<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032018000100069</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2018.04</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Moderate Epistemic Akrasia]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lo Guercio]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Nicolás]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Buenos Aires  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Argentina</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>50</volume>
<numero>148</numero>
<fpage>69</fpage>
<lpage>97</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032018000100069&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032018000100069&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032018000100069&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary Moderate epistemic akrasia is the state a subject is in when she believes that p and suspends judgment about whether her evidence supports p. In this article it is argued that, given a certain understanding of the attitude of suspension of judgment, moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically irrational. The paper starts with a brief introduction that makes explicit some background notions and clarifies the dialectics of the debate. Second, the well-known distinction between propositional and doxastic rationality is introduced and some cases of improper basing are discussed (Turri 2011). Third, two different cases are considered in which one might argue that moderate epistemic akrasia is doxastically rational, and it is argued that none is successful. Fourth, several objections are presented and answered. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Un agente está en un estado de akrasia epistémica moderada cuando cree que p y, simultáneamente, suspende el juicio sobre si su evidencia apoya p. En este artículo se argumenta que, dada cierta manera de entender la suspensión del juicio, un agente moderadamente acrático es doxásticamente irracional. En primer lugar, se introducen ciertos conceptos básicos para el argumento y se discute la dialéctica del debate. En segundo lugar, se elabora la conocida distinción entre racionalidad doxástica y racionalidad proposicional, y se discuten algunos casos de fundación impropia desarrollados por Turri (2011). En tercer lugar, se consideran dos posibles casos a partir de los cuales podría argumentarse que la akrasia epistémica moderada es doxásticamente racional y se argumenta que ninguno de ellos funciona. En cuarto lugar, se examinan varias objeciones a la propuesta.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[suspension of judgment]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[higher-order evidence]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[doxastic rationality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[propositional rationality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[epistemic basing relation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[suspensión del juicio]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[evidencia de segundo orden]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[racionalidad doxástica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[racionalidad proposicional]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[relación de fundación epistémica]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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