<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0186-1042</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Contaduría y administración]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Contad. Adm]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0186-1042</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Facultad de Contaduría y Administración]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0186-10422018000300800</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/fca.24488410e.2018.1188</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Propuesta y diseño de una regla fiscal genérica]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[A generic fiscal rule: Proposal and design]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Zack]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Guido]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sotelsek]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Daniel]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Alcalá  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>63</volume>
<numero>spe2</numero>
<fpage>800</fpage>
<lpage>820</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0186-10422018000300800&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0186-10422018000300800&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0186-10422018000300800&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Las herramientas esenciales del Estado para cumplir con el objetivo de estabilidad macroeconómica son la política monetaria y la política fiscal. Sin embargo, el avance en términos de reglas de comportamiento ha sido mucho mayor en el caso de la política monetaria. En el presente artículo se pretende hacer un aporte en relación al mecanismo que debería regir una regla fiscal, de forma que fomente un comportamiento contracíclico, sin que ponga en cuestionamiento la solvencia del sector público. Para ello, es fundamental dotar a la regla de flexibilidad, a través de una correcta selección de la base y una cláusula de escape clara y transparente. Una vez descritas sus características deseables, se propone una regla fiscal genérica que debería ser adaptada a cada caso particular, en esta oportunidad el ejercicio se realiza para el caso de España en los años previos a la última crisis. Finalmente, se concluye que una regla fiscal bien diseñada puede ser de mucha utilidad no solo para los objetivos de solvencia y estabilidad, sino también como guía para la discrecionalidad.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: The State has two essential tools to achieve the goal of macroeconomics stability, monetary policy and fiscal policy. However, the progress in terms of behavioral rules has been greater in the case of monetary policy. This article aims to make a contribution in relation to the mechanism that should be followed by a fiscal rule to promote a counter-cyclical behavior, without questioning the solvency of the public sector. To do so, the flexibility of the rule is fundamental, through a proper selection of its base and a clear and transparent escape clause. Once described its desirable characteristics, a generic fiscal rule is proposed, which has to be adapted to each particular case. This is done for the case of Spain in the years prior to the last crisis. Finally, it is concluded that a well-designed fiscal rule can be really useful not only for purposes of solvency and stability but also as a guide for discretion.]]></p></abstract>
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<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[E62]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[H60]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Política fiscal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Reglas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Discrecionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Solvencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Estabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[E32]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[E62]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[H60]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Fiscal policy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Discretion]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Solvency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Stability]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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