<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>1665-1324</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Signos filosóficos]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Sig. Fil]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>1665-1324</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, División de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S1665-13242007000100101</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Sobre la viabilidad de una epistemología empírica y normativa]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Eraña]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Ángeles]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2007</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>06</month>
<year>2007</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>9</volume>
<numero>17</numero>
<fpage>101</fpage>
<lpage>137</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S1665-13242007000100101&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S1665-13242007000100101&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S1665-13242007000100101&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen La epistemología del siglo XX estuvo centrada en tres preocupaciones: (1) definir la noción de conocimiento, (2) ofrecer respuestas plausibles al cuestionamiento escéptico, y (3) estudiar los procesos que utilizamos en la producción de creencias y determinar cuáles de ellos conducen al conocimiento. En este artículo, argumento que si bien, esas preocupaciones están vinculadas de manera íntima entre sí, el énfasis que se otorgue a cada una de ellas en la investigación propiamente epistemológica dará lugar a proyectos muy diversos. En particular, el énfasis en (3) ha sido uno de los pilares del desarrollo de la llamada epistemología naturalizada. El desarrollo de este tipo de proyecto lleva consigo un cuestionamiento importante respecto a la manera tradicional en que se ha entendido el carácter normativo de la epistemología, al mismo tiempo que acarrea una serie de problemas de difícil solución. La tesis central de este artículo es que la aceptación de la idea de que las normas epistémicas no necesariamente son universales, no implica, como han argumentado los detractores de este tipo de proyecto, la renuncia a las aspiraciones normativas de la epistemología.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The three main concerns of epistemology throughout the XXth Century were the following: (1) provide a definition of knowledge; (2) provide plausible answers to the skeptical challenge and; (3) study our belief-forming processes in order to determine which of them are leading towards the acquisition of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that while these three concerns are intimately interrelated, the emphasis given to either one is leading to the development of quite different epistemological projects. In particular, a strong emphasis on (3) is conducive towards a naturalized epistemology. As I will show, the implementation of this particular project implies a deep questioning on the traditional way of conceiving the normative character of epistemology. My main contention is that the idea that epistemic norms are not necessarily universal does not imply, as has been argued by the critics of the naturalized epistemology project, the abandonment of the normative aspirations of epistemology.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Epistemología naturalizada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[normas de razonamiento]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reglas heurísticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[racionalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[evaluación epistémica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Naturalized epistemology]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[reasoning norms]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[heuristic rules]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[rationality]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[epistemic assessment]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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