<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-899X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista de El Colegio de San Luis]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Revista Col. San Luis]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-899X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[El Colegio de San Luis A.C.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-899X2018000300137</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21696/rcsl8172018814</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Democracia y redistribución: Adam Przeworski y la desigualdad política]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Democracy and redistribution: Adam Przeworski and the political inequality]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Millán]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Henio]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,El Colegio Mexiquense  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>8</volume>
<numero>17</numero>
<fpage>137</fpage>
<lpage>162</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-899X2018000300137&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-899X2018000300137&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-899X2018000300137&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen El objetivo de este artículo es revisar críticamente las aportaciones recientes de Przeworski en torno a la desigualdad económica, la desigualdad política y la redistribución. Se siguió una metodología analítica de la tasa distributiva del votante mediano cuando la distribución de la influencia política está determinada por la desigualdad económica. Una de las limitantes del análisis consiste en que el modelo de Przeworski es una aproximación adecuada, pero necesita ser reforzada con una vigorización alterna del votante decisivo. Asimismo, no fue posible contrastar este modelo con evidencia empírica por falta de espacio para exponer y criticar las ideas básicas de Przeworski. El artículo es valioso porque representa un paso adelante en las aportaciones de Przworski acerca del problema de la relación entre desigualdad política y desigualdad social. Por lo tanto, se determina que es necesario ajustar el modelo en tres aspectos: el agente decisivo es innecesario, la tasa redistributiva es ambigua y el mecanismo de transmisión es débil.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The objective of this article is to critically review Przeworski&#8217;s recent contributions regarding economic inequality, political inequality and redistribution. An analytical methodology of the distributive rate of the average voter was followed when the distribution of political influence is determined by economic inequality. One of the limitations of the analysis is that the Przeworski model is an adequate approximation, but it needs to be reinforced with an alternate invigoration of the decisive voter. Likewise, it was not possible to contrast this model with empirical evidence for lack of space to expose and criticize Przeworski&#8217;s basic ideas. The paper is valuable because it represents a step forward in the contributions of Przeworski about the problem of the relationship between political inequality and social inequality. Therefore, it is determined that it is necessary to adjust the model in three aspects: the decisive agent is unnecessary, the redistributive rate is ambiguous, and the transmission mechanism is weak.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[desigualdad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[redistribución]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[democracia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Przeworski]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[crítica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[inequality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[redistribution]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[democracy]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Przeworski]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[critique]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Alesina]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Angeletos]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G. M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Fairness and redistribution]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[American EconomicReview]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>95</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>960-80</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bénabou]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ok]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E. A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Social mobility and the demand for redistribution:The PUOM hypothesis]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Quarterly Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<volume>116</volume>
<numero>May</numero>
<issue>May</issue>
<page-range>447-87</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Black]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[On the rationale of group decision-making]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>1948</year>
<volume>56</volume>
<numero>1</numero>
<issue>1</issue>
<page-range>23-34</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Downs]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Teoría económica de la democracia]]></source>
<year>1973</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Madrid, España ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Aguilar]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Grossman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G. M.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Helpman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[E.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Special interest politics]]></source>
<year>2001</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge, Massachusetts, Estados Unidos ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[MIT Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Meltzer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A. H.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Richards]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S. F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[A rational theory of the size of government]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>1981</year>
<volume>89</volume>
<numero>5</numero>
<issue>5</issue>
<page-range>914-27</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Milanovic]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[B.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribution: An empirical test with the required data]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[European Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<volume>16</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>367-410</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Przeworski]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Economic inequality, political inequality, and redistribution]]></source>
<year>2015</year>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ritchey]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Estadística para las ciencias sociales. El potencial de la imaginaciónestadística]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Distrito Federal, México ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[McGraw-Hill]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Roemer]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[John E.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Why the poor do not expropriate the rich? An old argument in new garb]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Public Economics]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>70</volume>
<numero>3</numero>
<issue>3</issue>
<page-range>399-424</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Scervini]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[F.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Empirics of the median voter: Democracy, redistribution and the role of the middle class]]></article-title>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Inequality]]></source>
<year>2011</year>
<volume>10</volume>
<numero>4</numero>
<issue>4</issue>
<page-range>529-50</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shapiro]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[I.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The State of Democratic Theory]]></source>
<year>2003</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Princeton, Nueva Jersey, Estados Unidos ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Princeton University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Varian]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[H.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Microeconomía intermedia]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Barcelona, España ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Antoni Bosch]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
