<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0186-7202</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Estudios Económicos (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Estud. Econ. (México, D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0186-7202</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[El Colegio de México A.C.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0186-72022015000200269</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The structure of political power and redistribution in economies with multiple governments]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ponce Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Raúl A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kochi]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ikuho]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gutíerrez Casas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Luis E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af3">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>30</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>269</fpage>
<lpage>303</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0186-72022015000200269&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0186-72022015000200269&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0186-72022015000200269&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract For economies with multiple governments, the effort and effectiveness of public redistribution policies depend on the political structure of the federation. The central government determines the degree of redistribution and the interaction between the preferences and wages of voters controlling, respectively, the central and sub-national governments determine whether income redistribution can be an effective tool to redistribute welfare. In this paper, we identify conditions in which the interaction between the central government and sub-national governments lead to a Pareto superior allocation in the redistribution of income.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Para economías con múltiples gobiernos, el esfuerzo y efectividad de la redistribución pública depende de la estructura política de la federación. El gobierno central determina el grado de redistribución pública; las preferencias y el salario de los votantes que controlan, respectivamente, al gobierno central y gobiernos sub-nacionales determinan si la redistribución del ingreso es efectiva en redistribuir el bienestar. En este artículo identificamos condiciones en las que la interacción entre el gobierno central y gobiernos sub-nacionales conduce a una asignación Pareto superior en la redistribución del ingreso.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[redistribution]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[efficiency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[federalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[elections]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[redistribucíon]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[eficiencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[federalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[elecciones]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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