<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2013000300651</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Efectos de la reducción de tarifas de terminación móvil en el bienestar en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones de México]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Harbord]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[David]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hoernig]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Steffen]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Market Analysis Ltd.  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[Oxford ]]></addr-line>
<country>Reino Unido</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Nova School of Business, and Economics  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Portugal</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2013</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>80</volume>
<numero>319</numero>
<fpage>651</fpage>
<lpage>686</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2013000300651&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2013000300651&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2013000300651&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[RESUMEN En Europa las tarifas de terminación móvil (TTM) están siendo reducidas en magnitud para reflejar los costos reales, ya sean marginales o incrementales, de terminación de llamadas en redes celulares, lo que se está considerando en términos generales como un paso intermedio a la adopción del sistema bill-and-keep (es decir, que no existan TTM para las llamadas de celular a celular y de fijo a celular). Otros países alrededor del mundo, como Nueva Zelanda, también están siguiendo este ejemplo. En México, las TTM aún son lo que crea una barrera para la fijación de precios eficientes en redes celulares y fijas, y para una competencia de largo plazo más efectiva. En este artículo revisaremos en primer lugar los debates recientes sobre tarifas de terminación celular en Europa, y luego presentaremos los resultados de un modelo de bienestar calibrado del mercado celular mexicano, que incluye tres redes de telefonía celular; llamadas desde y hacia redes fijas; discriminación de precios basada en la red, y externalidades de las llamadas. Nuestras simulaciones muestran que la reducción de las tarifas de terminación celular para las llamadas tanto de celular a celular como de fijo a celular, ya sean a costo incremental de largo plazo; tarifas recíprocas de terminación en redes fijas, o al sistema bill-and-keep puede aumentar el bienestar social por más de mil millones de dólares por año en ausencia de externalidades de llamada, y por más de 2.25 mil millones de dólares por año cuando las externalidades de llamada son fuertes. Nuestro análisis ofrece apoyo a un cambio desde el sistema de fijación de precios basado en costos completamente asignados (o completamente distribuidos), como se practica actualmente en México, hacia tarifas de terminación celular mucho más bajas, con el sistema bill-and-keep, que con frecuencia conducirá al mayor incremento en el bienestar. La reducción de las TTM a costo incremental, o la adopción del bill-and-keep, deberá dar lugar a una estructura de precios más eficiente tanto al mayoreo como al menudeo, ayudar a eliminar las barreras de entrada causadas por los efectos de red derivados del monto de tarifas, y aumentar el bienestar y la competencia a largo plazo en el mercado celular mexicano.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[ABSTRACT In Europe Mobile Termination Rates (MTR) are being subject to reduction to reflect actual costs, marginal or incremental, of calls termination in mobiles nets. This is considered as an intermediate step to adopt the "bill-and-keep" system. Other countries around the globe, such as New Zealand, are following this example. In Mexico MTRs are still high, which is a barrier for an efficient price setting in these markets and for the promotion of a competitive market. We review the European case and the construct a model to analyze welfare gains for the Mexican case. Our results suggest that the adoption of the European price policy in the mobile market would increase the welfare in Mexico.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[telecomunicaciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[poder monopólico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[tarifas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[OCDE]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[México]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[competencia monopolística]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[redes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[telefonía celular]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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