<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2018000300583</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20430/ete.v85i339.596</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Adopción de nuevas tecnologías de abatimiento y regulación ambiental en oligopolios]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Adoption of New Abatement Technologies and Environmental Regulation in Oligopolies]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gama]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Adriana]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,El Colegio de México Centro de Estudios Económicos ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>85</volume>
<numero>339</numero>
<fpage>583</fpage>
<lpage>600</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2018000300583&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2018000300583&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2018000300583&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen:  Antecedentes:  Una característica deseable en los instrumentos de regulación ambiental es que fomenten la adopción de tecnologías de abatimiento más limpias. Es natural asumir que políticas de regulación más estrictas incentivan una mayor adopción de dichas tecnologías. Sin embargo, se ha demostrado que, bajo competencia perfecta, esto no siempre es así.  Metodología:  Este artículo ofrece un estudio teórico sobre los incentivos de tres instrumentos de regulación ambiental (impuestos, permisos comerciables y estándares de emisión) en la adopción de una nueva tecnología de abatimiento para un oligopolio de Cournot.  Resultados:  Al igual que en competencia perfecta, si las curvas de costo de abatimiento marginal de dos tecnologías (una más deseable que la otra) se cruzan y las firmas tienen costos de adopción diferentes, es posible que los impuestos altos, pocos permisos comerciables y un estándar de emisión pequeño (políticas estrictas) desincentiven la adopción de tecnologías nuevas.  Conclusiones:  Al elegir un instrumento regulatorio es importante considerar la estructura de las tecnologías de abatimiento disponibles. De no hacerlo, en lugar de fomentar el uso de tecnologías más limpias, el regulador puede hacer lo contrario si las políticas son muy estrictas.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract:  Background:  A desirable property of the different environmental regulatory instruments is that they incentivize the adoption of cleaner abatement technologies. It is natural to assume that stricter regulatory policies incentivize a higher adoption of such technologies. Nonetheless, it has been shown that, under perfect competition, this is not always true.  Methodology:  This article offers a theoretical study of the incentives of three different environmental regulatory instruments (taxes, tradable permits and emission standards), on the adoption of a new abatement technology for a Cournot oligopoly.  Results:  As in perfect competition, if the marginal abatement cost curves of both technologies cross and the firms have different adoption costs, it is possible that high taxes, few tradable permits and a small emission standard (strict policies) discourage the adoption of new technologies.  Conclusions:  When choosing a regulatory instrument, it is important to take into account the structure of the available abatement technologies. Otherwise, instead of incentivizing the use of cleaner technologies, the regulator might do the opposite if the policies are too strict.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[regulación ambiental]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[costo de abatimiento]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[impuestos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[permisos comerciables]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estándares de emisión]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[oligopolio de Cournot]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[curvas MAC]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[environmental regulation]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[abatement cost]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[taxes]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[tradable permits]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[emission standards]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Cournot oligopoly]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[MAC curves]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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