<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-5705</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Inter disciplina]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Inter disciplina]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-5705</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Ciencias y Humanidades]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-57052024000100245</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/ceiich.24485705e.2024.32.87013</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Poder de decisión de los partidos políticos en las LXIII y LXIV Legislaturas mexicanas: un análisis con teoría de juegos y simulaciones]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Decision power of political parties in the LXIII and LXIV Mexican Legislatures: an analysis with game theory and simulations]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Larios Ferrer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[José Leonel]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Politécnica de la Energía  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>04</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>04</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>12</volume>
<numero>32</numero>
<fpage>245</fpage>
<lpage>276</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-57052024000100245&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-57052024000100245&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-57052024000100245&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Las decisiones tomadas en los diferentes congresos son de gran trascendencia para el ámbito social y económico de un país, pues sin una cooperación entre los partidos se puede estancar la aprobación de reformas y leyes. La manera en que se estudia la dinámica del poder de decisión entre las distintas fuerzas políticas puede ser abordada desde un punto de vista cuantitativo. Por lo anterior, en la presente investigación se analiza el poder de decisión de los partidos políticos en las Legislaturas LXIII y LXIV por medio de distintos índices ofrecidos por la teoría de juegos cooperativos y mediante simulaciones desarrolladas en Scilab. La importancia de estudiar este tipo de tópicos desde un enfoque interdisciplinario radica en el mejor entendimiento de la conducta política dentro de los congresos y en el conocimiento de las múltiples formas que se pueden tener para poder aprobar los diferentes acuerdos. Se encuentra que, en tres años, MORENA aumentó en más de un 60% su poder de decisión y el PRI ha perdido casi un 50% del mismo. También se pudo verificar que el PRI es el partido más beneficiado al hacer coaliciones, y el PAN el más perjudicado en este tipo de análisis.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract Decisions made in different congresses are of great importance for the social and economic sphere of a country, since without cooperation between parties, the approval of reforms and laws can be stalled. The way in which decision-making&#8217;s power dynamics between the different political forces is studied can be approached from a quantitative point of view. That is why in the present investigation the decision-making power of political parties in the LXIII and LXIV Legislatures is analyzed through different indices offered by cooperative game theory and through simulations developed in Scilab. The importance of studying this type of topics from an interdisciplinary approach lies in the better understanding of political behavior within congresses, and in the knowledge of the multiple ways that can be had to approve the different agreements. It is found that in three years MORENA increased its decision-making power by more than 60% and the PRI has lost almost 50% of it. It was also possible to verify that the PRI is the party that benefits the most from making coalitions and that the PAN is the most harmed in this type of analysis.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teoría de juegos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[índices de poder]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[valor coalicional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[partidos políticos de México]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Cámara de Diputados de México]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[poder de decisión]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[simulaciones en Scilab]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[theory of games]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[power indexes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[coalitional value]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[political parties of Mexico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Chamber of Deputies of Mexico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[decision power]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[simulations in Scilab]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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