<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1405-0218</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Isonomía]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Isonomía]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1405-0218</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México; Fontamara]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1405-02182024000200012</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.5347/isonomia.61/2024/745</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Razones jurídicas, lógica y determinación normativa]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Legal Reasons, Logic and Normative Determinacy]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Navarro]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Pablo E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Lisbon  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Portugal</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>61</numero>
<fpage>314</fpage>
<lpage>341</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1405-02182024000200012&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1405-02182024000200012&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1405-02182024000200012&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Joseph Raz sostiene que los enunciados jurídicos están lógicamente estratificados. En el nivel básico se encuentran los enunciados jurídicos de razones para la acción y todos los demás enunciados jurídicos (e.g., permisiones, derechos, deberes, competencia, etc.) deben explicarse por sus relaciones lógicas con la forma elemental de los enunciados jurídicos. Esta idea es una de las claves de la respuesta que Raz ofrece al argumento dworkiniano contra el positivismo jurídico, al menos en la versión ofrecida por Dworkin en sus trabajos sobre la tesis de la respuesta correcta en el derecho. En esta respuesta, Raz despliega los rudimentos de una lógica de las razones jurídicas concluyentes y, a partir de ese desarrollo formal, defiende que el derecho carece de lagunas genuinas. En este trabajo me propongo (i) analizar algunos aspectos formales de la respuesta de Raz al desafío de Dworkin al positivismo jurídico, (ii) utilizar la lógica de normas y la lógica de proposiciones normativas desarrollada por Alchourrón y Bulygin como pauta de comparación con la lógica de las razones concluyentes y (iii) demostrar en qué sentido la lógica de las razones concluyentes no puede garantizar la completitud de los sistemas jurídicos.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract Joseph Raz argues that legal statements are logically stratified. At the basic level there are the legal statements of reasons for action, and all other legal statements (e.g., permissions, rights, duties, competences, etc.) must be explained by their logical relations with the elemental form of legal statements. This idea is one of the keys to Raz&#8217;s response to Dworkin&#8217;s argument against legal positivism, at least in the version presented by Dworkin in his work on the thesis of the one right answer in law. In this response, Raz unfolds the rudiments of a logic of conclusive legal reasons and, based on this formal development, argues that the law lacks genuine gaps. In this paper, I intend to (i) analyze some formal aspects of Raz&#8217;s response to Dworkin&#8217;s challenge to legal positivism, (ii) use the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions developed by Alchourrón and Bulygin as a benchmark for comparison with the logic of conclusive reasons, and (iii) demonstrate in what sense the logic of conclusive reasons cannot guarantee the completeness of legal systems.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[enunciados jurídicos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razones concluyentes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[lagunas en el derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[lógica deóntica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal statements]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[conclusive reasons]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal gaps]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[deontic logic]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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