<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032020000200003</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2020.1192</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[The Standard Story of Action and the Problem of Agential Guidance]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Aguilar]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Jesús H.]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Rochester Institute of Technology Department of Philosophy ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>USA</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2020</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>52</volume>
<numero>155</numero>
<fpage>3</fpage>
<lpage>25</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032020000200003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032020000200003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032020000200003&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract The problem of agential guidance consists in explaining the possibility of guiding an action in purely reductive causal terms. After examining Harry Frankfurt&#8217;s articulation of this problem, the standard systemic reductive causal answer is explored and found wanting. Two general explanatory challenges are singled out as decisive in assessing the viability of a causal answer to the problem of agential guidance: first, the correct identification of the actual sources of action guidance in the form of guiding intentions, and, second, the recognition of the limitations of a content-based strategy to identify an action under guidance.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen El problema de la agencia guiada consiste en explicar la posibilidad de guiar una acción puramente en términos reduccionistas causales. Después de examinar la articulación que Harry Frankfurt ofrece de este problema, la respuesta causal comúnmente aceptada es explorada y cuestionada. Dos desafíos explicativos generales se identifican como decisivos para evaluar la viabilidad de una respuesta causal al problema de la agencia guiada: primero, el poder identificar correctamente las fuentes detrás de las acciones guiadas a través de intenciones guías, y, segundo, el reconocimiento de los límites de una estrategia basada en el contenido como el modo de identificar una acción que es guiada.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[systemic agency]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[guiding intention]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[causal reduction]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[agential awareness]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[sustained causation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[agencia sistémica]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[intención guía]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reducción causal]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[conciencia agencial]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[causación sostenida]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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