<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2015000200403</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Distribución exclusiva y competencia]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Estrada González]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ernesto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones (IFT)  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>México</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2015</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>82</volume>
<numero>326</numero>
<fpage>403</fpage>
<lpage>431</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2015000200403&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2015000200403&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2015000200403&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Este artículo evalúa el impacto en competencia de los acuerdos de distribución exclusiva. La literatura económica identifica estos acuerdos como un instrumento para alinear incentivos entre fabricantes y distribuidores, y optimizar las actividades de venta. También los identifica como un medio para reducir la competencia, pero esta posibilidad se observa sólo bajo condiciones específicas de mercado. Por su parte, la legislación mexicana prohíbe la distribución exclusiva cuando la establece una empresa dominante con el objeto o efecto de desplazar competidores, pero no señala criterios para identificar cuándo puede ocurrir. Lo anterior introduce incertidumbre de cuándo se considera ilegal y puede inhibir la conducta incluso cuando sea eficiente, o alentarla cuando sea anticompetitiva. Este artículo propone criterios para minimizar estos riesgos con base en una revisión de la literatura económica y de la experiencia internacional relevante.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: This note evaluates the effects on competition of exclusive dealing agreements. The economic literature identifies these agreements as an instrument to align incentives between manufacturers and distributors, and optimize sale activities. It also identifies them as a mechanism to reduce competition, but this possibility is only observed under specific market conditions. In this regards, the Mexican legislation prohibits exclusive dealing when it is undertaken by a dominant firm with the purpose or effect of displacing competitors, but it does not establish criteria to evaluate when this could happen. The above introduces uncertainty regarding the legality of exclusive dealing, and can inhibit this conduct even when it is efficient, or encourage it when it is anticompetitive. This note proposes criteria to minimize this risk based on a review of the relevant economic literature and international experience.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[distribución exclusiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[restricciones verticales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[prácticas monopólicas]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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<page-range>115-29</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
