<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?><article xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
<front>
<journal-meta>
<journal-id>2448-718X</journal-id>
<journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre económico]]></journal-title>
<abbrev-journal-title><![CDATA[El trimestre econ]]></abbrev-journal-title>
<issn>2448-718X</issn>
<publisher>
<publisher-name><![CDATA[Fondo de Cultura Económica]]></publisher-name>
</publisher>
</journal-meta>
<article-meta>
<article-id>S2448-718X2008000300779</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title xml:lang="es"><![CDATA[Los programas de delación compensada para la persecución de los cárteles. Una revisión de la bibliografía]]></article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author">
<name>
<surname><![CDATA[González]]></surname>
<given-names><![CDATA[Aldo]]></given-names>
</name>
<xref ref-type="aff" rid="Aff"/>
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="Af1">
<institution><![CDATA[,Universidad de Chile Departamento de Economía ]]></institution>
<addr-line><![CDATA[ ]]></addr-line>
<country>Chile</country>
</aff>
<pub-date pub-type="pub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2008</year>
</pub-date>
<pub-date pub-type="epub">
<day>00</day>
<month>09</month>
<year>2008</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>75</volume>
<numero>299</numero>
<fpage>779</fpage>
<lpage>804</lpage>
<copyright-statement/>
<copyright-year/>
<self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&amp;pid=S2448-718X2008000300779&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_abstract&amp;pid=S2448-718X2008000300779&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><self-uri xlink:href="http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&amp;pid=S2448-718X2008000300779&amp;lng=en&amp;nrm=iso"></self-uri><abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="es"><p><![CDATA[Resumen: El artículo realiza una revisión de la bibliografía a nivel teórico respecto a la manera en que los programas de amnistía o delación compensada afectan la estabilidad de los cárteles y permiten su detección y disuasión. Sobre la base de las principales contribuciones, se presenta un modelo unificado que permite extraer los mensajes más relevantes de la bibliografía. Finalmente se entregan recomendaciones de política para la instrumentación de dichos programas.]]></p></abstract>
<abstract abstract-type="short" xml:lang="en"><p><![CDATA[Abstract: The article makes a literature review on the theory of Leniency Programs for cartels prosecution. We focus on how these programs affects cartel stability through detection and deterrence. On the base of the main contributions, we build a unified model that allows us to extract the main messages of the literature. Finally, we make policy recommendations for the implementation of these programs.]]></p></abstract>
<kwd-group>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[cárteles]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[delación compensada]]></kwd>
<kwd lng="es"><![CDATA[fiscalización de las leyes]]></kwd>
</kwd-group>
</article-meta>
</front><back>
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</article>
