<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>0011-1503</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (México, D.F.)]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[Crítica (Méx., D.F.)]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>0011-1503</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S0011-15032009000300039</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2009.918</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Conceptuality and Generality: A Criticism of an Argument for Content Dualism]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Conceptualidad y generalidad: una crítica a un argumento en favor del dualismo de contenido]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Duhau]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Laura]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2009</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>00</month>
<year>2009</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>41</volume>
<numero>123</numero>
<fpage>39</fpage>
<lpage>63</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S0011-15032009000300039&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S0011-15032009000300039&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S0011-15032009000300039&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Summary In this paper I discuss Heck&#8217;s (2007) new argument for content dualism. This argument is based on the claim that conceptual states, but not perceptual states, meet Evans&#8217;s Generality Constraint. Heck argues that this claim, together with the idea that the kind of content we should attribute to a mental state depends on which generalizations the state satisfies, implies that conceptual states and perceptual states have different kinds of contents. I argue, however, that it is unlikely that there is a plausible reading of the Generality Constraint under which it is non-trivially true both that conceptual states meet it and that perceptual states do not. Therefore, the soundness of Heck&#8217;s argument is dubious.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen En este artículo discuto el nuevo argumento de Heck (2007) en favor del dualismo de contenido. Este argumento se basa en la afirmación de que los estados conceptuales, pero no los perceptuales, cumplen con el Requisito de Generalidad de Evans. Heck argumenta que esta afirmación, junto con la idea de que el tipo de contenido que debemos atribuir a un estado mental depende de las generalizaciones que el estado satisface, implica que los estados conceptuales tienen un tipo de contenido diferente del de los estados perceptuales. Yo argumento, sin embargo, que es poco probable que haya una interpretación convincente del Requisito de Generalidad según la cual sea verdadero pero no trivial tanto que los estados conceptuales lo satisfacen como que los perceptuales no. Por lo tanto, la solidez del argumento de Heck es dudosa.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Generality Constraint]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[conceptual states]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[perceptual states]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[conceptual content]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[nonconceptual content]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Requisito de Generalidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estados conceptuales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estados perceptuales]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido conceptual]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contenido no conceptual]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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