<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-1324</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Signos filosóficos]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Sig. Fil]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-1324</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-13242016000200118</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Inferencias mooreanas y fortaleza de la posición epistémica]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Moorean inferences and the strength of the epistemic position]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Anaya Ruiz Esparza]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[José Alfonso]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,University of Warwick Departamento de Filosofía ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Reino Unido</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2016</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>18</volume>
<numero>36</numero>
<fpage>118</fpage>
<lpage>137</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-13242016000200118&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-13242016000200118&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-13242016000200118&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo analizo el diagnóstico de Martin Smith sobre qué está mal con las inferencias mooreanas, según el cual éstas contienen un defecto epistémico incapaz de incrementar la fiabilidad de su conclusión. Smith considera que este defecto puede ser útil para explicar el fenómeno del fallo de transmisión del respaldo epistémico. Argumentaré que la propuesta de Smith se equivoca al suponer que la única manera en que puede haber transmisión del respaldo es mediante el incremento de la fiabilidad de la conclusión. Propongo que, cuando la evidencia incrementa la probabilidad de que la conclusión sea verdadera, la posición epistémica respecto a ésta mejora, lo cual puede resultar en un respaldo epistémico en favor de ella.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract In this article I analyze Martin Smith&#8217;s diagnosis of what is wrong with Moorean inferences, according to which these exhibit an epistemic defect incapable of increasing the reliability of their conclusion. Smith thinks this defect can be used to explain the phenomenon of epistemic warrant transmission failure. I will argue that Smith&#8217;s proposal is mistaken in supposing that the only way in which there can be warrant transmission is by increasing the reliability of the conclusion. I propose that, when the evidence increases the probability that the conclusion is true, the epistemic position about it improves, which could result in an epistemic warrant for it as well.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[respaldo epistémico]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[inferencias mooreanas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[fracaso de transmisión]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[fiabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[probabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[epistemic warrant]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Moorean inferences]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[transmission failure]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[reliability]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[probability]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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