<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2007-4387</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Problema anuario de filosofía y teoría del derecho]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Probl. anu. filos. teor. derecho]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2007-4387</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2007-43872018000100139</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iij.24487937e.2018.12.12446</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Alcance y derrotabilidad de las reglas jurídicas]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Scope and Defeasibility of Legal Rules]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pulido Ortiz]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Fabio Enrique]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de La Sabana Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas Departamento de Teoría Jurídica]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Colombia</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<numero>12</numero>
<fpage>139</fpage>
<lpage>168</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2007-43872018000100139&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2007-43872018000100139&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2007-43872018000100139&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo se analiza el alcance práctico de las reglas (AP) y su relación con las reglas de derrotabilidad (RD). Primero, se afirma que determinar el AP depende tanto de las reglas secundarias del sistema jurídico como del dominio limitado de las autoridades. Segundo, se muestra que las reglas secundarias pueden incluir o excluir las razones justificatorias de las reglas y, en esos contextos en donde esas razones no son excluidas, es posible que ellas generen excepciones implícitas, las cuales no pueden ser identificadas de manera anticipada. Tercero, se concluye que la derrotabilidad de la reglas es una propiedad contingente que depende de dos elementos: a) la presencia de razones justificatorias que no son excluidas de acuerdo con las reglas secundarias y el límite de dominio de las autoridades, y b) que las consecuencias normativas de esas razones no puedan ser identificadas ex-ante.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The article analyses the practical scope (PS) of legal rules and its relation with the defeasibility of the rules (DR). First, I argue that to determine the PS depends on three factors: a) the content of secondary rules, b) the legal systems and, c) establishing the specific and legitimate jurisdiction of the authorities. Second, I suggest that the PS can include or exclude the justificatory reasons of rules and, in those contexts where such reasons are not excluded, it is possible that they generate implicit exceptions that cannot be identified in advance. Third, the author concludes that DR is a contingent property that depends on two elements: a) the presence of justificatory reasons -that are not excluded according to secondary rules and the limited domain of authorities- and, b) that the normative consequences of such reasons cannot be identified ex-ante.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Normatividad del derecho]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reglas jurídicas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[derrotabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razón práctica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[razones para la acción]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Normativity of law]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[legal rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[defeseability]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[practical reason]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[reasons for action]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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