<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2018000100005</article-id>
<article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.20430/ete.v85i337.658</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Uruguay: Incentivos e instituciones en una década de reformas]]></article-title>
<article-title xml:lang="en"><![CDATA[Uruguay: Incentives and Institutions in a Decade of Reforms]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Bergara]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Mario]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Milnitsky]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Sergio]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de la República Facultad de Ciencias Sociales Departamento de Economía]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<aff id="Af2">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de la República Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Uruguay</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>03</month>
<year>2018</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>85</volume>
<numero>337</numero>
<fpage>5</fpage>
<lpage>50</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2018000100005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2018000100005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2018000100005&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: El cúmulo de reformas implementadas y en proceso desde el año 2005 en Uruguay tiene un carácter estructural y conforma un cambio sustancial de las reglas de juego generales de la economía y de la sociedad uruguaya. Adicionalmente, el soporte organizacional imprescindible para que esa nueva estructura de incentivos opere efectivamente ha conducido a una reestructuración en múltiples áreas de la institucionalidad del Estado. Se hace necesario explicar por qué fue factible en Uruguay desplegar un conjunto tan relevante de reformas profundas en un corto lapso. Se aplica un enfoque de economía institucional para describir las transformaciones organizacionales y para entender cómo la institucionalidad política y el proceso de diseño e implementación afectan los resultados de las políticas públicas, además de comprender cómo esta implementación altera las condiciones y las reglas del juego original, así como el papel, los incentivos y el poder relativo de sus principales jugadores. Las reformas que apuntaron a generar nuevas estructuras de incentivos y una institucionalidad acorde para su cumplimiento tienen en su base un enfoque político-ideológico acerca del papel del Estado. Mitigar las asimetrías de información y la desigual distribución de poder económico demandan un papel compensatorio desde el aparato estatal. En la medida en que la discrecionalidad da paso a estructuras de estímulos e incentivos predeterminadas, el manejo clientelístico y elitista del poder da paso al acceso más democrático, transparente y abierto a reglas mejor especificadas.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: The structural reforms already implemented and in progress in Uruguay since 2005 imply a significant change in the rules of the game in the Uruguayan economy and society. Additionally, the organizational support required to make these new incentive structures effective has led to a relevant restructuring in several areas at the State apparatus. In order to understand why it was feasible in Uruguay to deploy such a relevant and deep reform process in a short term, we apply the Institutional Economics perspective, describing the organizational transformations and explaining how political institutions and the political game affect the policymaking process and the policy outcomes. In doing so, we also analyze the role, the incentives and the relative power of the main actors. The reform process led to new incentive structures and institutions/organizations consistent with supporting the credibility of those new rules and it implies an ideological approach regarding the role of the State. Mitigating information asymmetries and the inequitable distribution of economic power demands a compensating role from the public sector. Since discretion is supersede by better defined and open access rules, elitist and clientelistic management of power is supplanted by a more transparent and democratic political and social environment.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[instituciones]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[incentivos]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[políticas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[reformas]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[Uruguay]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[institutions]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[incentives]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[public policies]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[reforms]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="en"><![CDATA[Uruguay]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
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