<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-5346</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista mexicana de economía y finanzas]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. mex. econ. finanz]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-5346</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-53462019000200189</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21919/remef.v14i2.309</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Optimal Reciprocal Dumping in a Managed Trade Regime]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Dumping recíproco óptimo bajo un régimen de protección administrada]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gallegos David]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Alberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Anáhuac México  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>14</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>189</fpage>
<lpage>202</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-53462019000200189&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-53462019000200189&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-53462019000200189&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The purpose of this article is to examine the strategic relationship between trade policy in a managed protection regime and commercial exchange at prices below normal value. It presents a three-stage model of imperfect competition that incorporates the possibility for the government authority to influence the production decisions of companies through a credible threat, by means of a specific tariff. This methodology-in a context of segmented markets, Cournot conjectures, and the application of an optimal tariff-generates a mechanism of incentives (which are not sufficient from a social welfare perspective) for domestic and foreign companies to practice reciprocal dumping. A general conclusion is that a free trade policy would be counterproductive, since it would eliminate the incentives that domestic and foreign companies would have to carry out the commercial exchange that would diminish the loss of welfare associated with the existence of monopolies in both markets.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen El propósito de este artículo es el de examinar la relación estratégica que existe entre la política comercial en un régimen de protección administrada y el intercambio comercial a precios por debajo del valor normal. Presento un modelo de competencia imperfecta en tres etapas que incorpora la posibilidad de que la autoridad gubernamental influya sobre las decisiones de producción de las empresas a través una amenaza creíble, mediante el uso de un arancel específico. Esta metodología, en un contexto de mercados segmentados, conjeturas à la Cournot y la aplicación de un arancel óptimo, genera como resultado un mecanismo de incentivos -que no son suficientes desde una perspectiva de bienestar social-, para que las empresas doméstica y extranjera realicen una práctica de dumping recíproco. Una conclusión general, es que una política de libre comercio sería contraproducente, pues ésta eliminaría los incentivos que las empresas doméstica y extranjera tendrían para realizar el intercambio comercial que disminuiría la pérdida de bienestar asociada a la existencia de monopolios en ambos mercados.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Cournot competition]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Managed trade]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Reciprocal Dumping]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[F12]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Competencia Cournot]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Comercio administrado]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Dumping Recíproco]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[F12]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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