<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2010000400853</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Análisis del mercado crediticio. Un enfoque de equilibrio general]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dam]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Kaniska]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas  ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Mexico</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2010</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>12</month>
<year>2010</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>77</volume>
<numero>308</numero>
<fpage>853</fpage>
<lpage>872</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2010000400853&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2010000400853&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2010000400853&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: Se analiza un modelo de contratos de incentivos en el que cada uno de los principales, que poseen la misma tecnología de supervisión que los demás, celebran contratos con agentes seleccionados de entre un grupo de individuos que difieren en cuanto a su dotación de riqueza. Los principales y los agentes están emparejados para formar sociedades y estos emparejamientos están sujetos a problemas de riesgo moral bilateral. Los agentes necesitan pedirles préstamos a los principales para poder financiar sus proyectos. En equilibrio, los pagos a los principales y agentes están determinados endógenamente. Los agentes más acaudalados obtienen pagos mayores, mientras que todos los principales obtienen el mismo pago. Se analiza también los efectos de los cambios en el costo de la supervisión y la tasa de interés libre de riesgo en la supervisión óptima y los precios de las acciones.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: I analyse a model of incentive contracts where principals who each possesses the same monitoring technology, contract with agents from a pool of individuals differing in their wealth endowments. Principals and agents are matched to form partnerships, and the matches are subject to a double-sided moral hazard problems. Agents need to borrow from the principals to finance their projects. In equilibrium, payoffs to the principals and agents are determined endogenously. Wealthier agents consume higher payoffs, whereas all principals get the same payoff. I further analyse the effects of changes in the monitoring cost and the risk-free interest rate on the optimal monitoring and stock prices.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[emparejamiento bilateral]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[estabilidad]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[contratos óptimos]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
<ref-list>
<ref id="B1">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ackerberg]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D. A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Botticini]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>2002</year>
<volume>110</volume>
<page-range>564-91</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B2">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Credit Market Equilibrium with Bank Monitoring and Moral Hazard]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Besanko]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kanatas]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Review of Financial Studies]]></source>
<year>1993</year>
<volume>6</volume>
<page-range>213-32</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B3">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Besley]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[T.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Ghatak]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The American Economic Review]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>95</volume>
<page-range>616-36</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B4">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Occupational Choice, Incentives and Wealth Distribution]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Chakraborty]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Citanna]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Economic Theory]]></source>
<year>2005</year>
<volume>122</volume>
<page-range>206-24</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B5">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Principal-Agent Matching Market]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Dam]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[K.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Frontiers of Theoretical Economics]]></source>
<year>2006</year>
<volume>2</volume>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B6">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Multi-Item Auctions]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Demange]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[G.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Gale]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sotomayor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M. O.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Journal of Political Economy]]></source>
<year>1986</year>
<volume>94</volume>
<page-range>863-72</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B7">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Grossman]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[S. J.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Hart]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[O. D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Econometrica]]></source>
<year>1983</year>
<volume>51</volume>
<page-range>7-45</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B8">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Kahn]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Mookherjee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The RAND Journal of Economics]]></source>
<year>1998</year>
<volume>29</volume>
<page-range>443-65</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B9">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Business Creation and the Stock Market]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Michelacci]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[C.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Suárez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[The Review of Economic Studies]]></source>
<year>2004</year>
<volume>71</volume>
<page-range>459-81</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B10">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard and Bank Monitoring: A Model of the Credit Channel]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Repullo]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[R.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Suárez]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[J.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[European Economic Review]]></source>
<year>2000</year>
<volume>44</volume>
<page-range>1931-50</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B11">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Roth]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[A. E.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Sotomayor]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M. O.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis]]></source>
<year>1990</year>
<publisher-loc><![CDATA[Cambridge ]]></publisher-loc>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Cambridge University Press]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B12">
<nlm-citation citation-type="journal">
<article-title xml:lang=""><![CDATA[The Assignment Game I: The Core]]></article-title>
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shapley]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[L. S.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Shubik]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[M.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[International Journal of Game Theory]]></source>
<year>1971</year>
<volume>1</volume>
<page-range>111-30</page-range></nlm-citation>
</ref>
<ref id="B13">
<nlm-citation citation-type="book">
<person-group person-group-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Von Lilienfeld-Toal]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[U.]]></given-names>
</name>
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[Mookherjee]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[D.]]></given-names>
</name>
</person-group>
<source><![CDATA[A General Equilibrium Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy Law]]></source>
<year>2007</year>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Universidad de Boston]]></publisher-name>
</nlm-citation>
</ref>
</ref-list>
</back>
</article>
