<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032019000200033</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2019.08</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Intuiciones, simplicidad y extrapolación de conceptos]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Intuitions, Simplicity and Extrapolation from Concepts]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Pérez Otero]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Manuel]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Barcelona Facultad de Filosofía Departamento de Filosofía]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Spain</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2019</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>51</volume>
<numero>152</numero>
<fpage>33</fpage>
<lpage>59</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032019000200033&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032019000200033&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032019000200033&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Presento y defiendo una teoría sobre las intuiciones y la justificación que proporcionan. La teoría invoca una noción familiar: tener justificación directa prima facie derivada de la mera comprensión de los conceptos. Pero, en el supuesto de que no todas las proposiciones intuitivamente verdaderas están tan directamente justificadas, propongo y desarrollo una tesis original sobre el resto de casos en que alguien tiene una intuición: cuando un sujeto intuye que P, hace una estimación (típicamente implícita) sobre la simplicidad comparativa de posibles extensiones de ciertas partes de su sistema de creencias.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: I present and defend a theory about intuitions and the justification they provide. The theory relies on a familiar notion: having direct prima facie justification merely on the basis of understanding concepts. But, under the assumption that not all intuitively true propositions are so directly justified, I advance and develop an original thesis about the rest of cases in which someone has an intuition: when a subject has the intuition that P, she/he makes a (tipycally implicit) estimate about the comparative simplicity of possible extensions of certain parts of her/his system of beliefs.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[sistemas de creencias]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[impresiones no perceptivas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[justificación intuitiva]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[capacidades expertas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Peacocke]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[systems of beliefs]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[non-perceptual impressions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[intuitive justification]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[expertise]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Peacocke]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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