<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2015000400847</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Tomas de control en el mundo y beneficios privados del control bajo las distintas regulaciones vigentes]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jurfest]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Sonia Patricia]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Paredes]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ricardo D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Riutort]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Julio]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Escuela de Ingeniería ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Escuela de Ingeniería ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af3">
<institution><![CDATA[,Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Escuela de Administración ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>82</volume>
<numero>328</numero>
<fpage>847</fpage>
<lpage>871</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2015000400847&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2015000400847&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2015000400847&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: En este artículo se revisa la regulación sobre transferencias de control vigente en el mundo y encontramos evidencia de que a nivel global la legislación está convergiendo desde la regla de mercado (MR, por sus siglas en inglés) hacia la regla de igualdad de oportunidad (EOR, por sus siglas en inglés). La literatura sobre la racionalidad económica de estas reglas muestra que los beneficios privados del control (BPC) afectan los cambios de control; en particular, la EOR tiene el potencial de bloquear transferencias ineficientes aunque también de ralentizar la actividad del mercado del control. Jurfest, Paredes y Riutort (2015) proponen un modelo que permite estimar los BPC bajo las distintas regulaciones, tomando como caso especial el conocido modelo del Block Premium de Barclay y Holderness (1989) y Dyck y Zingales (2004). Asimismo, se ilustra la aplicabilidad y consistencia de este modelo para estimar los BPC en los diferentes regímenes regulatorios vigentes y bajo distribuciones alternativas del poder de negociación del vendedor del control.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: We review the corporate takeover regulation in place in the world and find evidence that it is converging from the Market Rule (MR) towards the Equal Opportunity Rule (EOR). The literature on the economic rationale of these rules shows that the Private Benefits of Control (PBC) affect control changes; in particular, the EOR has the potential to preclude inefficient transfers but also to slow down the overall activity of the corporate control market. Jurfest, Paredes and Riutort (2015) proposes a model to estimate the PBC under the different regulations, nesting as a special case the well-known model of Block Premium Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004). In this paper we illustrate the applicability and consistency of this model to estimate the PBC under the different regulatory regimes in place and under alternative distributions of the bargaining power of the seller of control.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Block Premium]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[beneficios privados del control]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regla de igualdad de oportunidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regla de mercado]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[tomas de control]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regulación]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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