<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-5346</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Revista mexicana de economía y finanzas]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Rev. mex. econ. finanz]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-5346</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Instituto Mexicano de Ejecutivos de Finanzas A.C.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-53462023000200002</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.21919/remef.v18.2.749</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Credit rationing, institutions and local public debt]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Racionamiento de crédito, instituciones y deuda pública local]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gallardo Del Angel]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Roberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Xu]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Yiwen]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Veracruzana  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Morrison Insurance Brokers Ltd.  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Canada</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2023</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2023</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>18</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-53462023000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-53462023000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-53462023000200002&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract This work presents a model of credit rationing under the effects of judiciary in- efficiency and criminal extraction. Under low judiciary quality and high criminality, we argue that banks are more likely to lend to the government rather than private enterprises. We argue that credit rationing increased local public debt in Mexico before coming into effect the new law of Financial Discipline for States and Municipalities in 2016. Our scientific objective is explaining the supply of bank loans to the local public sector in Mexico under low institutional quality and credit rationing. We use Panel regression analysis and also applied an Autoregresive Distributed Lag model to obtain the long term growth rates. We also used Clustering analysis in order to classify states in Mexico in terms of their debt, defaults in the industry sector, crime and judicial inefficiency rates. Our empirical analysis shows that judiciary inefficiency and criminality induced higher amounts of bank loans to state governments during the period of 2004 to 2016. We also found that defaults in the industry sector also increased the amount of bank loans to local governments in Mexico, which may explain in part that the rationed credit is redirected to the public sector. We argue that keeping the quality of institutions low may induce higher bank lending to states, so there might be little incentive to improve the judiciary and public safety. The possible solution is to improve judicial efficiency and decrease criminality in order to reduce credit rationing and subsequently ensure local public debt stability in the long term.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Este trabajo presenta un modelo de racionamiento del crédito bajo los efectos de la ineficiencia judicial y la extracción criminal. En condiciones de baja calidad judicial y alta criminalidad, argumentamos que es más probable que los bancos presten al gobierno en lugar de a las empresas privadas. Argumentamos que el racionamiento crediticio incrementó la deuda pública local en México antes de la entrada en vigencia de la nueva ley de Disciplina Financiera para Estados y Municipios en 2016. Nuestro objetivo científico es explicar la oferta de crédito bancario al sector público local en México bajo condiciones de baja calidad institucional y racionamiento de crédito. Utilizamos análisis de regresión de panel y también aplicamos un modelo Autorregresivo de Rezagos Distribuidos para obtener las tasas de crecimiento a largo plazo. También utilizamos el análisis de Clusters para clasificar los estados de México en términos de su deuda, morosidad en el sector industrial, índices de delincuencia e ineficiencia judicial. Nuestro análisis empírico muestra que la ineficiencia judicial y la criminalidad indujeron mayores montos de préstamos bancarios a los gobiernos estatales durante el período de 2004 a 2016. También encontramos que los incumplimientos financieros en el sector industrial también aumentaron el monto de los préstamos bancarios a los gobiernos locales en México, lo que puede explicar en parte que el crédito racionado se redirecciona al sector público. Argumentamos que mantener baja la calidad de las instituciones puede inducir mayores préstamos bancarios a los estados, por lo que podría haber pocos incentivos para mejorar el poder judicial y la seguridad pública. La recomendación es mejorar la eficiencia judicial y disminuir la criminalidad para reducir el racionamiento del crédito y asegurar la estabilidad de la deuda pública local en el largo plazo.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Credit rationing]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[criminality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[judicial efficiency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[public debt]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Racionamiento de crédito]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[criminalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[eficiencia judicial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[deuda pública]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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