<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2019000200343</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20430/ete.v86i342.697</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El efecto del partido político del alcalde sobre variables de gasto municipal]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The effect of the major&#8217;s political party on municipal spending variables]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Acuña]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Hector]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carrasco]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Diego]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Carrasco]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Martín]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Soto]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Andrés]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Los Andes ESE Business School Centro de Estudios Financieros]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Queensland  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Australia</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af3">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad del Desarrollo Facultad de Economía y Negocios ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af4">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>86</volume>
<numero>342</numero>
<fpage>343</fpage>
<lpage>404</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2019000200343&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2019000200343&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2019000200343&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen  Antecedentes: ¿Cuánto podría afectar el partido político del alcalde los resultados de las políticas a nivel municipal? La literatura ha investigado la interacción entre los partidos políticos y los votantes en la formación de políticas, centrándose en los Estados Unidos y en los países europeos. Sin embargo, los contextos en los que se han llevado a cabo estas investigaciones son muy diferentes a los de Chile. En particular, respecto de los países que la literatura ha analizado, en los que las primarias son la norma y cualquier candidato es capaz de desafiar al alcalde incumbente, en Chile los líderes partidistas tienen mayor discreción para decidir dónde hacer las primarias.  Metodología: Mediante el uso de un panel que incluye datos de 2001 a 2016, estimamos los resultados con un diseño de regresión discontinua (RD). Las variables utilizadas en este estudio son la inversión en infraestructura, las transferencias a educación y salud, el gasto en personal municipal y el gasto en programas sociales.  Resultados: Se encuentra que la alineación política del alcalde no tiene efectos sobre gastos del municipio en áreas como inversión propia, personal municipal, educación, salud y programas sociales durante su periodo de ejercicio. Una hipótesis que explicaría estos hallazgos es que los alcaldes son incapaces de hacer cambios presupuestarios en las áreas estudiadas principalmente por motivos institucionales como la falta de atribuciones en materia presupuestaria, el rol del concejo municipal y la interacción con otras instituciones del Estado. Alternativamente, al momento de separar la muestra según el nivel de apoyo del concejo municipal y del alineamiento con el signo político del gobierno central, se encuentra que, en determinadas condiciones, existirían diferencias en el gasto en programas sociales, el cual tiende a ser más alto en el caso de que haya alcaldes pertenecientes a partidos de centro-izquierda.  Conclusiones: Frente a las restricciones impuestas por la institucionalidad chilena que restringen las decisiones de gasto municipal según el partido político, el gasto en programas sociales se convierte en la única herramienta que los alcaldes pueden usar para hacer valer los conceptos de manejo de gasto propiciados por su partido. De todas maneras, esto sólo acontecería en función de la configuración del concejo municipal y de la alineación política con el gobierno central en turno. Por consiguiente, el grueso de la política de gasto municipal chileno no variaría según las preferencias de los votantes o del alcalde en ejercicio.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract  Background: How much the major&#8217;s political party can affect policy results at municipal level? The literature has investigated the interaction between political parties and the voters in the formation of policies, focusing on the United States and European countries. However, the contexts in which these investigations have been carried out are very different to Chile. In particular, regarding the countries that the literature has analyzed, where the primaries are the norm and any candidate is able to challenge the incumbent major, in Chile the partisan leaders have greater discretion to decide where to make primaries.  Methodology: Using a panel that includes data from 2001 to 2016, we estimate the results through a discontinuous regression design (RD). The variables used in this study are investment in infrastructure, transfers to education and health, expenses on municipal personnel and on social programs.  Results: We find that the major&#8217;s political affiliation has no effect on the municipal expenditures such as investment, municipal staff, education, health and social programs. One hypothesis that would explain these findings is that majors are unable to make budgetary changes due to institutional restrictions such as the lack of budget allocations, the role of the municipal council, and lack of interaction with other State institutions. Alternatively, by separating the sample according to the level of support of the municipal council and the alignment with the political sign of the central government, we find that, under certain conditions, there would be differences in social programs expenses which tend to be higher in the case of majors belonging to center-left parties.  Conclusions: Given the restrictions imposed by the Chilean institutions, the expenses on social programs become the only tool that majors can use to apply the concepts of expenditure management according to their parties ideology. However, this would only happen depending on the configuration of the municipal council and the political alignment with the current central government. Consequently, the bulk of the Chilean municipal expense policy would not vary according to the preferences of voters and/or the major.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[economía política]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[gobiernos locales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[gasto municipal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[administración pública]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regresión discontinua]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[political economy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[local governments]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[municipal expense]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[public administration]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[regression discontinuity desing]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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