflected by the countries of the region. To do so, we have analysed the news (4,093 news randomly collected on February and August 2005) produced by the governments of the Arab states through their national news agencies. Several regional and world maps had been constructed to show the official Arab representation of the World, the Arab countries conflict agenda, the persistence of colonial ties (with the European metropolis) and the emergence of new relationships (Asian countries). The representation of the world that appeared in the analysis focuses its interest on the USA, the war in Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the United Kingdom, France, and Iran. The Arab regional powers organise the flow of information (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) and the colonial past determines the current structure of communication (French-speaking bloc and English-speaking bloc)

**Key words:** international news, news agencies, Arab countries, network analysis, world system.

**Resumen:** El propósito de este trabajo es elaborar un mapa con la representación del mundo y de los países árabes tal como la observan los países de esta región. Para ello, hemos analizado las noticias (4,093 recogidas entre febrero y agosto de 2005) producidas por los gobiernos de los Estados árabes a través de sus agencias de noticias nacionales. Se presentan diferentes mapas mundiales y regionales para mostrar la representación oficial árabe del mundo, la agenda de los países árabes en conflicto, la persistencia de los lazos coloniales (con la metrópoli europea) y la aparición de nuevas relaciones (países asiáticos). Se observa una concentración de interés en algunos países (EE.UU., Irak y el conflicto Israel-Palestino, Reino Unido, Francia e Irán), y cómo la importancia de los poderes regionales (Arabia Saudí y Egipto) y así como el pasado colonial (bloques anglófono y francófono) determina la estructura actual de la comunicación.

**Palabras clave:** noticias internacionales, agencias de noticias, países árabes, sistema mundial, análisis de redes.

## **The Arab world: imaginary and real maps**

Real and imaginary maps are juxtaposed in our picture of the Arab world, which is seen as a united whole. This vision is based on the political map of the 22 countries members that make up the League of Arab States, the pan-Arabic view of a linguistic and cultural unity 'from the Gulf to the Ocean', and of course, the strength of Islam beyond the borders of the the Arab world. Not to mention that it is the main religion of what used to be the Ottoman Empire, now-a-days Iran, among part of the population that immigrated to Europe, and it is very widespread across Asia, the Indian Subcontinent, the Indian and Pacific Islands, and the neighbouring countries of the Sahara Desert.

The reasons behind the construction of a united vision of the Arab world can be found both from inside and outside of it. From the outside, and with regard to the recent situation, this vision of unity fits in with a culturalist explanation of the world, what Said called orientalism (1979). However, this also helps form the creation of a new enemy in the clash of civilizations (a replacement of the Cold War's main enemy), which is readily associated with fanaticism, terrorism and military power (weapons of mass destruction) (Tortosa, 1999). From the inside, the pan-Arabic vision was built using the Arabic and the Islamic cultural heritage as motivating element in the process against the Ottoman rule, the European colonisation, the confrontation between the blocs during the Cold War (the Arab nationalism sometimes tended to identify with socialism but in other cases went against it), and of course, against Israel and backing the Palestinian cause.

There are also strong reasons to support the vision of a fragmented Arab world. Its physical geography is characterized by a constant change of landscapes and climates. Even the apparent similarities found at first sight between the fluvial regimes of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the Nile disappear when we look at the great difference in the farming regimes that have developed in these areas (Planhol, 1998). If we consider its human geography, the array of people, languages and cultures that we find is even more noteworthy (Planhol, 1998 and 2002). The colonisation process is also a dividing factor of the territory between the great powers (the United Kingdom and France, followed by Italy and Spain, competing with the Ottoman Empire). This creates a new form of unity and linguistic fragmentation (French or English-speaking areas) that is above the other languages and Arabic dialects. Not to forget that after the decolonisation process a varied map of nations-state takes shape; these new states have

different interests and compete amongst themselves (Iraq-Kuwait, Morocco-Algeria, Morocco-Sahara, Yemen, Syria-Lebanon...) (UCDP/PRIO, 2005). As well as this geographical, cultural and political fragmentation, we must take into account the differences in terms of wealth, type of economic activity and natural resources available to each of these economies, which have a greater economic exchange with the non-Arab economic powers (the European Union, the USA, Japan, Russia, China, and India) than between them. This situation has conditioned the steps taken towards the economic integration of the region. The Arab Maghreb Union, formed on the 17<sup>th</sup> of February 1989 by Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Libya and Mauritania, is at a standstill (Vermeren, 2002). The Gulf Cooperation Council, formed on May 25, 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, focuses its objectives on the outside (negotiating free trade agreements with the European Union and NAFTA) rather than on the inside. In this sense, OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, with headquarters in Vienna), the most powerful cooperation organisation in the region, is not Arabic in structure nor in its ideals.

This fragmented picture of the Arab world is defended both from inside and outside Arab countries. From the outside, the old metropolis and new powers are interested in establishing unilateral commercial and military ties with different countries, as well as setting up associations led by these powers. Examples of this include the Eizenstat initiative for a free trade agreement between the USA and the North African countries, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, and last but not least, the League of Arab States, which was created with the intervention of the United Kingdom. In the same way, the nationalists' views within the Arab countries, together with the ethnic, class, and religious divides are opposed to the creation of a pan-Arabic project.

The purpose of this paper is to draw a new type of map: the representation of the world and the Arab states as reflected by the countries of the region. To do so, we have analysed the news produced by the governments of the Arab states through their national news agencies. The resulting map is compared with the structure of communication predicted by the Structural Theory of Imperialism (Galtung, 1971).

### **The Arab Imaginary: the geopolitics of communication**

The decolonisation process gave rise to the creation of the national media. These bodies became mechanisms for the development of the new independent

states in the international order, which until then had been controlled by the agencies and media of the metropolis. The king of Morocco, Mohammed V, who set up Africa's first news agency, and Ghana's leader, Kwame Nkrumah, gave national agencies the mission of 'taking part in the development of a national and pan-African conscience in the colonies, where information has been controlled by the transnational institutions' (quoted in LIJAF, 2005). These agencies were not only directly funded by the governments as part of a nationalist, anti-colonial and solidarity strategy, but also as a tool to wield their power through the control of what was published. As a matter of fact, the recent break of the state monopoly by the private or international initiative of television, radio, press, and Internet has led governments to renew their communication and influence strategies (Guaaybess, 2005).

The Arab countries provided themselves with several tools, institutional and technological, in order to set up their own communication system. As far as news agencies, it is important to mention the creation, in 1975, of the Federation of Arab News Agencies (FANA) established within the scope of the Arab League that comprises in its membership 18 countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Iraq, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Syria, and Mauritania. Along those lines, the Non-Aligned News Agencies Pool was formed in 1975 by a decision made during the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries. This pool was set-up to ensure co-operation among non-aligned countries with a view to promote a balanced flow of information. However, as it was pointed out during the last Conference of Information Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement in Malaysia, on November 2005, the NANAP has become ineffective as many members withdrew from it during the 1980s. In any case, a new entity to be called 'the NAM News Network', or NNN, has been launched during the Conference (COMINAC Malaysia, 2005). Returning to the Arab countries, these efforts were also carried out in other communication areas, which resulted in bodies such as the Arab States Broadcasting Union, and the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (ARBSAT), which launched the ARABSAT satellite in 1985.

As a result of these efforts, it was to be expected that a regional communication system independent from the colonial rule would emerge. The system is, self-centred (with a good deal of information about the countries in the region) [a1, a2, a3...], and balanced (with a flow of information, in and out, between all the Arab countries) [bi-directional arrows], and even with

information about countries in other continents [p1, p2, p3...], as well as about the centres [c1, c2...] (see figures 1 and 2).

However, multiple obstacles must be overcome so as to achieve these goals (Galtung and Vincent, 1992). Johan Galtung, in his structural theory of imperialism (1971), explains that the communication network between central and peripheral countries has rather a feudal structure of communication, with the characteristics as shown in figure 2. Peripheral countries [p1, p2, p3...] communicate directly with central countries, generally the old metropolis and the new powers [c1, c2, c3...]. There is no communication between peripheral countries [p1, p2...]. The communication with central countries from other regions or other peripheral countries is done through other central countries. In today's world this type of structure can be seen in commercial relationships and air traffic (see figures 3 and 4).

If the situation predicted by the structural theory of imperialism was a reality, the information produced by the national Arab news agencies would be characterized by:

- a) A high level of information about the countries that control the commercial, cultural and military relationships with the Arab world (the USA, United Kingdom, and France).
- b) A low level of information about the Arab countries.
- c) Lack of information about the centres and peripheries from other regions (Latin America, Africa, Asia, Oceania).

The debate about the 'New World Information and Communication Order' (NWICO) promoted in the context of the United Nations by non-aligned countries would support this hypothesis, and has generated reports like *Many voices one world*, that UNESCO commissioned Sean MacBride in 1980. MacBride's report officially highlighted the control the world powers have over the information through their news agencies (UPI, Reuters, AP, France Press), and their communication resources (satellites, television, radio, press). Other reports drew similar conclusions, like *Foreign news in the media* by Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. (1985), which pointed out the global trend of covering the same issues and locations in the news. The structural theory of imperialism in communication has been backed empirically by Meyer in *Global news flows* (1989), and by Penalva's research (1998 and 1999). The former showed the dependence of the Latin America media and the former British colonies in Africa on the American news agencies (UPI, AP) and the British ones (Reuters), respectively. The latter pointed out how

the Spanish press reproduced the centres and peripheries structure in its view of the world.

In the political sphere and as a consequence of the NWICO strategy, both the USA (in 1984) and the United Kingdom (1985) left UNESCO. This resulted in the institution losing 25% and 4.6% of its budget, respectively. The USA would join the UNESCO again in 2003, whereas the UK had done so in 1997, once the organisation had changed its political direction after the fall of the Soviet bloc in 1989. In the World Summits on the Information Society held in Geneva (2003) and Tunisia (2005) a commercial approach to communication prevailed, in line with the guidelines established by the World Trade Organisation as regards the media (Raboy, 2004).

### **Analysis of the national Arab news agencies**

In order to study the representation of the world in the national Arab news agencies, the members of the Federation of Arab News Agencies (FANA) were taken into account. The following agencies were chosen out the 18 organisations the FANA lists as its members: Jordan News Agency (PETRA), Emirates News Agency (WAM), Tunis - Afrique Press (TAP), Algerian Press Service (APS), Saudi Press Agency (SPA), Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Palestinian News Agency (WAFA), Qatari News Agency (QANA), Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA), Jamahiriya News Agency (JNA), Maghreb Arab Press (MAP), Mauritanian Press Agency (MPA), Yemen News Agency, (SABA), Middle East News Agency – Egypt (MENA), Sudan News Agency (SUNA), and Oman News Agency (ONA). Two agencies were not included: the Iraqi News Agency (INA), which was inactive during the time of our fieldwork, and the National News Agency – Lebanon (NNA), which does not translate its reports. The Bahrain News Agency is not listed as a member of the FANA.

Given the considerable volume of information produced by these agencies, it was decided to choose a sample of their news articles. We have randomly selected five days in February 2005 (on different days of the week). For confirmatory purposes another month has been randomly selected during the second half of 2005: August. The results from both samples showed a great similarity so it was considered that the sample size was adequate for the purpose of this paper. The sample consisted of 4,093 news articles, in full text, produced by news agencies. It was decided to gather the articles in English and French on the basis of the agencies being from English or

French-speaking areas. The software used for our analysis and the linguistic competence of the research team did not allow us to analyse the news items written in Arabic, a fact we consider a bias in this research. In any case, nearly all the news items are translated; those which are not translated usually refer to domestic issues of these countries.

A dictionary of countries was built for our analysis that included the name of the country, its capital and the name given to its inhabitants. This allowed us to know if the country was mentioned in each of the 4,093 news articles analysed, in which 6,624 references to different countries around the world were found. To avoid self-reference, our analysis has not taken into consideration those news items that only referred to the agency's own country (1,549 self-references). Please take note that a single news article may have references to more than one country. The number of news items in which a country is mentioned has been taken as an indicator of the visibility of that country. The maps, tables and graphs shown below have been created using this indicator of visibility, and the relationships between countries have been analysed using social network analysis via the UCINET software (Bogartti, 2002).

### **The Arab representation of the world**

The representation of the world that appeared in the analysis focuses its interest on the USA, the war in Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, and Iran. These areas obtain almost 50% of the information (see table 1). It is therefore a world that includes the world superpower, the former colonial powers, a non-Arab regional power (Iran), the two Arab regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Egypt), and the two most important geo-strategic conflicts for the region (see figure 5).

On an intermediate level of representation we find the rest of powers in Europe (Russia and Germany), the Asian continent (Japan, India and China), and the Middle East (Turkey), as well as several eastern Arab countries.

As relevant as the countries represented in this map are those that are not there. There is no information about non-Arab African countries, America (except the USA), part of South East Asia and Oceania, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia. The Arab countries in Northern Africa are almost invisible.

## Structure of the Arab representation of the world

The presence of these countries in the information can be linked with their position in the structure of the world system, and with some elements of the present situation that attract media attention (war-conflict). As indicators of structure we have used the gross domestic product (GDP), adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP), and military expenditures in US dollars.

Table 2 includes the top twenty countries in the world with: a) high GDP, b) high military expenditure, and/or c) high visibility in the information produced by Arab agencies.

The results of crossing the level of visibility with the variables 'economic power' and 'military power' are two almost identical tables (see tables 3 and 4). If we take a closer look at them we can distinguish three types of countries:

a) Countries whose level of visibility is matched by their economic or military power (found in the diagonal of the table: number 1, 5, and 9). In this group we find a high correspondence between economic/military power and visibility. The most visible countries (number 1) are the world superpower (the USA), and the main European powers that colonised the Arab world (the United Kingdom and France). In an intermediate level of visibility (number 5) is Turkey, the other historic power that exerted its control over the Arab world. The world's peripheral countries with a low economic/military power are almost invisible, including the Arab countries in North Africa, and the small countries in the Persian Gulf.

b) Countries whose visibility is higher than their economic/military power (number 4, 7, and 8).

All the countries in this group are located in the Middle East. The group can be divided into three categories that we will further explain below: regional powers (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Israel), conflicts (Iraq, Palestine-Lebanon-Syria-Jordan/Israel, and Sudan), and the particular case of Bahrain as it is the only country in the Middle East with a relatively high visibility, in contrast to Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Djibouti, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates.

c) Countries whose economic/military power is higher than their visibility (number 2, 3, and 6).

None of the countries in this group is located in the Middle East. They are European, Asian and American countries. The other major

economic/military powers in the world (China, Japan, India, Germany, and Russia) get an intermediate level of visibility, whereas the regional powers in Europe (Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands), America (Brazil, Canada, and Mexico), and Asia-Oceania (South Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan, Australia, and Thailand) remain invisible.

### Conflict in the Arab representation of the world

We have already pointed out that some countries with a low economic/military power have high levels of visibility due to conflicts. That is the case of Palestine and Sudan. Iraq, which was historically a military power and one of the countries with more oil reserves in the world, adds to its structural situation the situation of its current conflict. The results of our analysis show a list of conflicts and the high level of attention that is being paid to Iraq (398 references) and Palestine. Local conflicts get a medium level of attention: Sudan (93 references), or the situation between Lebanon and Syria (the killing of former prime minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005, and the withdrawal of Syrian troops on March 2005). These two countries receive this attention because of their relationship with Palestine (like Jordan) but on account of the conflict between them and their domestic circumstances. A lower level of attention is given to Pakistan (56 references), Afghanistan (44 references), Indonesia (44 references), Western Sahara (16 references), and Chechnya (8 references). Other conflicts, visible or latent, are virtually ignored, like those in Ivory Coast (3 references), Colombia (4 references), Nepal (11 references), Nigeria (11 references), Uganda (19 references), Uzbekistan (1 reference), and the Philippines (12 references) (see UCDP/PRI 2005).

In short, this pattern shows that a high level of attention is directed towards internal conflicts (Iraq, and Palestine-Israel-Syria-Lebanon-Jordan), followed by Sudan and Algeria. In so far as external conflicts, Pakistan and Afghanistan attract the most attention. However, other conflicts related to Islamic movements (Chechnya, Nigeria, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, and Eritrea) are virtually invisible, such as those in the periphery of the Arab world (Western Sahara), and those that take place in Africa, Latin America, or Asia.

Some social actors become more present in the news due to their situation in the structure and their, direct or indirect, relationship with the above mentioned conflicts. This would be the case of the USA, whose high

visibility can be explained by structural elements as well as their connection with several conflicts in the region. The same relationship between structure and conflict can be found in Israel, the United Kingdom, France, Iran, and Turkey, which explains the high level of visibility of these countries.

### **The colonial heritage and the new alliances in the Arab representation of the world**

A second, complementary map of the region can be drawn using social network analysis to study the information flows. Table 5 shows the results of the centrality analysis we have conducted. Regarding news production Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt are the most important agencies, as these four countries invest more in communication and have the most complete news agencies in the region. As for the countries that predominantly feature in the news, these are Iraq (its news agency is currently inactive), Palestine, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. The relationship between the production and the reception of news is only balanced in Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the centre of the network as they have links with all the countries, both for the reception (indegree) and the production of information (outdegree). As a matter of fact, the indicator of the degree of intermediation (betweenness), that is, the number of links between actors that go through these countries is the highest in our analysis (table 6). Thus, using the terminology of network analysis, they can be considered bridges between the different countries. Palestine, whose news agency focuses on domestic news and has a low profile in news production, is however the main focal point of the information produced by both groups of countries (indegree).

The way in which the information is structured results in two large groups of countries (see centrality graph; figure 6). In the first group are most of the Middle East countries (Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Oman), along with Sudan. They are characterised by:

- a) High closeness to the bridges in the network, particularly to Saudi Arabia, and then Egypt.
- b) High density of information between them.

The second group is made up by Syria and the North African countries (Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Mauritania), that is to say, the French-speaking periphery and Libya, which are characterised by:

- a) Being further away from the bridges in the network (Saudi Arabia and Egypt).
- b) A lower density of information between them.

The two groups that we see in our analysis of the in- and out-flows of information between the agencies chosen for this study can also be seen in the information patterns of both groups (see table 7). In the information produced by the first group (Middle East and Sudan) a higher relative weight is given to the USA-United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Japan, or India. The western group for its part gives more weight to the European Union and Russia. Saudi Arabia and Egypt follow a pattern more similar to that of the Middle East countries than to the North African ones.

### **About the structural theory of imperialism**

The structural theory of imperialism predicts most of the results obtained by our analysis: the central position of the superpower (USA) followed by the former colonial powers (United Kingdom, France, and Turkey), and then the Arab regional powers that organise the flow of information (Saudi Arabia and Egypt). The colonial past determines the current structure of communication. There is a French-speaking bloc with a weaker structural position. This group of countries focuses on the European Union and Russia but still keeps the superpower (USA) and the regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) as points of reference. The English-speaking bloc for its part holds a stronger structural position and focuses its news items on the USA and the United Kingdom. There is also a deep lack of connection with the peripheries of other parts of the world (America, Africa, Asia, Oceania, Eastern Europe, and Scandinavia), and their regional powers (Canada, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Australia).

However, some aspects of this theory cannot be seen from the results of our study. There is a certain connection with the main power in the Asian continent (Japan, India, and China), which supports the hypothesis André Gunder Frank set out in *Reorient: global economy in the Asian age* (1998), suggesting that the center of the world economy is once again moving to Asia. There is also a high level of information about the Arab countries. The elements of conflict (especially in Iraq and Palestine) raise the interest in some Middle East countries, both Arab (Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan) and non-Arab states (Israel, Iran, and Turkey), that play a key role in the region. Paradoxically, conflicts create a pattern of regional integration in the communication. Nevertheless, there is an obvious centre-periphery structure wi-

thin the Arab countries. The centre being Saudi Arabia and Egypt, followed by Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and there are two peripheries: the Middle East (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Oman), and North Africa (Morocco, Mauritania, Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia).

In any case, these results must be carefully interpreted due to the limited time span of the information (the months of February and August 2005), the relatively reduced sample size (particularly when the results regarding countries with a low number of references are used), and the information bias on account of the fact that we analysed news items written in English and French, and excluded those written in Arabic. Having said this, we can consider the data presented here as an X-ray of the year 2005 since the results of both months are virtually identical.

Bearing in mind these limitations, the communication structure that we have detected can be read in geopolitical terms, in which the United States has a strong control over the region. This is so not solely because the USA is the main element in the information, but also because of its cooperative relationship with the centres of the information network (Saudi Arabia and Egypt). However, on account of the centrality of the Palestinian cause and Iraq, the Arab agencies show more interest in their own region. Thus, a pan-Arabic effect takes place in communication. The high visibility of the USA (and the United Kingdom) should be analysed in qualitative terms: is this country an enemy, ally, arbiter, mediator, bully, or a peacemaker? The fact that Russia and France keep a high visibility in the periphery of the Arab world (the former French colonies) must also be stressed. It should be added to this that both countries are significantly featured in the information produced by the group of countries formerly under British rule.

The results show a structure of communication partly consistent with the postulates of the structural theory of imperialism. The provisions of this theory are softened by the effects of conflict and a pan-Arab approach. The structure of communicative exchanges could be a mirror image of the structure of economic, political and cultural relations between the Arab countries.

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## Anexo

Figure 1  
Independent regional communication




Figure 2  
Feudal communication. Structural theory of imperialism (Galtung, 1971)




Figure 3

World trade (Gimeno and Metrano, 2003)




Figure 4

Air traffic (Amiel *et al.*, 2005)




Figure 5

The world map of the Arab agencies




Figure 6  
Centrality graph




Table 1

Visibility index: countries mentioned in the news items of the national Arab news agencies (February and August 2005). Percentage, frequency, cumulative percentage and ranking.

Country	% cum	% REF	Ranking	Country	% cum	REF	Ranking	Country	% cum	REF	Ranking	
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	8.67	8.67	440	1	ITALY	1.16	67.17	59	22	SRILANKA	0.49	83.13
IRAQ	7.84	16.51	398	2	PAKISTAN	1.10	68.28	56	23	BRAZIL	0.47	83.61
ISRAEL	6.13	22.64	311	3	SPAIN	1.10	69.38	56	24	SINGAPORE	0.47	84.08
PALESTINE	5.87	28.51	298	4	ALGERIA	0.97	70.34	49	25	KENYA	0.45	84.53
UNITED KINGDOM	4.33	32.85	220	5	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	0.97	71.31	49	26	VATICAN	0.45	84.99
SAUDI ARABIA	3.80	36.65	193	6	BELGIUM	0.95	72.26	48	27	THAILAND	0.43	85.42
IRAN	3.17	39.82	161	7	TUNISIA	0.93	73.18	47	28	MAURITANIA	0.37	85.79
EGYPT	3.09	42.92	157	8	YEMEN	0.91	74.09	46	29	CHYPRE	0.37	86.17
FRANCE	2.78	45.69	141	9	AFGHANISTAN	0.87	74.96	44	30	UGANDA	0.37	86.54
LEBANON	2.72	48.41	138	10	INDONESIA	0.87	75.82	44	31	NORWAY	0.35	86.90
JORDAN	2.09	50.50	106	11	QATAR	0.75	76.57	38	32	BANGLADESH	0.33	87.23
GERMANY	1.95	52.45	99	12	SWITZERLAND	0.71	77.28	36	33	GHANA	0.33	87.57
SYRIA	1.83	54.29	93	13	OMAN	0.69	77.97	35	34	MALI	0.33	87.90
SUDAN	1.83	56.12	93	14	AUSTRALIA	0.65	78.62	33	35	MEXICO	0.32	88.22
RUSSIA	1.79	57.91	91	15	CANADA	0.65	79.27	33	36	NEW ZEALAND	0.32	88.53
JAPAN	1.73	59.65	88	16	SENEGAL	0.61	79.88	31	37	W. SAHARA	0.32	88.85
INDIA	1.38	61.02	70	17	MOROCCO	0.59	80.47	30	38	BULGARIA	0.30	89.14
BAHRAIN	1.30	62.33	66	18	NIGERIA	0.59	81.06	30	39	IRELAND	0.30	89.44
CHINA	1.24	63.57	63	19	MALAYSIA	0.57	81.64	29	40	AUSTRIA	0.28	89.71
TURKEY	1.24	64.81	63	20	NETHERLANDS	0.51	82.15	26	41	BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	0.28	89.99
KUWAIT	1.20	66.01	61	21	LIBYA	0.49	82.64	25	42	Others	10.01	100
									Total	100	-	
										5,075	-	

Table 2

Top 20s of visibility on Arab news agencies, gross domestic product, or military expenditures.

	Visibility (% news items)	GDP (millions \$) <sup>1</sup>	Military expenditures (millions \$) <sup>1</sup>	Visibility ranking	Economic ranking	Military ranking
UNITED STATES	8.67	12,410,000	518,100	1	1	1
IRAQ	7.84	94,100	1,340	2	58	50
ISRAEL	6.13	140,100	9,450	3	52	17
PALESTINE	5.87	2,568	n.a.	4	184	n.a.
UNITED KINGDOM	4.33	1,869,000	42,836	5	6	5
SAUDI ARABIA	3.80	340,600	18,000	6	27	11
IRAN	3.17	552,800	4,300	7	18	26
EGYPT	3.09	339,200	2,440	8	28	39
FRANCE	2.77	1,822,000	45,000	9	7	3
LEBANON	0.24	20,420	540	10	113	73
JORDAN	2.09	27,860	1,400	11	100	49
GERMANY	1.95	2,454,000	35,063	12	5	6
SYRIA	1.83	63,310	858	13	68	58
SUDAN	1.83	84,930	587	14	61	72
RUSSIA	1.79	1,539,000	26,000 <sup>2</sup>	15	10	8
JAPAN	1.73	3,914,000	44,310	16	3	4
INDIA	1.38	3,699,000	19,040	17	4	10
BAHRAIN	1.30	14,110	627	18	127	68
CHINA	1.24	8,182,000	81,480	19	2	2
TURKEY	1.24	552,700	12,155	20	19	13
ITALY	1.16	1,651,000	28,182	22	8	7
SPAIN	1.10	1,017,000	9,906	24	13	15
INDONESIA	0.87	901,700	1,300	31	15	51
AUSTRALIA	0.65	642,100	17,840	35	16	12
CANADA	0.65	1,080,000	9,801	36	11	16
NETHERLANDS	0.51	501,600	9,480	41	23	18
BRAZIL	0.47	1,568,000	9,940	44	9	14
THAILAND	0.43	545,800	1,775	48	20	44
MEXICO	0.32	1,068,000	6,070	56	12	20
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (SOUTH KOREA)	0.16	965,300	21,060	86	14	9
TAIWAN	0.16	611,500	7,930	87	17	19

Source: (1) Central Intelligence Agency (2006), The World Factbook 2006. CIA: Washington. (2) BICC (2002).

Table 3

**Visibility and economic power (gross domestic product adjusted by purchasing power parity, PPP)**

	High visibility Top 10	Medium visibility Ranking 11-20	Low visibility Ranking 21<
High GDP Top 10	(1) USA, UK, France	(2) China, Japan, India, Germany, Russia	(3) Italy, Brazil
High-Medium GDP Ranking 11-20	(4) Iran	(5) Turkey	(6) Canada, Mexico, Spain, South Korea, Indonesia, Australia, Taiwan, Thailand
Low GDP Ranking 21<	(7) Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine	(8) Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain	(9) Rest of the World

Table 4

**Visibility and military expenditures**

	High visibility Top 10	Medium visibility Ranking 11-20	Low visibility Ranking 21<
High Military expenditures Top 10	(1) USA, UK, France	(2) China, Japan, Germany, Russia, India	(3) Italy, South Korea
High-Medium Military expenditures Ranking 11-20	(4) Saudi Arabia, Israel	(5) Turkey	(6) Australia, Brazil, Spain, Canada, Netherlands, Taiwan, Mexico
Low Military expenditures Ranking 21<	(7) Iran, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine	(8) Jordan, Syria, Bahrain, Sudan	(9) Rest of the World

Table 5  
Freeman's degree centrality measures

Diagonal valid?		NO			
Model:		ASYMMETRIC			
		1 InDegree	2 OutDegree	3 NrmInDeg	4 NrmOutDeg
9	PALESTINE	298.000	9.000	1986.667	60.000
11	SAUDI ARABIA	193.000	166.000	1286.667	1106.667
2	EGYPT	157.000	151.000	1046.667	1006.667
3	JORDAN	106.000	68.000	706.667	453.333
12	SUDAN	93.000	12.000	620.000	80.000
13	SYRIA	93.000	41.000	620.000	273.333
4	KUWAIT	61.000	378.000	406.667	2520.000
1	ALGERIA	53.000	24.000	353.333	160.000
15	U. ARAB EMIRATES	49.000	74.000	326.667	493.333
14	TUNISIA	47.000	15.000	313.333	100.000
16	YEMEN	46.000	23.000	306.667	153.333
10	QATAR	38.000	282.000	253.333	1880.000
8	OMAN	35.000	9.000	233.333	60.000
7	MOROCCO	30.000	16.000	200.000	106.667
6	MAURITANIA	21.000	35.000	140.000	233.333
5	LYBIA	9.000	17.000	110.000	113.333

Note: InDegree.- The number of directional relations ending at a node is called the indegree of the node. OutDegree: The number of arcs beginning at a node is called the outdegree of the node. NrmInDeg and NrmOutDeg are the normalized measures.

Table 6  
Freeman's betweenness centrality

Un-normalized centralization: 175.660		1	2
		Betweenness	nBetweenness
11	SAUDI ARABIA	15.291	7.282
2	EGYPT	10.916	5.198
3	JORDAN	10.088	4.804
10	QATAR	6.222	2.963
14	TUNISIA	4.922	2.344
12	SUDAN	4.064	1.935
4	KUWAIT	3.841	1.829
1	ALGERIA	3.096	1.474
6	MAURITANIA	2.600	1.238
15	U. ARAB EMIRATES	2.213	1.054
7	MOROCCO	1.765	0.841
13	SYRIA	1.669	0.795
16	YEMEN	1.369	0.652
9	PALESTINE	0.942	0.448
5	LYBIA	0.030	0.017
8	OMAN	0.022	0.009

Network Centralization Index = 5.58%

Table 7

Information patterns of Middle East, North of Africa, Arabia Saudi and Egypt agencies

	Middle East (Uk zone agencies)		North of Africa (France zone agencies)		SPA (Saudi)		Egypt (Mena)	
	REF.	(Ref./ NEWS)	REF.	(Ref./ NEWS)	REF.	(Ref./ NEWS)	REF.	(Ref./ NEWS)
UKZONE	548	40,9	71	13,4	73	24,1	131	28,4
USA + UK	354	26,4	78	14,7	87	28,7	60	13,0
UE24	220	16,4	103	19,4	79	26,1	21	4,5
FRANZONE	210	15,7	110	20,8	42	13,9	82	17,7
SAUDI ARABIA	144	10,7	23	4,3	104	34,3	24	5,2
EGYPT	112	8,4	22	4,2	20	6,6	133	28,8
IRAN	97	7,2	22	4,2	20	6,6	22	4,8
JAPAN	58	4,3	7	1,3	12	4,0	10	2,2
INDIA	52	3,9	2	0,4	11	3,6	3	0,6
RUSSIA	48	3,6	18	3,4	18	5,9	4	0,9
CHINA	36	2,7	8	1,5	13	4,3	6	1,3
TURKEY	27	2,0	16	3,0	4	1,3	14	3,0
Total (References)	1906	142,1	480	90,6	483	159,4	510	110,4
Number of news	1341	100,0	530	100,0	303	100,0	462	100,0

UKZONE: United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman, Sudan. FRANZONE: Morocco, Mauritania, Western Sahara, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Lebanon. AGENFRAN: Morocco Mauritania, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Lebanon, Algeria. AGENUK: Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Yemen, Sudan, Jordan, Emirates.

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Envío a dictamen: 17 de noviembre de 2009.

Aprobación: 04 de abril de 2010.