<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2010000400831</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Un oligopolio mixto con contratación endógena de administradores y titularidad privada nacional y extranjera]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Fernández Ruiz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jorge]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,El Colegio de México  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2010</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2010</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>77</volume>
<numero>308</numero>
<fpage>831</fpage>
<lpage>852</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2010000400831&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2010000400831&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2010000400831&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Este artículo analiza un oligopolio mixto en el que las empresas pueden contratar administradores y delegarles sus decisiones con fines estratégicos. A diferencia de investigaciones anteriores, examinamos un caso en el que una empresa pública compite con una extranjera y otra local, ambas privadas. Mostramos que estas dos empresas privadas se comportan de manera diferente: en equilibrio; solamente la empresa local contrata estratégicamente a un administrador que no persigue la simple maximización de ganancias. Esto conduce a un bienestar social mayor que el que se obtiene cuando ninguna empresa contrata a un administrador y que el que resulta de la competencia de una empresa local y otra extranjera, ambas dirigidas por administradores.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: This paper analyzes a mixed oligopoly in which firms may hire managers and delegate their decisions to them for strategic reasons. Unlike previous research, we examine the case in which a public firm competes with a foreign firm and a domestic firm, both of them private. We show that these two private firms behave differently. In equilibrium, only the domestic firm strategically hires a manager that deviates from simple profit maximization. This leads to a social welfare higher than the one obtained when none of the firms hires a manager and that resulting from the competition of a domestic and a foreign firm run by managers.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[oligopolio mixto]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[empresa pública]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[empresa extranjera]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contratos de incentivos de administradores]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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