<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0186-7202</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Estudios Económicos (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Estud. Econ. (México, D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0186-7202</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[El Colegio de México A.C.]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0186-72022018000200283</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Campaign contributions and local Public goods in a federation]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Contribuciones de campaña y bienes públicos locales en una federación]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ponce Rodríguez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Raúl Alberto]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>33</volume>
<numero>2</numero>
<fpage>283</fpage>
<lpage>311</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0186-72022018000200283&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0186-72022018000200283&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0186-72022018000200283&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract I develop a voting model of decentralized provision of local public goods (LPGs) with campaign contributions. I compare an economy with and without campaign contributions: in the former economy, local governments do not provide Pareto e&#64259;cient LPGs and do not maximize the welfare gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences of voters. For the economy with campaign contributions, LPGs with and without spillovers are Pareto e&#64259;cient, and the system of local governments maximizes the gains associated with matching LPGs with the inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen Se desarrolla un modelo de economía política para estudiar la provisión descentralizada de bienes públicos locales (BPLs). Se compara una economía con y sin contribuciones de campaña de los votantes: en la primera economía, los gobiernos locales proveen BPLs que no son Pareto eficientes y no maximizan las ganancias atribuibles a diferenciar los BPLs de acuerdo con la heterogeneidad inter-regional de preferencias de los votantes. Para una economía con contribuciones de campaña, los BPLs, con y sin externalidades, son Pareto eficientes y los gobiernos locales maximizan las ganancias atribuibles a diferenciar la provisión de BPLs de acuerdo con la heterogeneidad inter-regional de preferencias.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Local public goods]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[e&#64259;ciency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[externalities]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[federalism]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[elections and campaign contributions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Bienes públicos locales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[eficiencia]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[externalidades]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[federalismo]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[elecciones y contribuciones de campaña]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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