<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2012000200311</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Tasa impositiva única y cumplimiento fiscal]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Panadés]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Judith]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>España</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2012</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2012</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>79</volume>
<numero>314</numero>
<fpage>311</fpage>
<lpage>332</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2012000200311&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2012000200311&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2012000200311&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: El sistema impositivo que combina una única tasa impositiva con un mínimo exento ha sido objeto de largo debate en los años recientes. Sus detractores argumentan que los sistemas impositivos de estas características son menos progresivos y en consecuencia el grado de redistribución tenderá a ser menor. Por lo contrario, sus defensores esgrimen su sencillez como una de sus ventajas mayores, ya que la sencillez impositiva reduce las posibilidades de evasión y elusión fiscal. En este artículo presento un marco de análisis en el que comparo el cumplimiento fiscal de un mismo contribuyente con dos estructuras impositivas distintas: una de tarifa única con mínimo exento y otra de tasas marginales crecientes. Dada la condición de que en ambas estructuras impositivas la carga fiscal soportada por un contribuyente honesto sea equivalente, demuestro que la renta declarada será mayor con aquella estructura impositiva en la que el contribuyente se enfrente a un tasa marginal más alta.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: The tax system combining a flat tax rate with an exempt minimum income has been largely debated in recent years. Detractors argue that tax systems with these characteristics are less progressive and, hence, they tend to lower the degree of redistribution. In contrast, supporters brandish its simplicity as one of its major advantages as simplicity leads to lower levels of both tax evasion and tax avoidance. This paper presents a framework in which I compare the tax compliance of the same taxpayer under two different tax structures: the one with a flat tax rate featuring a tax exempt income bracket and the one exhibiting increasing marginal tax rates. Provided the condition that in both tax structures the tax burden borne by an honest taxpayer is equivalent, I show that the income declared is higher under the tax structure for which the taxpayer faces a higher marginal rate.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[evasión fiscal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[política fiscal]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Evasión en el pago del impuesto sobre la renta sobre nóminas a través de terceros]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aguayo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Arteaga]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J. C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bedoy]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Caamal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pérez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Rangel]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Centro de Investigaciones Económicas, Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Allingham]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sandmo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>1972</year>
<volume>1</volume>
<page-range>323-38</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: Properties of a Penalty Structure]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Balassone]]></surname>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Jones]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Public Finance Review]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>26</volume>
<page-range>270-85</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cantalá]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sempere]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sobarzo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Evasión fiscal en el impuesto sobre la renta de las personas físicas]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[El Colegio de México]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Clotfelter]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Review of Economics and Statistics]]></source>
<year>1983</year>
<volume>65</volume>
<page-range>363-73</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Unwillingness to Pay : Tax Evasion and Public Good Provision]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Cowell]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gordon]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>1988</year>
<volume>36</volume>
<page-range>305-21</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Does Tax Evasion Modify the Redistributive Effect of Tax Progressivity?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Freire-Serén]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M. J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Panadés]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Economic Record]]></source>
<year>2008</year>
<volume>84</volume>
<page-range>486-95</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Evasion and Tax Progressivity]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Goerke]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Public Finance Review]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<volume>31</volume>
<page-range>189-203</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Myth and Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion Response and Welfare Effects in Russia]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gorodnichenko]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Y.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Martínez-Vázquez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sabirianova]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<volume>117</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>504-54</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<collab>Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey</collab>
<source><![CDATA[Evasión global de impuestos: Impuesto sobre la renta, Impuesto al valor agregado e impuesto especial sobre producción y servicio no petrolero]]></source>
<year>2009</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Servicio de Administración Tributaria]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Russian 'Flat Tax' Reform]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ivanova]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Keen]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Klemm]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Economic Policy]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>20</volume>
<page-range>397-444</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Complexity: Problem or Opportunity?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Krause]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Public Finance Review]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<volume>28</volume>
<page-range>395-414</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Evasion and Self-Insurance]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Lee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>81</volume>
<page-range>73-81</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B14">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A Behavioral Study of the Meaning and Influence of Tax Complexity]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Milliron]]></surname>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Accounting Research]]></source>
<year>1985</year>
<volume>23</volume>
<page-range>794-816</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B15">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Evasion and Relative Tax Contribution]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Panadés]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Public Finance Review]]></source>
<year>2004</year>
<volume>32</volume>
<page-range>183-95</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B16">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Tax Evasion and Capital Gains Taxation]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Poterba]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>1987</year>
<volume>77</volume>
<page-range>234-9</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B17">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Exploring the Underground Economy: Studies of Illegal and Unreported Activity. Michigan: W. E]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pozo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[]]></source>
<year>1996</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Upjohn Institute for Employment Research]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B18">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Schneider]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Enste]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Literature]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<volume>38</volume>
<page-range>77-114</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B19">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Fixing the Leak in Okun's Bucket: Optimal Tax Progressivity When Avoidance Can Be Controlled]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>1994</year>
<volume>55</volume>
<page-range>41-51</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B20">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Simplification Potential of Alternatives to the Income Tax]]></source>
<year>1995</year>
<page-range>1331-8</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B21">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aaron]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Henry]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gale]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[William G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Which Is the Simplest Tax System of Them All? In The Economics Effects of Fundamental Tax Reform]]></source>
<year>1996</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Washington ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Brookings Institution Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B22">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[International Tax and Public Finance]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>8</volume>
<page-range>119-28</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B23">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Optimal Elasticity of Taxable Income]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Slemrod]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kopczuk]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[W.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<volume>84</volume>
<page-range>91-112</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B24">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Is Tax Evasion Never Justifiable?]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Torgler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>19</volume>
<page-range>143-68</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B25">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Torgler]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Surveys]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<volume>16</volume>
<page-range>657-84</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B26">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[On the Excess Burden of Tax Evasion]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Yitzhaki]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Public Finance Quaterly]]></source>
<year>1987</year>
<volume>15</volume>
<page-range>123-37</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B27">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Yitzhaki]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>1974</year>
<volume>3</volume>
<page-range>201-2</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
