<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032024000300029</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2024.1571</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Robustness, Exploitable Relations and History: Assessing Varitel Semantics as a Hybrid Theory of Representation]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sánchez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nicolás Sebastián]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional de Córdoba  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2024</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>56</volume>
<numero>168</numero>
<fpage>29</fpage>
<lpage>55</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032024000300029&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032024000300029&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032024000300029&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[SUMMARY A constitutive theory of representation must address two challenges. The content determination challenge requires specifying why a particular state has a given content. The job description challenge requires spelling out the explanatory role that representational notions play in that theory. Recently, Nicholas Shea has advanced varitel semantics as a hybrid approach to representation to answer those challenges, supplementing teleosemantics with non-historical features -namely, exploitable relations and robustness. In this paper, I critically assess the hybrid theory&#8217;s answers to both challenges, arguing that their hybrid nature undermines their merits. In each case, I will show that it is hard to establish how the alleged complementariness of the hybrid account components works. I will conclude that internal problems beset Shea&#8217;s theory of representation.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN Una teoría constitutiva de la representación debe responder a dos desafíos: la determinación del contenido -que requiere especificar por qué un estado particular tiene cierto contenido- y el desafío del rol representacional -que requiere detallar el rol explicativo que desempeñan las nociones representacionales en esa teoría. La semántica varitel ha sido propuesta como una aproximación híbrida a la representación que busca responder a esos desafíos, suplementando a la teleosemántica con aspectos no-históricos. En este artículo, evalúo críticamente las respuestas a ambos desafíos argumentando que su naturaleza híbrida mina sus méritos. En cada caso, mostraré que es difícil establecer cómo funciona la supuesta complementariedad de la explicación híbrida.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[intentionality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[job description challenge]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[teleosemantics]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[disjunction problem]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Nicholas Shea]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[intencionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[desafío del rol representacional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[teleosemántica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[problema de la disyunción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Nicholas Shea]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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