<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2019000100145</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20430/ete.v86i341.675</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Rescates y restricción presupuestaria blanda en un contexto de descentralización fiscal incompleta]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Bailouts and soft budget constraint in a context of incomplete fiscal decentralization]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Morales Sánchez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Elmar]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Ciudad de México ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>86</volume>
<numero>341</numero>
<fpage>145</fpage>
<lpage>178</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2019000100145&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2019000100145&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2019000100145&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen  Antecedentes  En el ámbito de las relaciones fiscales intergubernamentales algunos estudios atribuyen el problema de restricción presupuestaria blanda a las externalidades positivas que derivan de la provisión jurisdiccional de los bienes públicos. Suponiendo una descentralización fiscal incompleta, este trabajo explora cómo la divergencia entre la política fiscal del gobierno local y central también podría provocar el problema.  Metodología  Se construye un modelo en el que a cada nivel de gobierno se asigna una función de comportamiento fiscal que responde a tres posibilidades. Sobre esta base se formaliza un juego dinámico no cooperativo de competencia fiscal entre ambos niveles de gobierno y se determina la combinación de políticas que constituye el equilibrio del modelo.  Resultados  Se demuestra que la restricción presupuestaria se ablanda cuando la descentralización fiscal es incompleta y los objetivos de la política fiscal local se oponen a la central; además, se comprueba que el círculo vicioso de irresponsabilidad fiscal y rescate a los gobiernos locales es un equilibrio de Nash.  Conclusiones  En economías con fuertes desequilibrios fiscales en las que no es posible emprender una descentralización fiscal eficiente (es decir, completa), el problema de restricción presupuestaria blanda se convierte en un problema de riesgo moral que, inevitablemente, deteriora el bienestar social nacional.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract  Background  In the area of intergovernmental fiscal relations, some studies attribute the problem of soft budget constraint to positive externalities that derive from jurisdictional provision of public goods. The present study explores how the problem of soft budget constraint can also arise when incomplete fiscal decentralization is combined with divergent fiscal policies of the central and local governments.  Methodology  We construct a model in which each level of government is assigned a fiscal-behavior function that responds to three possibilities. Based upon that model, we formalize a dynamic, non-cooperative game of fiscal competition between the two levels of government. We then determine the combination of policies that constitute the model&#8217;s equilibrium.  Results  We show that budget constraint softens when incomplete fiscal decentralization is combined with opposing fiscal policies at the local and central levels of government. In addition, the vicious circle of fiscal irresponsibility and bailouts of local governments is a Nash equilibrium.  Conclusions  In economies with strong fiscal imbalances, and in which an efficient (i.e. complete) decentralization cannot be carried out, soft budget constraint becomes a significant moral-hazard problem that inevitably degrades a nation&#8217;s societal well-being.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[descentralización fiscal incompleta]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[restricción presupuestaria blanda]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[rescate]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[equilibrio de Nash]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[incomplete fiscal decentralization]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[soft budget constraint]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[bailout]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Nash equilibrium]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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