<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2005000400735</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20430/ete.v72i288.572</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[El componente de largo plazo de la relación entre la remuneración al ejecutivo y el desempeño de la empresa]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Giannatale]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Sonia Di]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Suárez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Eduardo L.]]></given-names>
</name>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2005</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>72</volume>
<numero>288</numero>
<fpage>735</fpage>
<lpage>764</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2005000400735&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2005000400735&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2005000400735&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo estudiamos el efecto de los componentes de corto y de largo plazos de la compensación gerencial en la relación entre la remuneración de los ejecutivos y el desempeño de la empresa. Proponemos un modelo dinámico de agencia con acumulación de capital para representar el proceso de toma de decisiones del principal respecto a la asignación óptima de los recursos en la empresa. A partir de una solución numérica de este modelo, producimos datos generados por el modelo a fin de computar las sensibilidades del desempeño a la remuneración que pueden compararse con las obtenidas en la bibliografía empírica de la compensación de los ejecutivos principales. Nuestros resultados son congruentes con algunas de las observaciones presentadas en esa bibliografía. Nuestra contribución en este artículo es el hallazgo de que el desempeño anterior de la empresa afecta más a la parte de la compensación futura de la remuneración del ejecutivo, mientras que el desempeño actual influye más en el componente salarial de esa remuneración.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract In this paper we study the effect of short and long-term components of managerial compensation in the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. We propose a dynamic agency model with capital accumulation to represent the decision making process of the principal regarding the optimal allocation of resources within the firm. From a numerical solution of this model, we produce model-generated data to compute pay-performance sensitivities that can be compared to those obtained in the empirical literature on CEO compensation. Our results are consistent with some of the observations reported in this literature. Our contribution in this article is the finding that past performances affect more the future compensation part of executive pay, while contemporaneous performances influence more the salary component of executive pay.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[información asimétrica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[acumulación de capital]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contrato dinámico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[compensación gerencial]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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